Schmidt v. N. Life Ass'n

• Decision Date: 06 October 1900
• Citation: 83 N.W. 800,112 Iowa 41
• Parties: SCHMIDT v. NORTHERN LIFE ASS'N.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

112 Iowa 41

83 N.W. 800

SCHMIDT

v.NORTHERN LIFE ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 6, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Scott county; James W. Bollinger, Judge.

Action on a benefit certificate of insurance in the defendant association. Each party filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff's motion was sustained, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Davison & Lane and Carney & Holt, for appellant.

Ely & Bush and Henry Vollmer, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

The defendant is a mutual benefit society organized under the laws of this state. On the 10th day of July, 1897, it issued a certificate of insurance on the life of Claus Behrens, payable to Christina Maria Behrens, her heirs or legal representatives, under which the beneficiary was entitled to share in the funds of the association to the amount of $2,000. After the issuance of the certificate the beneficiary caused the death of the insured (her husband), by administering to him a lethal does of poison. See State v. Behrens (Iowa) 79 N. W. 387. Notice and seasonable proofs of the death of the insured were made to the association; but, as it failed to pay the amount promised in its certificate, plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of Claus Behrens, deceased, commenced this action, claiming that, as the beneficiary took the life of the assured, she could not recover, and that she held the legal title to the proceeds of the certificate in trust for the benefit of the estate of deceased. Henry Vollmer, who received an assignment of the certificate from the beneficiary after the death of the insured, intervened in the action, and asked that the amount due on the certificate be paid to him. Defendant answered this petition, pleading the facts above recited as a defense to his (intervener's) claim, and made a motion for judgment on the pleadings. This motion was sustained, and Vollmer also appeals. Christina Behrens, the beneficiary, has two children,--Hulda Bendt and Paula Behrens. The former also filed a petition of intervention, in which she made claim to one-fourth of the proceeds of the certificate (one-half of her interest having been assigned to Henry Vollmer), as an heir of the beneficiary named in the certificate. To this the defendant demurred, and its demurrer was sustained. From that ruling Hulda Bendt appeals. In his reply to the answer to his petition of intervention, Vollmer set forth the assignment made to him by Hulda Bendt, and asked judgment thereon for one-fourth the amount of the proceeds of the certificate. The motion filed by defendant for judgment on the pleadings, tendering the issues between Vollmer and the defendant, was grounded, among other things, on the proposition that his claim to one-fourth of the proceeds in virtue of the assignment from Hulda Bendt was not properly pleadable in a reply.

Aside from the issues tendered by the petitions of intervention, the question presented may be stated in this wise: Where a certificate in a mutual benefit society is made payable to a third party, as beneficiary, who afterwards feloniously causes the death of the insured, can the administrator of the insured recover the benefits provided in the certificate? Before going to that question, it is well to consider the intervener's appeals. The certificate provides that on satisfactory proof of death, and it appearing that the member was in good standing and had complied with the conditions of the policy, the association agreed that Christina Behrens, her heirs or legal representatives, should be entitled to share in the beneficiary fund to the extent of $2,000. The certificate was made nonassignable, except by consent of defendant's board of directors. It is clear that, until the death of the beneficiary, her heirs have no claims, as such, against the defendant. The amount is payable to Christina Behrens, her heirs or legal representatives. So long as she is alive she has no heirs, and her children have no claim to the insurance simply because she caused the death of the insured, and thus forfeited her right to take under the certificate. Civil death, growing out of a sentence of imprisonment for life, is not generally recognized in this country. Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317, 18 N. E. 148, 6 Am. St. Rep. 368, 1 L. R. A. 264;Baltimore v. Chester, 53 Vt. 315;Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio, 260;Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118; Cannon v. Windsor, 1 Houst. (Del.) 143; Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 10 S. E. 435;Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R. I. 590, 30 Atl. 470, 26 L. R. A. 232;Willingham v. King, 23 Fla. 478, 2 South. 851;Davis v. Laning, 85 Tex. 39, 19 S. W. 846, 18 L. R. A. 82. The children of the beneficiary had no right of action against the defendant, and, having no right, there was nothing for them to assign to another. If the beneficiary named in the certificate could not recover, because of her act in taking the life of the insured, her assignee, who simply stands in her shoes, cannot. That Christina Behrens, who took the life of the insured, cannot recover on the policy, is conceded. It would be a reproach to our system of jurisprudence if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of the insured, whose life he had feloniously taken. Certainly one who sets fire to his own building cannot recover the insurance thereon, and we know of no reason why the maxim, “Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria,” should not apply. Indeed, the unbroken voice of authority is to the effect that a beneficiary in an insurance policy who murders the insured forfeits his rights thereunder. Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 Sup. Ct. 877, 29 L. Ed. 997; Association Co. v. Palmer, 25 Beav. 605; Schreiner v. High Court, 35 Ill. App. 576. See, also, as somewhat in point, Moore v. Woolsey, 4 El. & Bl. 243; Names v. Insurance Co. (Iowa) 64 N. W. 628; Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. S.) 194; Insurance Co. v. O'Neill, 21 Neb. 548, 32 N. W. 581;Ritter v. Insurance Co., 169 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 302, 42 L. Ed. 693;Hatch v. Insurance Co., 120 Mass. 550. The only exception to this wholesome rule seems to be found in cases relating to the descent of property, where the statutes make no exceptions, as in Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935, 25 L. R. A. 564;In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 203, 32 Atl. 637;Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794. But see, in this same connection, Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 5 L. R. A. 340. We are of opinion that the maxim cited applies to the case at bar, that contracts must be made and interpreted in the light of public policy, and that it is contrary to the good order of society, and an encouragement to crime, to allow a beneficiary who murders the assured to receive the benefits of the insurance. Any other rule would furnish the strongest temptation to crime, and give to the party interested the most potent incentive to bring about the death of the insured, that he might profit thereby. The public has an interest in such matters over and beyond the individuals or societies involved, and courts are not bound to enforce or hold valid any contract which offends public morals, violates the law, or contravenes public policy. Had the certificate contained a provision to the effect that benefits would be paid in the event the beneficiary took the life of the insured, it would clearly be opposed to public policy, and would not be enforced. If recovery were permitted by the beneficiary or her assignee in this action, it would be giving the same effect to the certificate as if such a clause was included in the contract. Neither of the interveners, Bendt or Vollmer, is entitled to recover.

2. We come now to the case made by the administrator, and the more important and controlling question hitherto stated. Public policy, as we have seen, forbids an action on behalf of the beneficiary or her assignee. But what becomes of the benefit promised to be paid on the death of the assured? Is the company absolved from all liability because of the murder of the assured, or must it pay the amount promised to some one, and, if so, to whom? Neither the beneficiary nor her children nor her assignee can recover, because of the wrong perpetrated by her; but does her wrong absolve the association from its liability? We think not. There is no provision in the certificate that it should be forfeited, in the event the insured was murdered, and no condition of any kind against murder. The agreement was to the effect that in case of the death of the assured the beneficiary should be entitled to a share in the beneficiary fund to the amount of $2,000. The application, which was made a part of the certificate, contained this statement: “I direct that all benefits to which I may be entitled from the association be paid to Christina Behrens, related to me as my wife, subject to such future disposal of benefits as I may hereafter direct.” It is also provided that the certificate, if issued, should designate as beneficiary either one of the insured's family or relatives, or his legal representatives, heirs, or legatees. This was in accordance with the statute in force at the time, which provided that “no corporation or association organized or operating, under this act, shall issue any certificate of membership, or policy, unless the beneficiary under said certificate shall be the husband, wife, relative, or legal representative, heir or legatee of such insured member.” Acts 21st Gen. Assem. c. 65, § 7. The object of such...