Schmalz v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
Decision Date | 20 December 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 890269,890269 |
Citation | 449 N.W.2d 817 |
Parties | Lee M. SCHMALZ, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Evans & Moench, Ltd., Bismarck, for appellant; argued by Kenneth S. Rau.
Dean J. Haas (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, Bismarck, for appellee.
Lee Schmalz appeals from a district court judgment upholding the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau's dismissal of his claim for benefits for injuries resulting from a heart attack he suffered during the course of his employment. We affirm.
Schmalz is a self-employed appliance, service, and refrigerator technician doing business under the name of Schmalz Appliance Service. He does his work in a garage which is approximately ten by twenty feet in size and twelve feet high. At the time of the heart attack, the garage did not provide for any fresh air ventilation.
Schmalz's work requires the use of an acetylene-oxygen torch to unsweat pipe connections. Some freon generally remains in the refrigeration tubing, and when heated, produces an odor and breaks down into a number of gases. The acetylene-oxygen torch also produces several gases including nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide. When reassembling the units, silver solder and cadmium flux are used which may produce gases when heated.
On November 29, 1984, Schmalz went into his shop at about 8:00 or 8:30 a.m. He began installing a compressor, using his acetylene torch, a task which is entirely usual and routine for him. He testified that he had been working on the compressor only minutes before experiencing chest pain. Schmalz sustained a heart attack, which was defined as death of heart muscle attributable to an inadequate supply of oxygen to the heart muscle.
Schmalz filed an application for workers compensation benefits on December 10, 1984. The Bureau dismissed the claim by order dated February 8, 1985. Schmalz failed to present any additional evidence and the order of dismissal was affirmed on December 10, 1986. He requested a formal hearing which was held on August 17, 1988. The Bureau issued an order reaffirming dismissal, based on additional evidence introduced at the hearing and its review of the entire record, on February 8, 1989. The Bureau, in its order reaffirming dismissal, determined:
The Bureau obtained the opinion of a cardiologist, Dr. Walter E. Frank. Dr. Frank indicates that approximately 90 percent of the individuals who suffer a heart attack have, as precipitating cause of the heart attack, the development of a blood clot which closes off an already narrowed blood vessel. There is no evidence that an exposure to these gases in any way leads the development of a blood clot.
Schmalz appealed from the Bureau's decision to the district court. The district court affirmed the decision of the Bureau in a judgment dated June 7, 1989. Schmalz then appealed to this Court.
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court involving the decision of an administrative agency, our review is limited to an examination of the decision of the agency and not the decision of the district court. Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576 (N.D.1986); Skjefte v. Job Service North Dakota, 392 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1986); Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D.1979).
Our review of administrative agency decisions involves a three-step process: (1) Are the findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence? (2) Are the conclusions of law sustained by the findings of fact? (3) Is the agency decision supported by the conclusions of law? Falcon v. Williams County Social Service Board, 430 N.W.2d 569 (N.D.1988); Otto v. Job Service North Dakota, 390 N.W.2d 550 (N.D.1986). In Skjefte, supra, this Court summarized the standards we use in reviewing administrative agency decisions as follows:
Section 65-05-05, N.D.C.C., provides for the payment of compensation and other benefits to employees who have "been injured in the course of their employment." The term "injury," as used in section 65-05-05, N.D.C.C., has been construed by this Court to mean "compensable injury" as defined in section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C. 2 See Grace, supra. The relevant part of the definition that controls this case reads:
"If an injury is due to heart attack or stroke, such heart attack or stroke must be causally related to the worker's employment, with reasonable medical certainty, and must have been precipitated by unusual stress."
Section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C.
The legislative history of the 1977 amendment to section 65-01-02(7), N.D C.C., to require "unusual stress" in cases of heart attacks or strokes is well documented:
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