Schmidt v. Board of Directors of Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Marco Polo Apartments

• Decision Date: 15 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 15672,15672
• Citation: 836 P.2d 479,73 Haw. 526
• Parties: Thomas F. SCHMIDT and Lorinna Jhincil Schmidt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF the MARCO POLO APARTMENTS and Marco Polo Management, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 479

836 P.2d 479

73 Haw. 526

Thomas F. SCHMIDT and Lorinna Jhincil Schmidt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF the MARCO POLO APARTMENTS and Marco Polo Management, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15672.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Sept. 15, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.

2. Where the operative language is undefined in the statute, we presume that the words in question were used to express their meaning in common language.

3. The "plain and obvious" application of HRS § 514A-94(b) is to an owner's substantiated claim against an association or its board to impose an affirmative course of action upon the association to put into execution--or to compel obedience to--any provision of its declaration, by-laws, house rules, or any enumerated provision of HRS Chapter 514A.

4. Departure from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute cannot be justified without a clear showing that the legislature intended some other meaning would be given the language or that a literal interpretation would produce absurd or unjust results that are clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute.

5. In the absence of any prayer for equitable, mandatory, or injunctive relief to compel obedience to an association's declaration, by-laws, house rules, or any enumerated provision of HRS Chapter 514A, HRS § 514A-94(b) does not apply to the action.

6. Prejudgment interest, where appropriate, is awardable under HRS § 636-16 in the discretion of the court. Generally, to constitute an abuse of discretion it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.

7. The purpose of the prejudgment interest statute--HRS § 636-16--is to allow the court to designate the commencement date of interest in order to correct injustice when a judgment is delayed for a long period of time for any reason, including litigation delays.

8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for prejudgment interest when the requesting parties were responsible for any delays in the rendering of a final judgment.

John Rapp, on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Melvyn M. Miyagi and Dan A. Colon (Reid, Richards & Miyagi, on the brief), Honolulu, for defendants-appellees.

Before LUM, C.J., WAKATSUKI and LEVINSON, JJ., WATANABE, Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge, in place of MOON, J., recused, and HEEN, Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge, in place of KLEIN, J., recused.

LEVINSON, Justice.

The plaintiffs-appellants Thomas F. Schmidt and Lorinna Jhincil Schmidt (collectively the Schmidts) appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. We agree with the trial court that Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 514A-94(b) (Supp.1991) does not apply to the Schmidts' action against the defendants-appellees The Board of Directors of the Association of Apartment Owners of the Marco Polo Apartments and Marco Polo Management (collectively the Association). We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying an award of prejudgment interest. We thus affirm the trial court's order.

I.

On July 4, 1987, the Schmidts filed a verified complaint against the Association, alleging that the Association was "negligently or through other breach of duty legally responsible in some fashion for the events and happenings herein referred to, and [that the Association] proximately caused injury and damages thereby to the Plaintiffs." (Emphasis added.) The complaint specifically claimed that "[c]ommencing in 1978, and continuing continuously to date," the Schmidts had complained to the Association of "water leakage" into their penthouse unit from the roof of the Marco Polo Apartments (the Marco Polo) and that the Association had failed to "correct said water leakage." According to the complaint, the Association was responsible for the water leakage because the roof of the Marco Polo was "under the sole control and authority of" the Association, the roof being a "common area" of the Marco Polo; the complaint further urged that, pursuant to the declaration and by-laws of the Association, the Association had "a duty and obligation to maintain, replace and/or restore the common areas, such as the roof." ¹

Based on the damage allegedly caused to the Schmidts' penthouse unit, including damage to the walls, ceiling, furniture, fixtures, and personal property, the Schmidts' complaint claimed $60,000 in property damage, at least $290,000 in lost rent, at least $750,000 for damage to reputation and business, at least $2,000,000 for emotional distress, $2,000,000 in punitive damages, and treble damages pursuant to HRS § 480-2 (1985). The complaint, however, did not pray for any equitable, mandatory, or injunctive relief to force the Association to correct the alleged water leakage.

At trial, the jury rendered a special verdict in favor of the Schmidts, finding the Association seventy percent and the Schmidts thirty percent legally responsible for the Schmidts' damages. In accordance with the jury's special verdict, the trial court awarded the Schmidts damages of $127,516.41, but denied their motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to HRS § 514A-94(b), ruling that the statute "[did] not apply to this action...." The trial court also denied the Schmidts' request for prejudgment interest.

The Schmidts timely appealed from the order denying attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.

II.

A.

The Schmidts contend that the trial court erred in ruling that HRS § 514A-94(b) did not apply to their action because "th[e] action involved a claim by a condominium owner which was substantiated against the ... [Association] to enforce a provision of the Declaration or By-Laws." The Association argues that the trial court was correct in its ruling because the Schmidts were not seeking to enforce any provision The question of the types of actions to which HRS § 514A-94 applies is one of first impression in the Hawaii appellate courts. ³ HRS § 514A-94(b) provides in pertinent part that "all reasonable and necessary expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees .. shall be awarded" to an owner who substantiates any claim "in any action against an association, any of its officers or directors, or its board of directors to enforce any provision of the declaration, bylaws, house rules, or this chapter...." (Emphasis added.) The parties disagree as to the meaning of the term "enforce."

of the Association's declaration, by-laws, house rules, or HRS Chapter 514A, but rather were pursuing a simple tort action to recover damages resulting from the Association's negligent failure to maintain the Marco Polo's roof. ²

This court has often stated that "[t]he fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.... [W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning." See, e.g., In re Tax Appeal of Lower Mapunapuna Tenants Ass'n, 73 Haw. 63, 68, 828 P.2d 263, 266 (1992) (quoting National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferreira, 71 Haw. 341, 345, 790 P.2d 910, 913 (1990)). Where, as in the present case, the operative language (i.e., "enforce") is undefined in a statute, we presume that the words in question "were used to express their meaning in common language." Id. at 66, 828 P.2d at 265; see also, HRS § 1-14 (1985). Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines "enforce," inter alia, to mean "[t]o put into execution, to cause to take effect; ... to compel Thus, the "plain and obvious" application of HRS § 514A-94(b) is to an owner's substantiated claim against an association or its board to impose an affirmative course of action upon the association to put into execution--or to compel obedience to--any provision of its declaration, by-laws, house rules, or any enumerated provision of HRS chapter 514A.

                obedience to."  Id. at 528.   Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989) defines "enforce," inter alia, to mean "to ... compel obedience to;  ...  to impose (a course of action) upon a person...."  Id. at 473
                

"[D]eparture from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute cannot be justified without a clear showing that the legislature intended some other meaning would be given the language[,]" In re Tax Appeal of Lower Mapunapuna Tenants Ass'n, 73 Haw. at 68, 828 P.2d at 266 (quoting Espaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Joint Venture, 68 Haw. 171, 179, 707 P.2d 365, 370 (1985)), or that a "literal interpretation would produce absurd or unjust results that are clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute." Kang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 72 Haw. 251, 254, 815 P.2d 1020, 1021-22 (1991) (citations omitted). The legislative history of HRS § 514A-94 reveals no intent that "enforce" was to be given anything other than its "plain and obvious" meaning. ⁴ Moreover, we conclude that resort to the "plain and obvious" meaning of "enforce" would not produce "absurd or unjust results" in the application of HRS § 514A-94(b).

In this case, the Schmidts did not seek to enforce any affirmative action on the part of the Association to comply with any provision of the Association's declaration, by-laws, house rules, or HRS chapter 514A; rather, in their own words, they were "seeking damages ... [for the Association's] fail[ure] to comply with the By-Laws and Declaration." As in any common, "garden variety" tort action, the Schmidts were seeking damages from the Association for the breach of a duty owed to them, i.e., the...