Schnathorst v. Williams
| Decision Date | 05 April 1949 |
| Docket Number | 47346. |
| Citation | 36 N.W.2d 739,240 Iowa 561 |
| Parties | SCHNATHORST v. WILLIAMS et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Brierly & McCall, of Newton, for appellant.
V H. Morgan and Campbell & Campbell, all of Newton, for appellee.
On August 23 1946, Earl S. Williams, whom we will refer to as the defendant, filed an information before a justice of the peace at Newton, Iowa, accusing plaintiff Henry Schnathorst, a farm hand in the employ of the informant and his son, Ward Williams, of the larceny in Jasper County, Iowa, on August 16, 1946, of a 1929 Model A Ford Tudor Sedan, which the informant had sold to plaintiff on a conditional-sale contract. Plaintiff was arrested by peace officers at Marshalltown on Friday, August 23, 1946, and placed in jail there for the night. The next day the sheriff of Jasper County under warrant issued on the information arrested plaintiff and took him before the justice of the peace at Newton. Plaintiff told the justice he was not guilty and waived preliminary hearing, and was ordered held to answer to the District Court of Jasper County, Iowa. In default of bond plaintiff was committed to the county jail where he was held until 2 P.M. on August 27, 1946 when he was released under bond.
On October 3, 1946, M. J. Carey, the county attorney, with the defendants as witnesses, appeared before the grand jury of the county, and after presentation of the charge, hearing of the testimony of defendants offered by the county attorney, with no testimony in behalf of the accused, the grand jury refused to indict. The county attorney then prepared and filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court the following dismissal of the charge against the plaintiff herein, commonly called a 'No Bill', towit, The prosecution was thus ended.
On October 21, 1946, plaintiff filed his petition alleging the matters above set out, and that the defendants Earl S. Williams and Ward Williams had by conspiracy instigated and procured the criminal prosecution willfully, deliberately, and maliciously without probable cause, and for wrongful purpose, thereby causing plaintiff to be held up to public hatred and ridicule, and to suffer mental and bodily pain and suffering and other injury to his great damage.
Defendants filed answer admitting the refusal of the grand jury to indict, the filing of the information, but alleged that it was filed in good faith, without malice, with probable cause, and upon the advice of the county attorney after full and true disclosure to him of all the facts; they further alleged that plaintiff had severed his employment with them without notice, and left with the car owing them a balance of $32 on the purchase price and money expended on the car, and they were unable to find plaintiff or the automobile. All other allegations in the petition were denied. Plaintiff's reply denied the affirmative allegations of the answer.
There is no dispute over much of the evidence. Defendant owned a 260-acre farm in the east part of Jasper County about two miles from the 120-acre farm of his son Ward, which farms they operated together. Plaintiff, about thirty years old, living with his wife and family in Poweshiek County near the east Jasper County line, had worked for the defendants on their farms during most of the year 1945. He was a good workman, and his relations with his employers were pleasant and agreeable. He had two children seven and eight years old, and a third child was born about January 1, 1946. After corn-picking in 1945 he was without work and defendant advanced him about $189 for family expenses. He lived about three miles from the Williams' land, and for transportation to and from his home and work in 1946, defendant bought plaintiff the Ford car described above, for which defendant paid the dealer $180, on December 29, 1945. On that date a 'Contract and Agreement' was executed by defendant, as first party, and plaintiff, as second party. It provided that whereas the first party was the owner of the car, and had paid the ceiling price therefor, and the insurance and license on the car, and might at his option repair it, and that second party desired to use the car, it was agreed that he should pay for said use the sum of $20 monthly commencing on January 2, 1946, by deduction from his monthly wage, and that upon payment in full of the cost price of the car, insurance, license, and all repair expense, first party would transfer the car to second party. It was also agreed that if second party should quit the employment before all said amounts were fully paid, first party might retain ownership of the car and all payments made 'as liquidated damages for the use of the car', and also first party had the option to cancel the contract and to retain ownership of the car and payments as above noted, if second party should default in any monthly payment.
On January 22, 1946, a casualty company issued a policy to the defendant, as the insured, covering the period from December 29, 1945 to the same date in 1946. The coverages A., B. and C. for which insurance was payable to defendant, were for bodily injury, property damage and medical payments, for which items the premium charges were $14.60. The coverages for deductible collision or upset, fire, theft, or windstorm were, as stated in the policy, 'payable as interest may appear to the named insured and Henry Schnathorst.' The premium charge for the last-noted coverages were $12. While plaintiff was being charged with the entire premium of $26.60, he was rightly chargeable with but $12. He had no protection under the policy for coverages A., B. and C., yet he, and not the defendant, was liable for casualties thereunder, under section 321.51, Code of 1946, I.C.A., and Hansen v. Kuhn, 226 Iowa 794, 285 N.W. 249.
About March 15, 1946 plaintiff was verbally employed as a farm hand on the two farms for a monthly wage of $100, one quart of milk and his noon meal each day, and the monthly rental of $12.50 for the home in which he and his family lived. Defendant or Ward had paid the premium of $26.60, $10.50 for car license on March 15, 1946, $10.36 on March 23, 1946 and $18.85 on April 30, 1946 for car repairs. The payments for repairs were made to the service men, and plaintiff saw none of the statements. Plaintiff's entire indebtedness for cost of the car and the items listed above never exceeded $246.31. It is conceded by all parties that five monthly payments of $41 each--April 15, May 15, June 15, July 15, August 15--or $205 were deducted from plaintiffs wages and credited on the car debt, leaving a balance owing thereon on August 16, 1946, the date of the alleged theft of the car, of $41.31. Deducting therefrom, as it should be, the sum of $14.60 for premiums under coverages A., B. and C., he was owing on the car debt on August 16, 1946, the sum of $26.71. He testified that on said date when he left he was not certain of the amounts of the different items of the debt. But he had at that time paid over eight-ninths of the total car debt. No payment under the contract was in default. It was alleged in the answer and testified by defendant that the balance on the car debt was $32. Defendant told the county attorney that $205 had been credited on the car debt. He did not tell him the amount of the premiums, or the license fee, but told him the price of the car was $180 and repairs amounted to approximately $20, and that the back account for money furnished plaintiff was $189. The county attorney testified: He was not entirely fair with the county attorney in this statement. He knew every wage deduction had been applied on the car debt. The receipts he gave plaintiff show this to be a fact and his testimony concedes it.
Although by the contract, plaintiff was granted the possession and use of the car, and the insurance policy specified that it was to be used for business and pleasure, yet it was the contention of defendant that plaintiff's use of it was limited. He testified: Defendant testified that if he failed to tell the county attorney all of the facts involving the autoamobile he was not aware of it. Assuming that he told the county attorney of these claimed limitations of plaintiff's use of the automobile, the jury might well have found that any such statement to the county attorney was neither fair, full, nor correct, because of the contract and the policy, and because for three and one-half months prior to March 15, 1946 plaintiff had the car in Poweshiek County where he lived and used it as he pleased, and defendant testified that 'he knew plaintiff drove it all over the county.' The jury could have found that defendant's testimony as to the limited use was to give the impression to the jury that plaintiff's operation of the car on and after August 16th was...
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