Schlukebier v. LaClair
| Decision Date | 17 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 39131,39131 |
| Citation | 268 Minn. 64,127 N.W.2d 693 |
| Parties | Arthur J. SCHLUKEBIER individually and dba Schlukebier Meat Market, Respondent, v. John P. LaCLAIR, Appellant, and Marie M. Tague, Edward Tague and Town and Country Motors, Inc., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In trial of an action arising out of an intersection accident, it was not error for the court to deny defendant's requested instruction with reference to reduced-speed statute, Minn.St. 169.14, subd. 3, where the record failed to indicate that any special hazards existed at the time and place of the accident which would warrant such an instruction. A court may refuse to give a requested instruction where it is without basis in the record and not applicable to the situation disclosed by it or assumes facts not supported by the evidence.
2. It is not error to deny a request for specific instructions if the substance of the request is covered in the charge as a whole.
3. It was not error for the trial court to deny a requested instruction as to the provision of § 169.68 relating to the requirement of sounding an audible warning by horn, where, under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the failure to sound a horn in no way contributed to the accident.
4. It was not error for the trial court to deny a request for instructions as to the provisions of § 169.67, subd. 5, relating to performance standards of brakes, where the record disclosed no evidence indicating defective brakes prior to the accident and where such instruction would only permit the jury to speculate as to facts not supported by the record.
5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining an objection to the opinion of a witness as to the speed of an automobile where the opinion sought was based upon conclusions as to physical facts which were available to the jury rather than upon the basis of the witness' observation of the speed of the automobile prior to the collision.
Rischmiller, Wasche & Hedelson, John E. Wasche, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Richard T. Malone, St. Paul, A. Paul Lommen, Minneapolis, Mansur & Mansur, St. Paul, for respondents.
This is an appeal from an order of the municipal court of St. Paul denying a motion for a new trial in an action for damages to real estate following a collision between two automobiles. It was agreed by all the parties that plaintiff was entitled to recover a stipulated amount of damages. They only issue to be determined was the liability of the various defendants.
The collision involved an Oldsmobile automobile driven by defendant John P. LaClair which came in contact with a DeSoto automobile owned by defendant Town and Country Motors, Inc., and driven by defendant Marie M. Tague. The DeSoto was stalled, and immediately before the collision was being pushed by the driver's husband, defendant Edward Tague, who was driving a Mercury automobile. By answers to special interrogatories, the jury found defendant John P. LaClair liable and exonerated defendants Marie and Edward Tague. The trial court made its order for entry of judgment in the amount fixed by stipulation, and defendant LaClair appealed. It is his principal contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give certain requested instructions to the jury.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it appears that on the night of November 3, 1960, Town and Country Motors, Inc., had loaned the Tagues a 1953 DeSoto automobile. The motor of this automobile had stalled, and an attempt was made to start it by pushing the automobile with the Tagues' Mercury. The accident occurred at the intersection of Stryker Avenue and Winifred Street in the city of St. Paul at about 7:30 p.m. At the place of the accident Stryker Avenue runs north and south with stop signs at the intersection of Winifred Street, a through thoroughfare. Defendant LaClair, with a passenger in the front seat, was driving north on Stryker Avenue. The Tagues were proceeding west on Winifred Street. They approached the intersection at a speed of about 23 m.p.h. Both the Tagues saw defendant LaClair approach the intersection from the left. As the DeSoto automobile entered the intersection, Mr. Tague, apprehending that LaClair was not going to stop in obedience to the stop sign, applied his brakes. Mrs. Tague made the same observation and applied the brakes on the DeSoto automobile. LaClair entered the intersection without stopping, and as his automobile passed in front of the DeSoto, Mrs. Tague attempted to turn to the left but was unable to avoid the accident. The right front of the DeSoto collided with the rear fender of LaClair's Oldsmobile. Thereafter Mrs. Tague lost control of the DeSoto and proceeded forward a distance of about 60 feet and came to rest against a retaining wall on plaintiff's property, causing the damage which is the subject of this action. The issue of negligence of Town and Country Motors, Inc., was not submitted to the jury, and no objection was taken to this action.
The trial court gave the jury the usual basic instructions, including a clear and concise definition of 'negligence,' 'reasonable care,' and 'proximate cause' and instructions for their application. The court further correctly instructed the jury on the subject of lookout and the statutes relating to speed restrictions (Minn.St. 169.14, subd. 1), right-of-way (§ 169.01, subd. 45) and rules relating to through highways and highways with stop signs (§ 169.20, subd. 3), vehicle lighting (§ 169.48), and speed limits where no special hazards exist (§ 169.14, subd. 2).
1. Appellant asserts as error the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury with reference to the so-called reduced-speed statute, Minn.St. 169.14, subd. 3, which provides:
'The driver of any vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements, drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.'
It is apparently appellant's position that the presence of the LaClair car at or near the intersection created a special hazard which warranted the reading of this statute to the jury. In considering this objection it is necessary to keep in mind that the court may refuse to give a requested instruction, even though it correctly states the law, where it is without basis in the record and not applicable to the situation disclosed by it; where it assumes facts not supported by the evidence; or where it is included in or fully covered by instructions given. Bruno v. Belmonte, 252 Minn. 497, 90 N.W.2d 899; Daugherty v. May Brothers Co., 265 Minn. 310, 121 N.W.2d 594; Fenton v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 252 Minn. 75, 89 N.W.2d 404; Oldendorf v. Eide, 260 Minn. 458, 110 N.W.2d 310; Hammond v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 257 Minn. 330, 101 N.W.2d 441; 8 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 1019; 19 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 9774.
The precise question raised by appellant was considered in Neal v. Neal, 238 Minn. 292, 297, 56 N.W.2d 673, 677. There we said that in a through highway intersection case, where the speed of the driver on the through highway is lawful and the application of the reduced-speed statute is predicated solely upon the presence of an intersection and 'none of the other factors specifically enumerated in § 169.14, subd. 3, are present, to hold that the reduced-speed statute requires the driver on the arterial highway to always reduce his speed when approaching and crossing in intersection protected by stop signs would be both unreasonable and impractical.' The Tagues, driving on a through highway, had a right to assume that the LaClair automobile approaching the stop sign would stop, until they had an opportunity to observe the contrary. Fickling v. Nassif, 208 Minn. 538, 294 N.W. 848; Schleuder v. Soltow, 239 Minn. 453, 59 N.W.2d 320.
Accordingly, the provisions of § 169.14, subd. 3, would not be applicable to the Tagues until such time as they reasonably should have seen that the LaClair car was not going to stop and that danger was imminent unless the speed was reduced. It is apparent from the record here that the Tagues were not aware of the fact that LaClair was not going to stop until it was too late for Mrs. Tague to do anything about it. See, Schleuder v. Soltow, supra; Adelmann v. Elk River Lbr. Co., 242 Minn. 388, 65 N.W.2d 661.
2. Moreover, it should be noted that the only special hazard in the whole situation was the fact that Mrs. Tague's automobile was being pushed rather than operating under its own power. But any hazard arising from this fact applied equally to all portions of the thoroughfare, not just to the intersection. This condition was covered in the charge by the instruction on § 169.14, subd. 1, which provides in part:
'No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.'
It is not error to deny a request for a specific instruction if the substance of it is adequately covered in the charge as a whole. Fenton v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 252 Minn. 75, 89 N.W.2d 404.
3. It is next contended by appellant that the trial court erred in denying a requested instruction with respect to the provision of § 169.68 relating to the requirement of sounding an audible warning by horn. That section provides in part as follows:
'* * * The driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audible warning with his horn, but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway.'
This assignment of error may be disposed of by observing that on the record before us it...
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