Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | INC,ANHEUSER-BUSC,No. 97-1603,97-1603 |
| Citation | 132 F.3d 455 |
| Parties | 75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1358, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,121 Rosemary SCHLUETER, Plaintiff--Appellant, v., a Corporation, Defendant--Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Louis Gilden, St. Louis, MO, argued (Charles R. Oldham, on the brief), for appellant.
Susan Nell Rowe, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellee.
Lamon N. White, Washington, DC, argued, for amicus curiae.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Rosemary Schlueter filed suit against her employer Anheuser-Busch, Inc. ("Anheuser") alleging discrimination based on her sex, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e--2000e-17 (1994) ("Title VII"), and age, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) ("ADEA"). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Anheuser after determining that Schlueter did not file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination as required by Title VII and the ADEA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Schlueter appeals claiming that the district court should have determined that her EEOC Intake Questionnaire, which she filed with the EEOC within the 300-day period, was a valid charge of discrimination. Schlueter alternatively argues that the district court should have tolled the 300-day filing period based on equitable considerations. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Schlueter worked for Anheuser in various capacities from 1951 through 1955 and again from 1965 through April 23, 1993. Schlueter announced her retirement in early April of 1993. She claims that her decision to retire was brought on by intolerable discrimination based on her sex and age. Schlueter's last day of work with Anheuser was April 23, 1993; however, she used earned vacation time to extend her official date of retirement to May 31, 1993.
Schlueter spoke with an attorney on January 27, 1994. 1 The attorney advised Schlueter to go to the EEOC office to file a charge of discrimination. On January 28, 1994, Schlueter went to the EEOC office for the express purpose of filing a charge. Schlueter communicated her intent to EEOC employee, Lynn Morgan. Morgan directed Schlueter to complete an Intake Questionnaire which Schlueter did. Schlueter's Questionnaire indicates that her last day of employment was May 31, 1993, but reports that the most recent date of alleged discrimination was in April of 1993. Schlueter's Questionnaire states her belief that she was discriminated against because she is a woman. Specifically, Schlueter's Questionnaire states: See Schlueter's App. at 63. Schlueter's Intake Questionnaire does not contain any allegation that she was discriminated against based on her age.
When Schlueter completed her Intake Questionnaire, Morgan advised her that she would have to return to the EEOC to complete more paperwork. Morgan scheduled an appointment for Schlueter to meet with EEOC employee Althea Bolden on February 24, 1994. When Schlueter left the EEOC office on January 28, she believed she had done everything necessary to file a charge of discrimination. Schlueter met with Bolden on February 24, and Bolden requested that she complete an official charge of discrimination. Schlueter filled out the charge, noting that Anheuser discriminated against her based on sex and age. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on November 30, 1995.
On April 11, 1996, Schlueter filed Title VII and ADEA claims against Anheuser. Anheuser filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Schlueter failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC because, using April 23, 1993 as the last date of alleged discriminatory action, Schlueter's charge was due February 18, 1994, but Schlueter did not file her charge until February 24. Schlueter countered Anheuser's motion with three arguments: (1) the 300-day filing period did not begin to run until May 31, 1993, because that was her last official day of employment; (2) she filed a valid charge on January 28, 1994, when she filed her Intake Questionnaire because, under 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.12(b), 1626.8(c) (1997), her formal charge of February 24, 1994, relates back to the date she completed her Intake Questionnaire; and (3) the 300-day filing period should be tolled based on equitable considerations. The district court rejected each of these arguments and granted Anheuser's motion for summary judgment.
Schlueter appeals arguing that her charge was timely because, when she filed it on February 24, 1994, it related back to the filing of her Intake Questionnaire on January 28, 1994. Schlueter also contends that the district court erred when it refused
to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to the 300-day filing period. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Hamilton v. West, 30 F.3d 992, 993 (8th Cir.1994). "Summary judgment is proper if, based on the pleadings and affidavits, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. "In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.
We first discuss Schlueter's Title VII claim. Schlueter contends that the district court should not have granted summary judgment on her Title VII claim because she completed her Intake Questionnaire within the 300-day filing period. Schlueter reasons that when she filed her charge on February 24, 1994, the charge related back to the January 28 completion of her Intake Questionnaire; therefore, the charge was timely based on the initial filing of her Intake Questionnaire. Schlueter's argument appears well taken. Nonetheless, we are bound by Eighth Circuit case law which holds that "[i]n Title VII cases, intake questionnaires do not satisfy the statutory requirements for a charge because they are not verified." 2 Diez v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 88 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir.1996). See also Hodges v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 990 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir.1993). But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1997) (). Because Schlueter's Intake Questionnaire did not amount to a charge of discrimination under Title VII, her formal charge of February 24, 1994 could not relate back to the filing of the Intake Questionnaire.
Schlueter also argues that the district court should have applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to the 300-day filing period. We agree. "[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); accord Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1159 (8th Cir.1989). "[E]quitable tolling is premised on the plaintiff's excusable neglect, which may or may not be attributable to the defendant." Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 306 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 299, 133 L.Ed.2d 205 (1995). After a careful review of the record, we conclude that Schlueter's failure to file a charge within the 300-day filing period was due to excusable neglect.
Schlueter went to the EEOC office on January 28, 1994 for the express purpose of filing a charge of discrimination. She told EEOC employee Morgan she intended to file a charge. With knowledge of Schlueter's intent, Morgan gave her an Intake Questionnaire rather than a charge form. Morgan then requested that Schlueter return to the EEOC office on February 24, 1994. There is evidence in the record which tends to show that the EEOC used the date of May 31, 1993 (Schlueter's last day of employment), rather than April 23, 1993 (the last day of alleged discriminatory action), to calculate when the 300-day filing period would expire. Evidence also exists which indicates that the EEOC considered Schlueter's Intake Questionnaire to be a valid charge (or believed that her charge would relate back to the completion of the Intake Questionnaire). Whichever of these beliefs the EEOC may have held, they were mistaken, and we will not hold Schlueter responsible for the EEOC's mistake. Cf. Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir.1982). 3 Schlueter left the EEOC office with the belief that she had done everything necessary to file a charge. Under the circumstances of this case, her belief was reasonable. 4 Therefore, we conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply, and we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on Schlueter's Title VII claim.
We now turn to Schlueter's arguments concerning her ADEA claim. The ADEA does not require that charges be verified. However, in Diez, this Court stated that "the EEOC does not intend the [intake] questionnaires to routinely function as [charges]." 88 F.3d at 676. Whether a plaintiff intended an Intake Questionnaire to function as a charge must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In each case, we ask whether "the circumstances indicate that the claimant intended to activate the machinery of the ADEA by lodging the questionnaire with the agency." Id. In this case, Schlueter's Intake Questionnaire did not indicate that she intended to file a charge of discrimination under the ADEA because it did not contain an allegation of discrimination based on age. The only allegations made in Schlueter's Intake Questionnaire relate to discrimination based on sex....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lucht v. Encompass Corp.
...questionnaire as a formal charge; and where the EEOC used the wrong date to calculate the limitations period. Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir.1998). The EEOC "w[as] mistaken, and [the court] will not hold [plaintiff] responsible for the EEOC's mistake." Id.; se......
-
Donnelly v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center
...cannot constitute a charge of discrimination for purposes of meeting the relevant statute of limitations, citing Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455 (8th Cir.1998) (Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act) ("ADEA"), and Hodges v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 990 F.2d 103......
-
Bumpass v. Verizon Wireless
...151 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1998); Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 132 F.3d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1998); Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458 (8th Cir. 1998). All of these cases pre-date the Supreme Court's decision in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002), wh......
-
Wilkes v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co.
...claimant's failure to adhere to those requirements may be excusable, and thus, equitable tolling may apply." Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 459 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (in a pre-Edelman analysis, permitting equitable tolling because the EEOC mistakenly gave the claimant an int......
-
Filing charges and lawsuits
...charge form, rather than “Age” box; court held plainti൵ failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. , 132 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 1998) (failure to allege age discrimination on intake form made charge untimely). Taking a more reasonable approach, the Eighth Circ......
-
Summary judgment
...and iled suit within 90 days of receiving the EEOC notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) Schlueter v. AnheuserBusch, Inc ., 132 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 1998); Lawrence v. Cooper Communities , Inc., 132 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that plainti൵s who followed, albeit inaccurate di......
-
Administrative process
...the charging party followed the directions of the EEOC and those directions resulted in the late iling. Schlueter v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 1998); Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, 132 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 1998). For example, if the EEOC advises the employee that it cannot......