Schluckebier v. Arlington Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

Decision Date01 December 1959
PartiesDonald SCHLUCKEBIER, Respondent, v. ARLINGTON MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO., a Wisconsin corporation, Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

Rogers & Owens, Portage, John T. Howard, Madison, Horace W. Wilkie, Wilkie, Anderson & Bylsma, Madison, of counsel, for appellant.

Hall & Griffith, Madison, for respondent.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

Respondent is the owner of a farm in the town of Burke, Dane county. Effective January 1, 1957, appellant issued a standard town mutual policy insuring respondent's farm property against damage or loss resulting from fire and lightning. In the policy a barn was insured in the amount of $16,000. Attached to the original policy is a supplemental coverage endorsement providing 'In consideration of the premium charged, and subject to provisions and stipulations (hereinafter referred to as 'provisions') herein and in the policy to which this Supplemental Coverage is attached, including riders and endorsements thereon, the coverage of this policy is extended to include direct loss by:

'1. * * *

'2. Collision with falling or moving bodies or vehicles.

'3. * * *'

On February 25, 1957 another endorsement was added to the policy to provide additional insurance for a milker, water heater and milking equipment, in the amount of $3,600.

On September 14, 1958, while the policy was in full force and effect, a silo adjacent to the barn referred to above collapsed and so damaged the barn as to render it a complete loss. Damage to the milking equipment in the barn was $1,978.

Claim was made under that provision of the endorsement extending coverage to direct loss by 'collision with falling or moving bodies * * *' Appellant denied coverage, contending that its liability under said clause is limited to loss resulting from falling aircraft and objects falling therefrom under the following provision of the endorsement:

'Provisions Applicable Only to Loss by Falling or Moving Bodies or Vehicles: * * * Loss by falling or moving bodies shall include direct loss by aircraft and direct loss by objects falling therefrom. Loss by falling or moving bodies * * * shall include only direct loss resulting from actual physical contact of a falling or moving body * * * with the property covered hereunder or with the building containing the property covered hereunder. This Company shall not be liable, however, for loss * * * (c) to any aircraft or vehicle including contents thereof other than stocks of aircraft or vehicles in process of manufacture or for sale.'

Appellant points out that it is a town mutual fire insurance company and maintains that because the parties here involved are a group constituting the members of the company on the one hand and the insured on the other, public policy requires that the group be favored over the individual in any construction of the policy terms. There is no question of public policy here.

Construction of the standard form of policy is not before us. We are concerned only with the endorsement as to additional coverage. The endorsement is not in a statutory form. All that the legislature has done, sec. 202.08, Stats., is authorize town mutuals to write, in addition to fire and lightning, certain other 'classifications of perils,' among which is 'collision with falling or moving bodies or vehicles.' But the legislature left to the companies the right to prescribe and define the policy terms with respect to the additional perils. Thus, in case of ambiguity in such terms, they must be construed against the insurer in accordance with the well established rule that:

'* * * in case of reasonable uncertainty, doubt, or ambiguity, courts should construe policies of insurance which are not standard policies, i. e., prescribed by statute, 'strictly,' or 'most strongly' against the insurer.' Merritt v....

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11 cases
  • Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 1, 1983
    ...would be to accord it the exceptional rather than the commonly accepted meaning." See also Schluckebier v. Arlington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 480, 484, 99 N.W.2d 705 (1959).13 It is clear that the use of the word "includes" in sec. 632.32(4)(a) 2, rather than the word "means," was purpo......
  • RTE Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1976
    ...possible. United Bank of Peublo v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976); Schluckebier v. Arlington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 480, 99 N.W.2d 705 (1959); Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 470, 232 N.W. 848 (1930); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit......
  • Cuna v. Board of Fire Com'rs, Avenel
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 4, 1964
    ...intended; or (2) that the thing which is stated constitutes only one of the things intended. Schluckebier v. Arlington Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 480, 99 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Sup.Ct.1959). Ordinarily the term 'include' is a word of enlargement and not of limitation. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S.......
  • Mutual Federal S & L Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • April 9, 1973
    ...151 N.W.2d 17. "(L)anguage of a contract is to be accorded its popular and usual significance." Schluckebier v. Arlington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1959), 8 Wis.2d 480, 483, 99 N.W.2d 705, 707. In North Gate Corp. v. National Food Stores (1966), 30 Wis.2d 317, 321, 140 N.W.2d 744, 747, this cou......
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