Schmidt v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 27 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 32110,32110
• Citation: 769 P.2d 932,48 Cal.3d 370,256 Cal.Rptr. 750
• Parties: , 769 P.2d 932 Teri Lynn SCHMIDT et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Santa Barbara County, Respondent; VALLEY MOBILE PARK INVESTMENTS et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 750

256 Cal.Rptr. 750

48 Cal.3d 370, 769 P.2d 932

Teri Lynn SCHMIDT et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Santa Barbara County, Respondent VALLEY MOBILE PARK INVESTMENTS et al., Real Parties in Interest.

L.A. No. 32110.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 27, 1989.

James R. Provenza, Santa Barbara and Joel Diringer, San Luis Obispo, for petitioners.

James B. Morales, San Francisco, and Richard S. Weiner, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Schramm & Raddue, Dale E. Hanst, Richard F. Lee, David C. Fainer and James P. Griffith, Santa Barbara, for real parties in interest.

W. Craig Biddle, Christian M. Keiner and Biddle & Hamilton, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.

ARGUELLES, ^* Justice.

In this case we must determine the validity, under California law, of a private mobilehome park rule limiting residence in the park to persons 25 years or older. The trial court found the rule valid, but the Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that Civil Code section 798.76 barred a private mobilehome park owner from adopting or enforcing such a rule. ¹ The Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 798.76, however, conflicted with the interpretation of the statute in another appellate court decision, ² and we granted review to resolve the conflict.

In September 1988, while this matter was pending before us, Congress enacted new legislation (Pub.L. No. 100-430 (Sept. 13, 1988) 102 Stat. 1619, 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, No. 8), effective March 1989, which defendant ³ mobilehome park owners acknowledge will render their 25-years-or-older policy invalid in the future, at least as applied to families with minor children. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, however, the new federal legislation does not render this proceeding inconsequential or moot, because plaintiffs seek damages for the mobilehome park owners' enforcement of the 25-years-or-older rule prior to the effective date of the new federal legislation and the validity of the park owners' conduct at that time necessarily turns on the proper interpretation of California law. Furthermore, the interpretation of the applicable California statutes will continue to affect the nature of the residence policies which private mobilehome parks in California may establish in the future in light of the new federal legislation. Thus, the state law issue posed by this case continues to have general significance.

As we shall explain, with respect to that state law issue we have concluded, contrary to the Court of Appeal's view, that the applicable California statutes permit the establishment and enforcement of such a rule in private mobilehome parks, and that neither the rule nor the related statutes are unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I

In May 1983, three adult sisters--one over the age of 25 years, one 24 years old, and one 18 years old--entered into a contract to purchase a mobilehome in which the three intended to live with the minor child of the eldest sister. The mobilehome was located and was to remain in Ranch Club Mobile Estates, a mobilehome park in Buellton owned and operated by defendants. The sale was conditioned on defendants' acceptance of the sisters' application to rent space in the mobilehome park for this purpose.

Defendants rejected the application, however, relying on an existing park rule--adopted by defendants in 1977--requiring new residents in the park to be 25 years or older. After defendants had rejected the initial application, the sisters offered to live in the park without the minor, but this offer was also rejected, on the basis of the same 25-years-or-older rule.

The sisters and the minor then instituted the underlying action against defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. Plaintiffs contended that defendants, by refusing to allow them to reside in the park on the ground that the minor and two of the sisters were under twenty-five years of age, had violated (1) the Unruh Civil Rights Act ( § 51 et seq. (hereafter Unruh Act)), (2) section 798.76, a provision of the Mobilehome Residency Law, and (3) various constitutional provisions.

After the trial court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, relying on the foregoing undisputed facts. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion, concluding in the course of its ruling that defendants' 25-years-or-older rule was valid, as a matter of law, under the provisions of section 798.76.

Plaintiffs then sought a writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal, after issuing an alternative writ and hearing argument, ruled in plaintiffs' favor. Relying on (1) the general public policy--reflected in the Unruh Act--disfavoring discrimination against children in housing and (2) various legislative enactments recognizing the critical shortage in this state of an adequate supply of affordable housing for families, the Court of Appeal construed section 798.76 to permit a mobilehome park owner to adopt a rule excluding children only where the park is specifically reserved for senior citizens.

Defendants petitioned for review, pointing out that the Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 798.76 conflicted with the interpretation of this same provision in another Court of Appeal opinion filed shortly before the appellate decision in this case. (See, ante, p. 751, fn. 2 of 256 Cal.Rptr., p. ----, fn. 2 of --- P.2d.) We granted review to resolve the conflict.

II

Before addressing the principal issue on which we granted review, we briefly respond to plaintiffs' suggestion that recent federal legislation renders the issue in this case insignificant.

In September 1988, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Pub.L. No. 100-430 (Sept. 13, 1988) 102 Stat. 1619, 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, No. 8), an act which makes substantial changes in the preexisting federal fair housing law. Among other significant changes, the act makes it unlawful for a business which engages in residential real estate related transactions to discriminate on the basis of "familial status," as well as on the previously forbidden grounds of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. (42 U.S.C. § 3605.) "Familial status" is defined to mean families which include children under the age of 18. (42 U.S.C. § 3602(k).)

While the new act generally bars discrimination in housing against families with children under 18, it also creates an exception for "housing for older persons" in which discrimination on the basis of familial status is not prohibited. (42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).) "Housing for older persons," in turn, is defined to include, inter alia, housing which is (1) "intended for, and solely occupied by, persons 62 years of age or older," or (2) "intended and operated for occupancy by at least one person 55 years of age or older per unit" provided that such housing is specifically designed to meet the physical or social needs of older persons and meets other specified criteria. (42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C).) ⁴ Plaintiffs contend that because, under traditional supremacy principles, the new federal legislation takes precedence over conflicting state law, and because, under the new legislation, defendants' 25-years-or-older rule may not be validly applied to exclude families with children under the age of 18, the issue of state law presented by this case has been rendered insignificant. For several reasons, we cannot agree.

First, and most obviously, the new federal act clearly does not control plaintiffs' damage claim in this case. By its terms, the federal act does not take effect until 180 days after its enactment (Pub.L. No. 100-430 (Sept. 13, 1988) § 13, 102 Stat. 1636), and nothing in the act purports to govern conduct--such as the actions of the mobilehome park owners at issue here--which occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. The validity of those actions, and the potential liability of the park owners, turn on the proper interpretation of preexisting state law.

Second, even with respect to the future, the new federal act does not totally eclipse the question of state law presented here. As we shall see, one of the points at issue in this case is whether the relevant California provisions prohibit a mobilehome park owner from adopting any age-based policy other than an 18-years-or-older rule. If state law does limit a mobilehome park owner's discretion in this fashion, then in the future mobilehome parks in California might well be prohibited from adopting the type of more narrowly defined age-based policies--i.e., a 62-years-or-older rule or a properly limited 55-years-or-older rule--which would qualify for the "housing for older persons" exemption under federal law. (See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C).) Accordingly, the question of statutory interpretation before us is by no means eliminated by the recent federal enactment.

We now turn to the state law question.

III

As noted above, the Court of Appeal in this case, relying on the general policies underlying the Unruh Act, concluded that section 798.76 (see ante, p. 751, fn. 1 of 256 Cal.Rptr., p. ----, fn. 1 of --- P.2d), a provision of the Mobilehome Residency Law, must properly be interpreted to permit a mobilehome park owner to adopt a rule excluding children only when the facility is reserved for senior citizens.

To place the statutory interpretation question in perspective, we begin with a brief chronological overview of the pertinent legislation and judicial authorities and then proceed to a more in-depth analysis of the specific statutory provisions.

A.

The Legislature first adopted the broad antidiscrimination provisions of the Unruh Act in 1959. As originally enacted, section 51 expressly declared that all persons are entitled to full and equal accommodations...