Schneberger v. State Board of Social Welfare

• Decision Date: 07 May 1940
• Docket Number: 45152.
• Citation: 291 N.W. 859,228 Iowa 399
• Parties: SCHNEBERGER et al. v. STATE BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

291 N.W. 859

228 Iowa 399

SCHNEBERGER et al. v. STATE BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE.

No. 45152.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 7, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Winneshiek County; T. H. Goheen, Judge.

Appeal from order of the district court reinstating claimants-appellees to their right to receive old-age assistance.

Reversed.

Fred D. Everett, Atty. Gen., and Don Hise, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen for appellants.

J. W Neuzil, of Calmar, for appellees.

HALE Justice.

On December 27, 1937, Mary Schneberger and Joseph Schneberger wife and husband, were granted certificates of assistance entitling them to secure old-age assistance. They received such benefits until January 5, 1939, and on April 12, 1939, were cancelled from the rolls and both were served with notice of cancellation which recited that the reason for cancellation of their certificates was: " You have failed to establish a degree of need which makes you eligible under the provisions of the law. The investigation shows that, at the time of said investigation, you had support or equivalent from such source as responsible relatives." The notice cites several sections of the Code. The reason for the cancellation of the certificates, as indicated by the board of social welfare, was because it appeared that claimants had a son who was able to assume their entire support or contribute approximately $25 a month to each of his parents. Claimants thereupon appealed to the state board and a hearing was had upon such appeal before a representative of the board, resulting in a ruling adverse to claimants. On June 28, 1939, the action of the division of old-age assistance in cancelling the certificates of assistance was affirmed by the state board of social welfare. On July 28, 1939, claimants filed their appeal to the district court from the decision of the state board, setting out the grant and receipt of the old-age assistance, the cancellation, alleging they had no income and the inability of their children to support them, that the department of social welfare was prejudiced because their son, J. P. Schneberger, had not satisfactorily explained his inability to support them, and that the action of the state board was not in accordance with the provisions of section 5296-f12, paragraph 10, or section 5298 of the Code of Iowa and amendments thereto, and asking order of court requiring the said board to make payments to them since December 28, 1938.

Answer was filed by the department of social welfare, denying generally, and alleging that said board did not commit fraud or abuse its discretion, and asking dismissal of appeal. By agreement the appeals of both claimants were heard as one cause, and on September 5, 1939, an order was entered reinstating claimants and directing payments to be resumed as of January 5, 1939, the effective date of the board's order of discontinuance. From this order the board appeals.

No brief or argument was filed by claimants. The appellant, the state board of social welfare, claims that the district court erroneously reinstated the claimants, and for its first assignment alleges that the finding of fact by the board that the claimants had not established the degree of need that would entitle them to receive old-age assistance benefits is a purely discretionary matter vested in the state board of social welfare and is binding on the courts. Appellant does not claim that the abuse of such discretion is not a proper subject of inquiry by the courts. The statute, by the Code of 1935, as by the present Code, provided for a review by the district court. The former Code provision (section 5296-f18), as amended by section 15, chapter 137, Acts of the Forty-seventh General Assembly, provided for an appeal to the district court and a hearing on the application on its merits, and the determination by such court whether or not the decision of the state board was in conformity with the law. As the law now stands, by the provisions of section 26, chapter 140, Acts of the Forty-eighth General Assembly, section 3828.014, Code of 1939, it reads: " The district court shall act as an appellate court to review the decision of the state board to determine whether or not it has therein committed fraud or abused its discretion."

The present law providing for review of the decision of the state board was in effect at the time of notice and hearing on appeal and such appeal was governed thereby. Huff v. Cook, 44 Iowa 639; Windsor v. City of Des Moines, 110 Iowa 175, 81 N.W. 476, 80 Am.St.Rep. 280; Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Streepy, 211 Iowa 1334, 236 N.W. 24.

That there must be discretion vested in the board designated by statute to administer the law is evident from its object and purpose. The determination of questions under the law involves investigation, examination of conditions, and in some cases consultation and advice. Courts ordinarily act only after a controversy has arisen, when a right is invaded or a duty neglected. Much discussion has arisen and the reports are full of cases concerning the particular functions of the three branches of the government, but it is not necessary to attempt to review the matter here. While the lines of demarcation are sometimes difficult to determine, and the duties sometimes overlap, yet it seems to us that the duties of the state board in matters of the kind here under discussion are clearly administrative, and under ...