Schmalz v. Wooley

• Decision Date: 14 November 1898
• Parties: SCHMALZ v. WOOLEY et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

41 A. 939

57 N.J.E. 303

SCHMALZ

v. WOOLEY et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 14, 1898.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from court of chancery.

Bill by Frederick W. Sclimalz, who sues in behalf of an unincorporated association, against Edwin Wooley and Frederick S. Crane. Demurrer to bill sustained (39 Atl. 539). and plaintiff appeals. Revetsed.

J. A. Beecher, for appellant.

Wm. B. Guild, for respondents.

DIXON, J. The bill in this case was filed in February, 1897, by the president of the Union Hat Makers' Association of Newark, for the use and benefit of all the members thereof, to enjoin the defendants from using a counterfeit trade-mark and label made in imitation of a trade-mark and label which had been adopted and filed by the said association in accordance with the provisions of the several acts of the legislature passed in the years 1889, 1892, and 1895 (3 Gen. St. p. 3678 et seq.). The defendants demurred to the bill, and, the demurrer having been sustained, the complainant appeals.

The act of 1889 is entitled "An act to provide for the adoption of labels, trade marks and forms of advertising by associations or unions of workingmen, and to regulate the same." It provides (section 1) that it shall be lawful for associations and unions of workingmen to adopt, for their protection, labels, trade-ma rks, and forms of advertisement, announcing that goods manufactured by members of such associations or unions are so manufactured; (section 4) that every such association or union adopting a label, trade-mark, or form of advertisement as aforesaid shall file the same in the office of the secretary of state, by leaving two copies, counterparts, or facsimiles thereof, with said secretary; and (section 5) that every such association or union adopting, etc., may proceed by suit in the courts of this state to enjoin the manufacture, use, display, or sale of any counterfeit of their label, trade mark, or form of advertisement; and that all courts having jurisdiction thereof shall grant such an injunction. The demurrants do not deny that the bill presents a case in conformity with this act, except in this respect: That under the act the bill should be filed by the association, or all its members, and not by one member alone. In our opinion, the act empowers the association to proceed by suit, making it for this purpose a quasi corporation, and therefore does not of itself entitle a single member to maintain the action. But this objection is obviated by section 4 of the act of 1892. if valid, which provides for the bringing of such proceedings in the name of any member duly authorized by the association or union for that purpose. We are therefore brought to the main question raised as to these statutes.

The demurrants contend that the act of 1889 violates that provision of the constitution (article 4, § 7, par. 11) which forbids the passage of private, local, or special laws granting to any association, corporation, or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever. Their position is that, as the privileges of this act are confined to associations or unions of workingmen for the protection of goods manufactured by their members, and are not offered to other workingmen who may not choose to form associations or unions, or to persons generally, the privileges are therefore exclusive, and the act is special. We do not agree to this conclusion. All the legislation of the state respecting societies, associations, and corporations is based upon the idea that privileges which are denied to single individuals may be conferred upon groups of persons; and nothing in the constitution was intended to subvert this doctrine. If the legislature offers to any class of persons privileges peculiarly appropriate to their class, on condition that several of them shall unite for the purpose of accepting and exercising them, the constitution will not thereby be infringed. The privileges of this act are offered to all workingmen engaged in the manufacture of goods, who thus unite, and they relate to goods of every description manufactured by them. Certainly workingmen engaged in the manufacture of goods constitute a distinct class of persons, and there is a manifest appropriateness in enabling any of there who comply with the act to provide and protect a mark distinguishing the products of their labor and skill. Nor is it at all necessary that a similar privilege should be given to those who are not working-men, but are only employers of workingmen. Such persons stand in a different class with respect to the exercise of those faculties which the legislature intended to foster. We think this act is constitutional.

The act of 1892, with its amendment of 1895, seems not to be exposed to the objection just considered; for their provisions extend to any persons and any associations or union of workingmen adopting a label or trade-mark to distinguish any merchandise or product of labor made, packed, or put on sale by such persons, association, or union. But these acts are assailed on the ground that their titles do not comply with that provision of the constitution (article 4, § 7, par. 4) which declares that "to avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The title of the act of 1892 is, "A further supplement to an act entitled 'An act to protect trade marks and labels.'" That of the act of 1895 is, "An act to amend an act entitled 'A further supplement,'" etc. (quoting the title of the act of 1892). The objection urged is that there existed no act entitled "An act to protect trade marks and labels," and therefore entitling these acts as supplements or amendments of such an act was misleading. But, conceding this, the inquiry is not concluded. The question still remains, was the title misleading as to the object of the act? Did not the title, in spite of its false assumption of the existence of a prior statute, fairly express the object of the proposed legislation? On reading the act it will be perceived that its object is to protect trade-marks and labels, and that for this purpose it is a complete and independent enactment. To express that object in the title, no particular form of words is required, nor is it necessary that the object would be expressed with precision. It is enough if the title be so phrased as to inform the legislators and the public of the subject-matter of the act. As was said by Mr. Justice Depue in Grover v. Ocean Grove, 45 N. J. Law, 399, 404, "The standard uniformly adopted for determining whether the legislature has complied with the constitutional requirement is whether the title of ...