Schmidt v. Breeden
Decision Date | 20 July 1999 |
Docket Number | No. COA98-422.,COA98-422. |
Citation | 517 S.E.2d 171,134 NC App. 248 |
Parties | Joy E. SCHMIDT, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Michael Anthony Schmidt, Plaintiff, v. Laurie BREEDEN, Jennifer Owens and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, Defendants. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Justice & Eve, P.A., by David L. Edwards, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.
Charles G. Monnett III, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.
Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by James G. Middlebrooks and Elizabeth Baker Scanlan, Charlotte, for defendants-appellants.
Defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for partial summary judgment predicated upon governmental immunity. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Pertinent facts and procedural history include the following: On 15 January 1992, Michael Anthony Schmidt (Michael) was a six year old student enrolled in a voluntary after-school enrichment program operated and controlled by defendant Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (the Board) at the Idlewild Elementary School (hereinafter the Program). The Program was not included within the regular school curriculum, but rather was conducted between 2:00 and 6:00 P.M. each weekday afternoon. It provided:
recreation for ... children, a nutritious snack, homework time, ... tutoring in areas that they may [have] need[ed] help..., hands-on type[s] of learning, science activities and music activities, language arts ... [and] all kinds of different activities by way of play.
Michael's mother, plaintiff Joy E. Schmidt, was charged a thirty-five dollar ($35.00) per week enrollment fee for her son's participation in the Program.
According to plaintiff's complaint, Michael suffered a head injury 15 January 1992 while participating in the Program and in the care of Program staff members defendants Laurel Jeanne Breeden (Breeden) and her assistant Jennifer Owens (Owens). At home, Michael subsequently developed a headache, became nauseated and began to vomit. According to plaintiff, she did not realize the medical significance of these symptoms because no one from the Program had disclosed Michael's injury. As a consequence, appropriate medical treatment was delayed, exacerbating Michael's condition which ultimately included permanent brain and vision impairment.
Therefore, plaintiff concluded, the Board was not entitled to governmental immunity because operation of the Program constituted a proprietary function. The trial court denied defendants' motion 4 February 1998 and the latter timely appealed.
Preliminarily, we note that orders denying motions for summary judgment are interlocutory and generally not immediately appealable. See Hill v. Smith, 38 N.C.App. 625, 626, 248 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1978). Notwithstanding, our courts have established that denial of a summary judgment motion grounded upon governmental immunity affects a substantial right and is thereby immediately appealable pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-277(a) (1996) and N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d) (1995). See Hallman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 124 N.C.App. 435, 437, 477 S.E.2d 179, 180 (1996); see also Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C.App. 35, 39, 476 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1996) ( ). As defendants' motion relied upon the defense of governmental immunity, we address the merits of their appeal.
Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 342-43, 368 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1988) (citations omitted).
We conclude defendants' argument has merit.
The liability of a county for torts of its officers and employees is dependent upon whether the activity in which the latter are involved is properly designated "governmental" or "proprietary" in nature, "a county [being] immune from torts committed by an employee carrying out a governmental function" and "liable for torts committed [by an employee] while engaged in a proprietary function." Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C.App. 693, 698, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990).
Our Supreme Court has delineated the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions as follows:
Britt v. Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 450-51, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1952).
Hickman, 108 N.C.App. at 84, 422 S.E.2d at 451-52 (citations omitted).
Certain activities qualify as "clearly governmental such as law enforcement operations and the operation of jails, public libraries, county fire departments, public parks and city garbage services." Hare, 99 N.C.App. at 698, 394 S.E.2d at 235. "Non-traditional governmental activities such as the operation of a golf course or an airport are usually characterized as proprietary functions." Id. at 699, 394 S.E.2d at 235.
In advocating designation of the Program as a traditional governmental activity, defendants rely upon Kiddie Korner v. Board of Education, 55 N.C.App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), disc. review denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d 150 (1982), wherein this Court viewed an after-school program as a "supplemental educational experience" and as an operation within the defendant school board's "[legislatively granted] power and authority." Id. at 140, 285 S.E.2d at 114. In Kiddie Korner, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education had established a committee to operate an after-school program at Dilworth Elementary School (the Dilworth program). Id. at 135-36, 285 S.E.2d at 112. The Dilworth program was designed to "alleviate the problem of the `latch key' child," i.e., a child "left without supervision between the time school closes and the time [the child's] parents come home from work." Id. at 135 n. 1, 285 S.E.2d at 112 n. 1.
Instead of leaving school at the end of the regular school day, the students enrolled in the [Dilworth] program remain[ed] at school where, under the supervision of program staff, they d[id] homework or study, and engage[d] in athletic or artistic activities.
Id. at 136, 285 S.E.2d at 112. "[T]he program [wa]s self-sufficient, the operating costs being covered by the $15.00 per week tuition charged to the participants." Id.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Boyd v. Robeson County
...that a denial of summary judgment grounded on claims of governmental immunity affects a substantial right, Schmidt v. Breeden, 134 N.C.App. 248, 251, 517 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1999), the detention officers' appeal from the trial court's denial of summary judgment on their defense of qualified im......
-
Considine v. City of Waterbury
...876 (municipal swimming pool); Epstein v. New Haven, supra, 104 Conn. at 283, 132 A. 467 (public park); see also Schmidt v. Breeden, 134 N.C.App. 248, 253, 517 S.E.2d 171 (1999) (recounting other traditional governmental functions as including "operation of jails, public libraries . . . and......
-
White v. City of Burlington
...liability insurance. Turner v. City of Greenville, 197 N.C.App. 562, 677 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2009) (quoting Schmidt v. Breeden, 134 N.C.App. 248, 517 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1999) ); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-435(a). White has alleged that the GCSO, City of Greensboro, and City of Burlington ha......
-
Stockton v. Wake Cnty.
...the youth of North Carolina, does not usually exercise the sovereign power and is, therefore, a public employee); Schmidt v. Breeden, 134 N.C.App. 248, 517 S.E.2d 171 (1999) (holding that staff members at an elementary after-school enrichment program were public employees not entitled to pu......