Schloot v. Guinevere Real Estate Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-9706-CV-258,49A04-9706-CV-258 |
| Citation | 697 N.E.2d 1273 |
| Parties | Kathie SCHLOOT and Carl Schloot, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. GUINEVERE REAL ESTATE CORP. and Duke Associates, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Kathie and Carl Schloot (collectively "Schloots") appeal the trial court's grant of Guinevere Real Estate and Duke Associates' (collectively "Duke") motion for judgment on the evidence.
We reverse and remand.
On the morning of February 6, 1992, Kathie slipped and fell in the employee parking lot of Jacobson's Department Store as she exited her vehicle to go to work. Kathie immediately began to feel pain in her lower back. As she made her way into work after the fall, Kathie noticed that the entire employee parking lot was slick and covered with ice. Kathie attempted to work that day, but the pain in her back forced her to leave work. When the pain in her back did not diminish, Kathie sought medical help. Despite various medications and medical consultations, Kathie continued to experience pain in her lower back.
Eventually, the Schloots filed a negligence suit against Duke to recover for Kathie's back injuries. During the jury trial, the Schloots attempted to admit Kathie's medical records over the objection of Duke. Relying on the business record exception to the hearsay rule 1, the trial court admitted the medical records. At the end of the Schloots' case, Duke moved for judgment on the evidence and, alternatively, partial judgment on the evidence concerning various specific back injuries. The trial court granted Duke's motion and entered judgment on the evidence in favor of Duke. The Schloots appeal this judgment.
The Schloots raise one issue on appeal which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred by granting Duke's motion for judgment on the evidence.
When reviewing a challenge to a ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence, we use the same standard as the trial court. Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. We will look only to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. "A judgment on the evidence is proper only when there is a total absence of evidence in favor of the plaintiff, that is, that the evidence is without conflict and is susceptible of only one inference and that inference is in favor of the defendant." Hampton v. Moistner, 654 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The tort of negligence consists of three elements: duty, breach of that duty, and proximate cause. Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Ind.1990). In order to justify the trial court's grant of judgment on the evidence, there must be a total absence of evidence of one of the three elements of the Schloots' negligence claim. Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. With this standard in mind, we now turn to each of the three elements of the Schloots' negligence claim.
The Schloots first argue that Duke had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Kathie from injury. Duke attacks the authority cited by the Schloots on the element of duty and argues that the trial court could have determined as a matter of law that any duty was not breached. Though couched in terms of duty, Duke is in reality attacking the evidence of breach of duty. The question of whether a duty exists is an issue of law to be determined by the trial court. Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 369. "Generally, a landowner has a common law duty to exercise care to keep his property in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees." Id.; see also Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.1991); Dunifon v. Iovino, 665 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. As the landowner, Duke had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Kathie. Because Duke owed a duty to Kathie, judgment on the evidence could not have been premised on the element of duty. Hampton, 654 N.E.2d at 1193.
Next, the Schloots argue that they presented enough evidence at trial to create the reasonable inference that Duke breached its duty by not acting to remedy the slick conditions in the parking lot. Duke contends that there was no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the slick conditions or that it knew Kathie would not be able to detect and avoid any dangerous conditions. The determination of whether Duke breached its duty to exercise reasonable care is a question of fact. Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 370. For the judgment on the evidence to have been premised on the element of breach of duty, there must not have been any evidence or reasonable inferences that Duke failed to exercise reasonable care. Hampton, 654 N.E.2d at 1193. In our review of the evidence concerning this element, we look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the Schloots. Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877.
The evidence presented by the Schloots at trial revealed that at the time of Kathie's fall on February 6th there was a large pile of snow in the employee parking lot and the parking lot had not been plowed or salted since January 26th. The evidence also revealed that temperatures on February 6th and the days immediately preceding it were above freezing during the day and below freezing at night. The Schloots argue that Duke knew or should have known that the piled snow would melt during the days and refreeze at night creating a hazardous condition. Kathie also testified that she did not detect any ice until after she had fallen. Because Kathie did not see any ice prior to her fall, the Schloots argue that Kathie could not have avoided the ice. Though this evidence is less than conclusive, it does support a reasonable inference that Duke should have known of and attempted to remedy the potentially icy conditions. Because the evidence was susceptible of an inference that Duke breached its duty, judgment on the evidence could not have been premised on a lack of evidence of breach of duty.
Finally, the Schloots claim that Kathie's testimony and the medical records admitted at trial were sufficient evidence that her fall proximately caused her injuries to prevent judgment on the evidence. Duke contends that the trial court erred by admitting the medical records and that the lack of expert medical testimony concerning the cause and nature...
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