Schimmel v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-320-CR,76-320-CR |
| Citation | 267 N.W.2d 271,84 Wis.2d 287 |
| Parties | Randy W. SCHIMMEL, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
In July, 1975 the defendant, Randy W. Schimmel, was participating in a six week alcohol education and treatment program directed by the Division of Corrections at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute. The defendant was then an inmate of the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay, and had enrolled in the program pursuant to a program contract the defendant had made with the division.
On July 9, at 6:45 p. m., Dennis Sutton, a division employee in charge of the treatment program, went to the defendant's room at the institution. Sutton told the defendant that his participation in the program was not satisfactory, and that if he did not become more involved it might be necessary to return him to the reformatory. Sutton indicated that he would be willing to talk to the defendant about this matter either that night or early the next morning. Twenty minutes later, the defendant went to Sutton's office and asked that the door be closed. After some general conversation, the defendant said he was not sure he could talk to anybody that night or at any later time about what was bothering him. Sutton asked the defendant a few questions when the defendant suddenly said that he had murdered a girl and had attempted to rape her. Sutton then asked the defendant questions as to when, where and how the homicide took place. After a brief hesitation, the defendant began to freely talk about the event and eventually made a statement to the effect that he attempted to rape and then did stab a pizza restaurant waitress in Green Bay.
Sutton took notes during the interview and asked the defendant what he wanted him to do with the information. The defendant replied, "Help me," and further stated that he could not live with this anymore and that he did not want to go into the streets with this on his mind. When Sutton informed the defendant that he would have to pass the information on to the Green Bay authorities, the defendant indicated that he understood the necessity of this and said that he would be willing to talk to the Green Bay police about the matter. Although Sutton advised him during their conversation that the defendant should be aware of what he was saying, and that what he told Sutton might be used against him in a subsequent legal proceeding, Sutton did not otherwise advise the defendant of his constitutional rights.
Sutton then called the Green Bay police and two officers arrived at the institute at about midnight. Sutton went to the defendant's room, woke him, and asked him if he wanted to talk to the police. The defendant responded that he did, and after the defendant dressed, the two returned to Sutton's office.
The officers were waiting in Sutton's office when they arrived. Sutton left the room and the officers identified themselves and explained their reason for coming to see the defendant. The defendant indicated that he wanted to talk to the police officers, and the defendant was advised of his rights. The defendant followed along as one of the officers read him his rights, after which the defendant agreed to waive the rights. The defendant then made a brief oral statement of his involvement in the homicide. The officers asked him if he would be willing to repeat his statement for the purpose of making a written statement. The defendant agreed and again waived his rights by signing a written waiver. A four page written statement was then made, each page of which the defendant signed. One of the officers signed as a witness. At the conclusion of this meeting, one of the officers asked the defendant if he would help them find the knife that he had used in the homicide, and the defendant indicated he would.
On the basis of the written statement, a criminal complaint charging the defendant with first degree murder was issued. An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held to determine the admissibility of the defendant's statements. The court concluded that all of the defendant's statements were voluntary. The court also concluded that the constitutional warnings enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) were not required during Sutton's interview with the defendant and that consequently the defendant's statements to Sutton and to the police were constitutionally antiseptic and admissible.
The defendant was tried to a jury on pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. During the first phase of the bifurcated trial, evidence in addition to the defendant's statements was adduced to show that the victim had been working alone on the evening of January 3, 1972 at a pizza restaurant, and was last seen alive at approximately 7:00 p. m. Her body was found in a small bathroom in the back of the restaurant at 7:20 p. m. Her blouse was unbuttoned, but she was otherwise fully clothed. A pathologist testified that the victim died between 6:45 and 7:45 p. m. from the loss of blood from two stab wounds.
During this first phase of the trial, the defendant attempted to call a psychiatrist, Dr. Ralph Baker, to testify as to the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. The court excluded such testimony from evidence, but allowed the defendant to make a testimonial offer of proof.
The defendant then testified on his own behalf. He testified that he had an argument with his wife and that he had left the house to calm down. He went to a bar and had a drink. When he returned home, he stated, he again fought with his wife and again went to a bar. When he was returning home for the second time, the defendant recalled going into the pizza restaurant, seeing the victim, and walking towards her as the girl backed away. The defendant did not recall having the knife with him on this occasion, but did admit that he usually carried one. The defendant did not remember stabbing the girl, unbuttoning her blouse, or doing anything else to her, but did recall being in the back of the restaurant with her.
The jurors were instructed on both first and second degree murder, and they returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder.
In the second half of the bifurcated trial, the parties adduced evidence from which the jury concluded that the defendant was not suffering from mental disease or defect.
The court sentenced the defendant to the mandatory term of life imprisonment and subsequently denied defendant's post-conviction motions. Writs of error issued to review the judgment of conviction and the order denying the post-conviction motions.
Howard B. Eisenberg, State Public Defender, for plaintiff in error.
David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), with whom on the brief was Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Two issues are raised on review:
1. Whether the defendant's statements were inadmissible at trial because they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; and
2. Whether psychiatric testimony is admissible in the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial for first degree murder?
This issue concerns the defendant's statements to Dennis Sutton, the employee of the Division of Corrections, and to the Green Bay police officers on the night of July 9 and 10, 1975. With the exception of his initial comment to Sutton, that he "had murdered a girl and attempted to rape her," the defendant contends his statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He contends that the statement to Sutton was made under circumstances which required a Miranda warning and waiver, and further contends that because Sutton failed to advise him of his rights, the defendant's later statement to the police was inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree."
During the evidentiary hearing, Sutton testified as to what happened after he informed the defendant that his failure to participate in the treatment program might necessitate his return to the reformatory:
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