Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hosp. of Las Vegas

• Decision Date: 31 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 25483,25483
• Citation: 910 P.2d 271,112 Nev. 42
• Parties: Debra SCHLOTFELDT, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. CHARTER HOSPITAL OF LAS VEGAS, a Nevada Corporation, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 271

910 P.2d 271

112 Nev. 42

Debra SCHLOTFELDT, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. CHARTER HOSPITAL OF LAS VEGAS, a Nevada Corporation,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

No. 25483.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Jan. 31, 1996.

Hamilton D. Moore, Las Vegas, for Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

Hafen, Mayor & Palmer, Ltd., Las Vegas, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

OPINION

YOUNG, Justice:

FACTS

On Saturday, March 4, 1989, appellant/cross-respondent Debra Schlotfeldt ("Schlotfeldt") presented herself to respondent/cross-appellant Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, a Nevada corporation ("Charter") that specializes in the treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction. Charter personnel observed that Schlotfeldt was extremely depressed and displayed rapid changes in her emotions. Schlotfeldt admitted at trial that she had abused alcohol and ingested methamphetamine prior to her admission to Charter. Schlotfeldt stated during a psychiatric examination that she gambled out of control when under the influence of drugs, was depressed for over a year and a half, and had thoughts of suicide. In a statement revealing the depth of Schlotfeldt's emotional difficulties, Schlotfeldt told Charter staff that "I don't trust myself," "I feel like I'm going crazy," and "I feel like I am at the end of my rope." After this conversation, Schlotfeldt went home to retrieve personal belongings. Escorted by her husband, Schlotfeldt returned to Charter and signed documents requesting voluntary admission and authorizing such care and treatment as ordered by her attending physician.

A Charter psychiatrist prepared an admitting diagnosis of Schlotfeldt that concluded she suffered from major depression and suicidal ideation. Anil Batra, M.D., also examined Schlotfeldt and diagnosed a major depressive disorder. On Sunday morning, March 5, 1989, Gilles M.K. Desmarais, M.D. ("Desmarais") ¹ examined Schlotfeldt. According to Charter, Desmarais was an independent doctor who was not assigned by Charter to Schlotfeldt. Instead, Desmarais attended to Schlotfeldt at the request of a Charter psychiatrist who was busy with other patients. Desmarais' examination revealed that Schlotfeldt had marital problems that led to alcohol abuse, drug use and compulsive gambling. Desmarais concluded that Schlotfeldt was a suicide risk because her severe depression of one and a half years was nearing a pinnacle.

Schlotfeldt argues that she made repeated requests to return home after the morning of March 5, 1989. Charter admits that Schlotfeldt requested to return home, but claims that because she was a suicide risk and her husband was out of town, releasing her at the time was imprudent. Desmarais urged her to stay voluntarily until her husband returned. Eventually, Desmarais allowed Schlotfeldt to leave because the effects of the drugs had worn off, she was no longer a suicide risk, and her husband had returned. Schlotfeldt spent a total of sixty-six hours at Charter.

Eighteen months later, Schlotfeldt filed suit against Charter and Desmarais. Schlotfeldt's initial complaint contained numerous claims for relief. However, all claims except the false imprisonment claim were withdrawn prior to trial. Schlotfeldt claimed she was admitted to Charter against her will and that she requested to leave Charter, but Charter and Desmarais continued to hold her against her will. Charter claimed that Schlotfeldt admitted herself voluntarily and it was obligated to urge her to remain until she was no longer a danger to herself or others. The district court excluded evidence showing Schlotfeldt was hospitalized for her psychiatric condition on multiple occasions after her

stay at the Charter facility. Also, the district court found, as a matter of law, that Charter was vicariously liable for the acts of Desmarais. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Charter and Desmarais liable for false imprisonment and awarded Schlotfeldt $50,000.00 in compensatory damages. After the district court entered a second amended judgment on the jury's verdict, Schlotfeldt and Charter appealed.

DISCUSSION

Subsequent hospitalizations

Schlotfeldt was hospitalized six times for her psychiatric condition after her sixty-six-hour stay at Charter. In her argument to the jury, however, Schlotfeldt asserted that she went to Charter because of marital problems. Further, she claimed she did not have any serious psychiatric problems and that Charter was, therefore, unjustified in admitting her for treatment. The hospitalization evidence directly contradicted Schlotfeldt's contentions and was highly probative of whether Charter's decision to detain Schlotfeldt was warranted and justified. If Schlotfeldt had a psychiatric condition that required subsequent hospitalizations, she may have had a similar condition during her stay at Charter. With this evidence, a jury could reasonably find that Charter was justified in detaining Schlotfeldt, thereby precluding a finding of false imprisonment.

The district court found that the evidence of subsequent hospitalizations was of limited probative value, that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and that a substantial delay would occur if it was presented. The district court reasoned that the subsequent hospitalization evidence would improperly color the jury's judgment in considering exactly what occurred when Schlotfeldt was admitted on March 4, 1989. According to the district court, in a false imprisonment case the knowledge of the defendant at the time of the alleged false imprisonment is of crucial importance. Because Charter was not aware of the subsequent hospitalizations at the time of the alleged false imprisonment, the district court excluded the evidence.

NRS 48.035 allows the district court to exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or undue delay. Even if evidence is otherwise admissible, a trial court may exclude the evidence after striking a proper balance between the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial dangers. Elsbury v. State, 90 Nev. 50, 53, 518 P.2d 599, 601 (1974). A district court's decision whether to exclude or admit evidence will only be reversed if it is "manifestly wrong." Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 567, 665 P.2d 798, 801 (1983).

By requiring the prejudicial effect of evidence to "substantially outweigh" its probative value, NRS 48.035 implies a favoritism toward admissibility. To merit exclusion, the evidence must unfairly prejudice an opponent, typically by challenging the emotional and sympathetic tendencies of a jury, not the jury's intellectual ability to evaluate evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. Further, a limiting instruction or other alternative method of introduction should be utilized before highly probative evidence is excluded. Mauldin v. Upjohn Co., 697 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir.1983).

In this case, the evidence of subsequent hospitalizations was extremely probative of the ultimate issue--false imprisonment. If Schlotfeldt had psychiatric problems, Charter would be justified in considering her a danger to herself and others. If Schlotfeldt voluntarily admitted herself for psychiatric treatment on later occasions, she may have admitted herself voluntarily on the occasion in question. Charter's reasoning during Schlotfeldt's initial admission and Charter's decision to urge her to stay in its facility would be explained. The intellectual abilities of the jury would not be challenged because the jury could easily understand that Charter was not aware of the subsequent hospitalizations when it admitted Schlotfeldt. Further, a limiting instruction could have directed the jury to consider the subsequent hospitalization records as only corroborating evidence that Schlotfeldt voluntarily admitted herself to Charter and that her condition explained Charter's actions in urging her to stay at its facility.

We conclude that the evidence of Schlotfeldt's subsequent hospitalizations was highly probative of the ultimate issue in this case, and because a jury instruction could have limited the prejudicial effect of the evidence, the district court was manifestly wrong in excluding the hospitalization evidence.

Agency relationship

The district court instructed the jury that Charter was vicariously liable, as a matter of law, for the acts of Desmarais. ² Based on the ostensible agency theory, the district court found that Charter should be held liable for the acts of Desmarais because he was chosen by Charter to examine Schlotfeldt. Charter opposed the instruction because it claimed an issue of fact existed as to whether an agency relationship existed between Charter and Desmarais. The district court's instruction, according to Charter, was improper and materially prejudiced its position by binding its liability to the improper acts of Desmarais.

The existence of an agency relationship is generally a question of fact for the jury if the facts showing the existence of agency are disputed, or if conflicting inferences can be drawn from the facts. Latin American Shipping Co. Inc., v. Pan American Trading Corp., 363 So.2d 578, 579-80 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978). A question of law exists as to whether sufficient competent evidence is present to require that the agency question be forwarded to a jury. In re Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 140, 18 L.Ed. 116 (1865); 3 Am.Jur.2D Agency § 362 (1986).

Determining whether an issue of fact exists for a jury to decide is similar to determining whether a genuine issue of fact is present to preclude summary judgment. In Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 105 Nev. 348, 351-52, 775 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1989), this court affirmed a summary judgment order that found, as a matter of law, that agency did not exist between a hospital and a doctor. The Oehler court stated that "[a] hospital is not vicariously liable for acts of physicians who are neither employees nor agents of the hospital." Id. at 351...