Schmidt v. Gibbons
Decision Date | 31 March 1966 |
Docket Number | CA-CIV |
Citation | 412 P.2d 716,3 Ariz.App. 147 |
Parties | Florence SCHMIDT, surviving spouse of Frank J. Schmidt, deceased, individually, and for and on Behalf of Gail Schmidt, surviving daughter of Frank J. Schmidt, deceased, Appellant, v. J. L. GIBBONS and Frances Gibbons, his wife, dba Arizona Cement Transportation Company, and William D. Eisele and Irene Eisele, his wife, Appellees. * 1291. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Belli, Ashe, Gerry & Ellison, by Robert L. Lieff, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Fennemore, Craig, Allen & McClennen, by Calvin H. Udall, Phoenix, for appellees.
This is an appeal from judgment entered upon a jury verdict favoring the defendants in a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile driven by the decedent colliding with the rear end of a parked truck. The facts of the controversy are of limited importance since the only issues raised on appeal relate to the giving, over objection, of instructions on contributory negligence, and questions relating to the admissibility in evidence of opinion testimony of experts.
The defendants below, appellees in this court, properly alleged the affirmative defense of contributory negligence in their answer to the plaintiff's complaint, and the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
'I instruct you that the driver of an automobile at night is negligent if he collides with an object which he has failed to see, and which an ordinarily prudent driver under like circumstances would have seen and with reasonable care could have avoided.
'If you find that plaintiff's decedent, Frank J. Schmidt, negligently failed to control his vehicle, and negligently failed to see the defendants' truck and trailer, and that this negligence proximately caused or proximately contributed to the cause of his death, Then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
(Emphasis added)
The foregoing was among other instructions upon the subject of contributory negligence as to which there is no complaint. Among these instructions was an instruction delineating the factual issues of the case and informing the jury that if its finding on contributory negligence were favorable to the position of the defendants:
'* * * then you May find for the defendants, but if you find that the plaintiff's decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence, you Must find for the plaintiff, * * *.' (Emphasis added)
In Arizona it has become increasingly perilous for a trial court to instruct a jury regarding contributory negligence. The peril arises from the confusion which surrounds the law of contributory negligence as a result of decisions handed down in recent years. Today trial judges in this state are caught betwixt and between, due to an essential conflict between their duty to declare the law and the danger that a choice of language will be deemed reversible error on appeal. In view of the perplexity with which the trial bench is faced in this regard, we deem it desirable to review the law governing instructions on contributory negligence at this time.
The Constitution of Arizona, provides art. 18, § 5, A.R.S., that:
Although article 18 of the Arizona Constitution, in which the above quoted provision is found, is dedicated to a consideration of labor law, it has been held that questions regarding contributory negligence are jury questions in all negligence actions. Butane Corporation v. Kirby, 66 Ariz. 272, 187 P.2d 325 (1947). It has been in the general field of negligence litigation divorced from labor law that the most significant decisions interpreting the constitutional provisions of article 18, section 5, have been rendered.
Two distinct but interrelated questions must be considered with reference to contributory negligence instructions: first, instructions which purport to define contributory negligence in terms of specific conduct, and second, instructions which deal with the jury's duty subsequent to its determination that the facts in issue do in fact constitute contributory negligence. The leading case representing the former proposition is Wolfswinkel v. Southern Pacific Company, 81 Ariz. 302, 305 P.2d 447 (1956), amplified, 82 Ariz. 33, 307 P.2d 1040 (1957); for the latter, Layton v. Rocha, 90 Ariz. 369, 368 P.2d 444 (1962).
In Varela v. Reid, 23 Ariz. 414, 204 P. 1017 (1922), the Supreme Court noted that article 18, section 5, of the Arizona Constitution, was taken from article 23, section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma and observed that:
'The Oklahoma Supreme Court, construing the constitutional provision of that state, has held that the court is precluded thereby from instructing the jury whether the facts do or do not constitute contributory negligence.' 23 Ariz. 414, 420, 204 P. 1017, 1019 (1922).
See Pioneer Hardwood Co. v. Thompson, 49 Okl. 502, 153 P. 137 (1915), Wichita Falls & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Woodman, 64 Okl. 326, 168 P. 209 (1917).
The court, in Varela, went on to say:
(Emphasis added) 23 Ariz. 414, 421, 204 P. 1017, 1020 (1922).
In Wolfswinkel v. Southern Pacific Company, 81 Ariz. 302, 305 P.2d 447 (1956), the Supreme Court considered the following instruction:
"* * * You are instructed that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Clarence Wolfswinkel failed to exercise proper vigilance or failed to yield the right-of-way to the approaching train and that such failure contributed, however slightly, to the collision, then you must find Clarence Wolfswinkel to have been guilty of contributory negligence." 81 Ariz. 302, 305--306, 305 P.2d 447, 450 (1956).
After reviewing the previous cases dealing with contributory negligence instructions, especially Varela v. Reid, supra, the court concluded;
81 Ariz. 302, 307, 305 P.2d 447, 451 (1956).
On rehearing, 82 Ariz. 33, 307 P.2d 1040 (1957), the court amplified its position in the first Wolfswinkel case:
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