Scherer & Sons, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 415, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 09 May 1962
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 31484,31484
• Citation: 142 So.2d 290
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: 50 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2216, 45 Lab.Cas. P 17,615 SCHERER & SONS, INC., a Florida corporation, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 415, international Ladies' Garment Workers Union,; Miami Joint Council of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,; all unincorporated voluntary associations; James Belluso, individually and as Business Agent of said International, and/or said Local 415, and/or said Miani Joint Council; Harry Metz, individually and as Business Agent of said International and/or said Local, and/or said Miami Joint Council; Robert Gladnick, individually and as Manager of said International, and/or said Local 415, and/or said Miami Joint Council; and the Florida Apparel Manufacturers' Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, Respondents.

Page 290

142 So.2d 290

50 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2216, 45 Lab.Cas. P 17,615

SCHERER & SONS, INC., a Florida corporation, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 415, international Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Miami Joint Council of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO; all unincorporated voluntary associations; James Belluso, individually and as Business Agent of said International, and/or said Local 415, and/or said Miani Joint Council; Harry Metz, individually and as Business Agent of said International and/or said Local, and/or said Miami Joint Council; Robert Gladnick, individually and as Manager of said International, and/or said Local 415, and/or said Miami Joint Council; and the Florida Apparel Manufacturers' Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, Respondents.

No. 31484.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 9, 1962.

Rehearing Denied July 6, 1962.

Marchant, Perkins, Cook & Schenerlein, Miami, for petitioner.

Orr & Lazar, Miami Beach, and Robert Cohn, Atlanta, Ga., for respondents International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 415, and others.

Harry B. Smith, Miami Beach, for respondent Florida Apparel Manufacturers' Assn., Inc.

THORNAL, Justice.

By a petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review a decision of a District Court of Appeal certified to us by that court as involving a question of great public interest.

We must determine whether, under the circumstances presented, state injunctive relief against a contract allegedly violative of Section 542.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is precluded by the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, under the doctrine of preemption.

The decision which we have under review is International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, et al. v. Scherer and Sons, Inc., Fla.App., 132 So.2d 359. Inasmuch as the matter is certified to us by the District Court of Appeal we may explore the entire record in arriving at our conclusion. Article V. Section 4, Florida Constitution, F.S.A.; Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard, Fla., 112 So.2d 832; Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16.

The respondent International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Local 415, hereafter referred to as the Union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the respondent Florida Apparel Manufacturers' Association. The agreement, which was dated October 25, 1960, contained the following provisions:

'Belts, covered buttons, buckles, neckwear, artificial flowers, embroideries, hemstitching, pleating and trucking on garments, etc., which are caused by members of the Association to be manufactured for them shall be made only by workers covered by collective bargaining agreements with the Union, the International, or affiliates thereof. In case a member of the Association shall have this work done by a non-Union shop, then, upon notification by the Union of this fact, the employer shall discontinue to give out such work to such non-Union shop or shops.'

The membership of the Manufacturers' Association consists of thirty-six manufacturers of ladies' garments in the greater Miami area. Petitioner Scherer is engaged primarily in the business of manufacturing belts and accessories for such garments in the same area. For a number of years prior to the agreement in question members of the Manufacturers' Association had been customers of Scherer. Because of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, which we have quoted, these members of the Manufacturers' Association thereafter refused to do business with Scherer. They based their refusal upon the prohibitions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed with the respondent Union. Scherer operates a non-union shop. Contending that the agreement constituted an unlawful restraint of trade, violative of Section 542.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., Scherer requested and obtained a temporary injunction against the continued enforcement of the agreement. It alleged and the District Court found that it proved that irreparable injury resulted from the agreement. The District Court of Appeal reversed the award of the injunction. It held in substance that the contract between the Union and Manufacturers' Association was arguably subject to condemnation as an unfair labor practice. It concluded that any state action thereon had been preempted by federal statutes even though the contract constituted a violation of the Florida Statute which prohibits such arrangements in restraint of trade. It is this decision which we must now consider.

Section 542.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., invalidates combinations in restraint of trade defined as follows, to wit:

'Any person who shall or may become engaged in any combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons, firms, corporations or associations of persons or of either two or more of them, for either, any or all of the following purposes:

'(1) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce or aids to commerce, or to create or carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit of any business authorized or permitted by the laws of this state;

'(2) To increase or reduce the price of merchandise, produce or commodities;

'(3) To prevent competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce, or commodities, or to prevent competition in aids to commerce;

'(4) To fix at any standard or figure whereby its price to the public shall be in any manner controlled or established any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, use, or consumption in this state; or * * *.'

The complaint for the temporary injunction was grounded entirely upon the alleged violation of the Florida Statute. The injunction was granted entirely on the theory that the statute had been violated. The Union defended against the injunction and obtained reversal in the District Court with the contention that the Federal Government had preempted the field of labor relations by the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. In particular, it was contended that the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Manufacturers' Association and Union was at least arguably subject to condemnation as an unfair labor practice. Hence, it was asserted that the initial determination regarding the validity of the agreement rested with the National Labor Relations Board, rather than with the state courts. The pertinent provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(e), reads in part as follows:

'(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void: * * * Provided further, that for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section the terms 'any employer', 'any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce', and 'any person' when used in relation to the terms 'any other producer, processor, or manufacturer', 'any other employer', or 'any other person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception.'

The Union likewise contended that the collective bargaining agreement was at least arguably subject to the federal prohibitions against secondary boycotts contained in 29 U.S.C.A., § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). The problem which we must resolve requires a decision as to whether the subject arrangement between the Union and the Manufacturers' Association is within the comprehension of the Taft-Hartley Act as a problem for initial consideration by the National Labor Relations Board. Otherwise stated, the Union here asserts that regardless of state legislation on the subject the power to regulate this particular type of contract has been preempted by the Congress.

Admittedly, many aspects of control of labor...