Schlacter v. State
| Citation | 466 N.E.2d 1 |
| Decision Date | 23 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 982S375,982S375 |
| Parties | Michael SCHLACTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
John D. Clouse, Michael C. Keating, Laurie A. Baiden, Evansville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cynthia Sue Stanley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction for robbery, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1. The case was tried by a jury. Appellant was sentenced to a term of thirty years.
Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the information gave proper notice in that it allegedly charged both class A and class B robbery; (2) whether the jury should have been instructed as to the lesser included offense of criminal recklessness; and (3) whether the court erred in excluding testimony of prior mental instability on the part of the appellant.
The facts tending to support the conviction show that appellant, Michael Schlacter, entered the Pop-A-Top liquor store in Evansville, Indiana around 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. on November 25, 1981. Appellant went to the potato chip rack and picked up a bag of chips. The owner's wife asked him twice if he had some form of identification to which appellant made no response. The owner then came around the counter and asked if he could help him. The appellant reached in his sweatshirt, pulled out a knife and stabbed the owner in the side, announcing "This is it, I want it all." The owner and his wife retreated to the backroom as the appellant waived the knife wildly. Appellant tried to open the cash register and was unsuccessful; consequently, he threw the knife at the owner and hit him in the bicep causing a superficial laceration. Appellant came charging wildly at the owner and his wife. The owner took a thirty-eight caliber pistol and shot the appellant at close range in the upper chest. The first shot did not stop him, and he continued to charge. The owner shot him again. Appellant stopped, turned and exited the store, taking some liquor as he left. Appellant ran up the street and finally fell in the grass where the police found him.
Appellant moved to dismiss this action on the basis of a defective information. Appellant alleges that the information charges both class A and class B robbery and therefore does not give proper notice as to which crime is being charged.
The form of the indictment or information must substantially comply with the form delineated in the statute and if the accused is specifically informed of the charge against him by the wording of the particular information or indictment, then the information or indictment substantially complies with the statute. Ind.Code Sec. 35-3.1-1-2 (since repealed) Sec. 35-34-1-1; Merry v. State, (1975) 166 Ind.App. 199, 335 N.E.2d 249. Defects or imperfections in an affidavit are only grounds for reversal where they prejudice substantial rights. Thorne v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 70, 292 N.E.2d 607.
Here the information completely complies with the statute, and carries on its face the express statement that the charge being made is class A robbery. Consequently, appellant's claim that he was not given proper notice because the information allegedly contained the elements of class B as well as class A robbery must fail. The appellant received proper notice and was not misled by the information. In addition he has not shown any prejudice resulting from the content of the information.
The trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss.
Appellant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury relative to criminal recklessness as a lesser included offense of robbery. The trial court refused to instruct on criminal recklessness, but did instruct on battery. The trial court also presented to the jury a general instruction on lesser included offenses.
Appellant's Instruction Number 2 stated that the offense charged in the information also includes the crime of criminal recklessness, which is defined by a statute of our State as follows:
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Seeglitz v. State
...related to an issue of insanity, is a direct question of fact for the jury and not a proper subject of expert testimony. Schlacter v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 1; Blackmon v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 586. The admission of expert testimony is within the sole discretion of the tria......
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Patterson v. State, 1084S381
...yet, we are persuaded by its argument that Patterson's substantial rights were not prejudiced by the deficiency. See, Schlacter v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 1; Johnson v. State (1982), Ind. 442 N.E.2d The key issue is whether Patterson was sufficiently apprised of the charges against h......
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Graves v. State
...arm. "Defects or imperfections in an affidavit are only grounds for reversal where they prejudice substantial rights." Schlacter v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 1, 2. Appellant has not demonstrated substantial prejudice from amending the information. Therefore, the court did not err in al......
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Reichard v. State
...a crime, not related to an issue of insanity, is a question of fact for the jury and not a proper subject for expertise. Schlacter v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 1; Simpson v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 495, 381 N.E.2d 1229. We agree with appellant that the trial court erred in ruling that T......