Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co.
Decision Date | 17 November 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 52622,52622 |
Citation | 739 S.W.2d 765 |
Parties | 110 Lab.Cas. P 56,019 William C. SCHMALZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARDY SALT COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Dallas W. Cox, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Joseph L. Leritz, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from the order of the court granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's seven count petition. The petition was based upon plaintiff's employment by defendant Hardy Salt Co. and the termination of that employment. We affirm.
Plaintiff was hired by Hardy Salt in August 1982 pursuant to a written contract. The agreement does not state a term of employment. It did contain the following severance provision:
(Emphasis supplied).
In April 1983, plaintiff was requested to resign his position. He was told if he did not do so he would be immediately fired. We accept plaintiff's assertions that his termination resulted from his romantic involvement with the executive secretary of the chairman of the board, defendant T. Walter Hardy, and the plans of plaintiff and the secretary to marry after each had divorced their present spouses. We will also accept arguendo plaintiff's contention that such grounds did not constitute "cause." Plaintiff executed a letter of resignation and at the same time signed a release. We find it unnecessary to address the question of whether a resignation executed under a threat of being fired is a "voluntary separation" or an "involuntary termination."
That release provided that:
Plaintiff continued in his employment with Hardy Salt through July 1983. Plaintiff's petition sought recovery for (1) breach of contract, (2) prime facie tort for wrongful termination, (3) fraudulent misrepresentation of the contract, (4) two counts of invasion of privacy, (5) tortious interference with contract and (6) outrage. The last count has not been pursued on appeal. All of these counts are factually based upon conduct connected with plaintiff's employment or its termination.
Defendants contend that plaintiff has fully released them from all liability under the contract or for matters connected with his employment or its termination. Plaintiff asserts that the release lacks consideration, that it was waived by plaintiff's continued employment, and that it was executed under duress. Underlying the consideration claim is plaintiff's conclusion that the employment contract entitled him to six months severance pay. This is based on his interpretation of the contract as authorizing such pay unless he was terminated for poor performance or for cause. Defendants interpret the contract as limiting severance pay to termination due solely to discontinuation of the company's operations, reorganization or similar reasons. Both parties agree the termination did not arise from such causes.
We need not resolve the meaning of the contract. At best for plaintiff's position it is ambiguous on his right to severance pay. Because no definite term of employment is contained in the contract it constituted a contract for employment at will. Haith v. Model...
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...(five months too long); DiMartino v. Hartford, 636 F.Supp. 1241, 1252 (D.Conn.1986) (two months too long); Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 767-68 (Mo.App.1987) (three months too long); Powell v. Oman Construction Co., 25 A.D.2d 566, 566, 267 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1966) (eleven months too......
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Berardi v. Meadowbrook Mall Co.
...the content of what he is signing he cannot claim the execution of the release was a product of duress." Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (citing Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir.1985)). While the presence of counsel will not ......
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Gustin v. FDIC, 93-0054-CV-W-1.
...therefore void.9 Whether particular facts are sufficient to constitute duress is a question of law for the court. Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo.App.1987); Anselmo, 771 F.2d at 419-20. The Court finds that the facts underlying Gustin's claim of duress in signing the Sett......
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Stone Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp.
...the courts of Missouri have uniformly rejected attempts to void contracts under a theory of economic duress. See Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo.Ct. App.1987) ("Where an experienced business man takes sufficient time, seeks the advice of counsel and understands the conten......