Schmidt v. Avco Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-473,84-473
• Citation: 15 Ohio St.3d 310,15 OBR 439,473 N.E.2d 822
• Parties: , 15 O.B.R. 439 SCHMIDT et al., Appellants, v. AVCO CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 310

15 Ohio St.3d 310

473 N.E.2d 822, 15 O.B.R. 439

SCHMIDT et al., Appellants, v. AVCO CORPORATION et al., Appellees.

No. 84-473.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 31, 1984.

Drew, Ward & Graf Co., L.P.A., Richard H. Ward and William R. Graf, Cincinnati, for appellants.

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Robert G. Stachler, Thomas R. Schuck, Dinsmore & Shohl, Mark A. Vander Laan and Stephen S. Eberly, Cincinnati, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The sole issue presented in this case is whether the trial court properly refused to certify this case as a class action. This court holds that the denial of class certification herein did not rise to the level of abuse of discretion and accordingly upholds the rulings of the lower courts.

The law to be applied to this case is not in dispute. It is well-established that a trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a class action may be maintained. Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, a trial court's determination as to class certification will not be disturbed. See, e.g., Vinci v. American Can Co. (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 98, 459 N.E.2d 507. It is within this context that this court addresses the specifics of this class action determination.

In order to maintain a class action, the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) and 23(B) must be met. Four prerequisites must be satisfied under Civ.R. 23(A) and the failure to satisfy any one of the four will result in the denial of certification:

"(A) One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."

In addition, it must also be shown the action comes within the purview of at least one of three types of class actions described in Civ.R. 23(B). The focus in this case has been on Civ.R. 23(B)(3) which provides as follows:

"[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. * * * "

Applying these standards to the instant case, while remaining mindful that the failure to meet any one of these prerequisites will defeat a request for class certification, this court cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying certification. Specifically, this court finds that there is ample support in the record to support the lower courts' determinations that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class do not predominate over any questions affecting only individual members or that a class action is not superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy fairly and efficiently as is required by Civ.R. 23(B)(3).

In reaching this determination, this court has been guided by generally accepted interpretations of the requirements of Civ.R. 23(B)(3) as well as by the specific guidelines outlined in the rule. Thus, while what is meant by "predominate" is not made clear by the rule, it is generally held that in determining whether common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues, it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist; rather, the common questions must represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication. And, in determining whether a class action is a superior method of adjudication, the court must make a comparative evaluation of the other procedures available to determine whether a class action is sufficiently effective to justify the expenditure of judicial time and energy involved therein. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1972) 59, Section 1779.

To aid courts in determining whether there has been compliance with the Civ.R. 23(B)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority, i.e., requirements that demonstrate the utility and propriety of employing the class action device, the drafters listed four factors which they deemed to be particularly relevant:

"(a) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."

These factors simply emphasize the policy objectives of the rule. Their consideration requires the court to focus on the efficiency and economy elements of the class action while emphasizing that special caution must be employed in Civ.R. 23(B)(3) class actions because of the loose affiliation among these class members which magnifies the risks inherent in any representative action. Wright & Miller, supra, at 46, Section 1777.

An examination of the complaint and record in the instant case supports the lower courts' determination that a class action would be inefficient and...