Schmitz v. United States Steel Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | A10-633 |
| Parties | Darrel Schmitz, Appellant, v. United States Steel Corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
St. Louis County District Court
Phillip M. Kitzer, Clayton D. Halunen, Frances E. Baillon, Halunen & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Marilyn J. Clark, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Rodney M. Torbic (pro hac vice), US Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Shumaker, Judge; and Collins, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent, arguing that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on his claims of retaliatory discharge and failure to offer continued employment under the workers' compensation statute and on his claims of disability discrimination and failure to make reasonable accommodation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Because the record evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellant is disabled, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to appellant's claims under the MHRA. But because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether appellant was discharged in retaliation for seeking workers' compensation benefits and whether respondent had employment available within appellant's physical limitations, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to appellant's claims under the workers' compensation statute and remand for the resumption of proceedings.
Prior to this litigation, respondent United States Steel Corporation employed appellant Darrel Schmitz at its iron-ore mine in Keewatin as a maintenance mechanic, a physically demanding position. Appellant has a history of lower-back problems, including reported work injuries in 1992, 1996, 1997, and 1998, as well as a number of other physical ailments. For instance, appellant underwent shoulder-replacement surgery on his right shoulder in 2000; injured his right knee at work in September 2005 andsubsequently underwent arthroscopic surgery, which successfully resolved all symptoms; and suffered a stroke in April 2006, resulting in left-side weakness in his body, but no paralysis or "significant muscular weakness."
Appellant returned to work in May following his stroke. On October 23, 2006, appellant injured his lower back at work. According to appellant, a couple of days later, Larry Sutherland, who was then a manager at the Keewatin facility, called appellant at home and told him that he likely would be fired if he filled out an accident report. Appellant returned to work a few days after October 23 and did not file an accident report at that time.
Appellant worked, apparently capably and without incident, until December 28, 2006, when he injured his lower back while putting meat in his freezer at home. Appellant attempted to return to work on January 2, 2007, but he was in pain and physically unable to work. On January 4, appellant filed a claim for sickness and accident benefits, which he received for one year. He underwent back surgery in August. In November, appellant was medically cleared to return to work with lifting restrictions, and he informed respondent of his desire to do so.
Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in April 2007. In July 2008, a workers' compensation judge issued a decision denying appellant's claim, concluding that appellant was not entitled to benefits because he had failed to provide sufficient notice to respondent and, alternatively, because his October back injury had fully resolved before he sustained the unrelated back injury while at home in December.
After respondent did not return him to work, appellant brought a civil action pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.82 (2008), claiming retaliatory discharge and failure to offer continued employment, and Minn. Stat. § 363A.08 (2008), claiming disability discrimination and failure to make reasonable accommodation. Respondent moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate when all the evidence in the record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (2008). We review de novo whether the district court erred in its application of the law and whether there are any genuine issues of material fact when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 7677 (Minn. 2002). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record contains evidence that is "sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions." DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). Courts "must not make factual findings or credibility determinations or otherwise weigh evidence relevant to disputed facts." Geist-Miller v. Mitchell, 783 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. App. 2010).
Appellant alleges that he is a qualified disabled person and that respondent engaged in unfair employment practices in violation of Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6(a), by failing to make reasonable accommodation to his known disability, and in violation of Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2, by discharging him or otherwise discriminating against him because of his disability. Both claims require appellant to prove that he is a disabled person, which the MHRA defines as "any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment." Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12 (2008).
When provisions of federal anti-discrimination statutes are similar to provisions of the MHRA, interpretations of those federal statutory provisions are "useful to guide our interpretation of the MHRA." Kolton v. Cnty. of Anoka, 645 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Minn. 2002). The MHRA is similar to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); the only relevant difference is that the ADA employs a "substantially limits [one or more major life activities]" standard, which is more stringent than the MHRA's "materially limits" standard. Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). An ADA plaintiff must clear the "significant hurdle" of establishing disability, and "does not prove that he or she has a disability simply by showing an impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her particular job without accommodation." Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Eighth Circuit has held that working is a major life activity under the ADA. Id. at 844. The relevant question is whether the individual's physical limitation "forecloses the broad category of jobs for which [his] background and skills otherwise would fit him." Id. at 848. "Ability to do another job of the same general class is inconsistent with a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working." Id.
Under the MHRA, courts consider the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographic area to which the person has reasonable access, the person's job expectations and training, and the relevant employment criteria or qualifications associated with different types of jobs. Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 543 (Minn. 2001).
Appellant has not produced sufficient evidence to create a triable fact question as to whether he is materially limited in the major life activity of working. The evidence is sufficient to show that appellant cannot work at a job requiring heavy or constant lifting or requiring climbing high ladders or scaffolding. But by his own testimony, appellant could work at a desk job, could likely be a truck driver, and could perform the responsibilities of a foreman assistant. We note that the record contains evidence of appellant's previous employment in other occupations. After high school, appellant served honorably as a United States Marine and subsequently attended two years of technical school in electrical maintenance and a year and a half of junior college. Appellant has previously worked as a teacher's aide and as a gas-station manager. Essentially, appellant's argument is that he cannot perform only the responsibilities of a maintenance mechanic, which is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.
A lifting restriction may be relevant to establishing disability, but even a permanent medical restriction on lifting "will not be enough to establish disability" under the ADA. Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 844-45. Lifting is merely "part of a set of basic motor functions that together represent a major life activity," and the question is whether there is a "substantial limitation of a constellation of... basic motor functions." Id. at 845.
Thus, "a limitation on lifting together with limitations on other basic motor functions may create a triable issue of disability if in the aggregate they prevent or severely restrict the plaintiff from doing the set of manual tasks that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. at 847 (quotation omitted).
Appellant testified in his deposition that, following his shoulder surgery, he "basically turned from right-handed to left-handed," conducting most activities with his left hand. He remains able to drive, but he drives predominantly with his left hand because it hurts when he uses his right hand. He is able to drive...
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