Schnedler v. Lee
| Decision Date | 25 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 115,362,115,362 |
| Citation | 445 P.3d 238 |
| Parties | Lori SCHNEDLER, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Heather Nicole LEE, Respondent/Appellee, and Kevin Platt, Third Party Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Christopher U. Brecht, McDaniel Acord & Lytle, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Michael F. Smith, McAfee & Taft, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Lori Schnedler, Petitioner/Appellant.
Bryan J. Nowlin, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Heather Nicole Lee, Respondent/Appellee.1
No appearance for Kevin Platt, Third Party Defendant/Appellee.
¶1 Lori and Heather, a same-sex couple, built and shared a life together in the ten or so years before Oklahoma recognized marriages between two people of the same sex.2 In the course of their committed relationship, they started a family together through assisted reproduction. In 2007, Heather gave birth to J.L. Eight years went by in which young J.L. grew up in a nurturing and loving environment with two parents, during which time J.L. came to know Lori as a parent in every significant sense. Lori and Heather separated in April 2015. When Heather abruptly denied Lori any further visitation with their daughter, Lori petitioned the district court for shared legal custody of, and visitation with, J.L. under the doctrine of in loco parentis and this Court's precedent in Ramey v. Sutton , 2015 OK 79, 362 P.3d 217.
¶2 Interpreting our decision in Ramey as prioritizing and privileging the veto power of a genetic donor —in this case, Kevin, who at no point in those eight years had sought any determination of his own parental rights—over the parental rights of the non-biological same-sex parent, the district court concluded that Lori lacked standing to seek any adjudication of custody, visitation, or support. Lori appealed; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. We are now tasked with deciding whether our law recognizes Lori's right to seek custody and visitation on the same equal terms as a legal parent. We hold here that it must.
¶3 Lori Schnedler and Heather Lee met each other in the early 2000s while working for the Bartlesville Police Department, staying only acquaintances at first. As their relationship advanced, they began living together in a modest apartment. Once Lori returned from her overseas military deployment in 2004, they bought a home. For the nearly eleven years that followed—with the sole exception of a brief separation early in the relationship—Lori and Heather lived in the home they had purchased together.
¶4 At that time, of course, they were unable to legally marry in (or have their marriage recognized by) the State of Oklahoma. Before the landmark rulings in Obergefell v. Hodges3 and Bishop v. Smith ,4 marriage between them would have been a "legal nullity." Ramey , 2015 OK 79, ¶¶ 12, 17, 362 P.3d at 220–21. Yet they became a family in every meaningful sense of the word, culminating in their mutual decision to have a child.
¶5 A work friend of Heather's, Kevin Platt, agreed to serve as the sperm donor. Heather became pregnant and delivered J.L. in July 2007, with her family and Lori present in the delivery room. Lori cut the umbilical cord, and the couple gave the newborn Lori's middle name. From the outset of Heather's pregnancy, both women agreed that they intended to raise J.L. together as their daughter.
¶6 Though Lori and J.L. do not share blood ties, J.L. recognized Lori as her "momma" or "Momma Lori." For the first eight years of J.L.'s life, Lori was a parent to her in every respect. By Heather's own admission, Lori provided "food, clothing, and shelter" for J.L. and "supplied all the financial stability" for the entire family. Moreover, her contributions to J.L.'s wellbeing were not limited to financial support: Lori was a full and active participant in J.L.'s emotional, social, and intellectual development.
¶7 Lori and Heather ended their relationship in April 2015. Heather left the home they had shared, and took J.L. with her. In the initial months following their separation, Lori and Heather adhered to a regular visitation schedule for J.L. This arrangement seemed workable for seven months, until Heather suddenly denied Lori any further contact with their daughter. Since that time, Lori has neither seen nor spoken with J.L.
¶8 In December 2015, Lori filed a petition in Tulsa County District Court for an adjudication of J.L.'s custody, visitation, and child support on in loco parentis grounds.5 Heather objected and sought to join Kevin, the biological father and genetic donor, as a necessary party to the proceedings. Additionally, both Heather and Kevin brought crossclaims in the action, requesting the trial court's determination that Kevin was J.L.'s "biological and natural father" and therefore entitled to full parental rights of custody, visitation, and support.
¶9 Before this litigation began, Kevin was not demonstrably involved in J.L.'s life.6
Since the start of these legal proceedings, however, J.L. has been staying with Kevin for overnight visits, and she has met Kevin's wife and children.7 She refers to him as "Kevin," although the recently increased frequency of their interactions has led to her calling him "dad" on occasion. Kevin testified that this surge in interaction between himself and J.L. came about because Lori's custody action "forced [his] hand" in entering J.L.'s life earlier than he expected, though he had always hoped to do so at some unspecified future time.
¶10 Both Heather and Kevin challenged Lori's standing to seek in loco parentis status. Following an evidentiary hearing in which Lori, Heather, and Kevin all gave testimony, the trial court—citing our decision in Ramey —found that Lori "has not met her burden of being considered a parent under the doctrine of in loco parentis ... and shall not be entitled to further pursue the aforementioned action relative to the custody, visitation and child support" of J.L. Specifically, the trial court interpreted the final prong of our holding in Ramey as requiring the biological donor's consent to, and encouragement of, the non-biological same-sex partner's parental role. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to clarify the standing of non-biological co-parents in same-sex relationships, and to create a meaningful and comprehensive framework for the adjudication of the same. We now reverse.
¶11 The dismissal of a petition by the trial court is reviewed de novo . Ramey , ¶ 5, 362 P.3d at 219 ; Eldredge v. Taylor , 2014 OK 92, ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 888, 890. "Court supervision over the welfare of children is equitable in character." In re Bomgardner , 1985 OK 59, ¶ 17, 711 P.2d 92, 97 ; see also In re Guardianship of Sherle , 1984 OK CIV APP 23, ¶ 10, 683 P.2d 78, 80 (). " ‘The purpose of a court sitting in equity is to promote and achieve justice with some degree of flexibility.’ " Merritt v. Merritt , 2003 OK 68, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d 878, 883 (quoting Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Ass'n , 826 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo. 1992) ). Doing so "requires an inquiry into the particular circumstances of the case." Id. In a case of equitable cognizance, this Court "will administer complete relief on all issues formed by the evidence regardless of whether the pleadings specifically tendered them for resolution."8 In re Estate of Bartlett , 1984 OK 9, ¶ 4, 680 P.2d 369, 374.
¶12 "Whenever possible, an appellate court must render or cause to be rendered, that judgment which in its opinion the trial court should have rendered." Clark v. Edens , 2011 OK 28, ¶ 5, 254 P.3d 672, 675 ; see also Snow v. Winn, 1980 OK 27, ¶ 3, 607 P.2d 678, 680–81. "We are bound neither by the reasoning nor by the findings of the trial court." Estate of Bartlett , ¶ 4, 680 P.2d at 374. Though this Court does not disturb the trial court's factual findings merely because we disagree with them, we will substitute our own view when "the trier's decision is manifestly wrong.’’ Sides v. John Cordes, Inc. , 1999 OK 36, ¶ 17, 981 P.2d 301, 307–08.
¶13 In Ramey , we confronted an issue in many ways similar to that here. That case also involved a custody dispute between separated same-sex partners. There, we established a trifold test for acknowledging the in loco parentis standing of a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship where "the couple, prior to Bishop , or Obergefell , (1) were unable to marry legally; (2) engaged in intentional family planning to have a child and to co-parent; and (3) the biological parent acquiesced and encouraged the same sex partner's parental role following the birth of the child." Ramey , 2015 OK 79, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218.
¶14 Here, the trial court correctly found that Lori and Heather were unable to marry at the time of J.L.'s conception, and also that the couple had consciously decided to co-parent together.9 But the trial court erred in concluding that the third prong of this test required Kevin's acquiescence in, and encouragement of, Lori's parental role. In short, this was a fundamental misreading of Ramey . The only acquiescing "biological parent" contemplated by Ramey is the same-sex partner who "entered into an intentional intimate relationship and made a conscious decision to have a child and co-parent as a family." Id. ¶ 17, 362 P.3d at 221. Only Heather could have fulfilled that role here.
¶15 The trial court's faulty application of our precedent found root in footnote four of the Ramey opinion. The footnote specified that the biological father in Ramey had never had a relationship with the subject child, and thus had never asserted a claim for custody or visitation. Id . n.4, 362 P.3d at 219 n.4. But here, because Kevin alleged he had maintained some relationship—albeit minimal and covert—with J.L., the trial court erroneously reasoned that Ramey likewise required...
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