Schneider Marble Co v. Knight, (No. 18031.)

• Decision Date: 16 January 1928
• Docket Number: (No. 18031.)
• Parties: SCHNEIDER MARBLE CO. v. KNIGHT et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

37 Ga.App. 646

141 S.E. 420

SCHNEIDER MARBLE CO.

v.KNIGHT et al.

(No. 18031.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia,

Division No. 2.

Jan. 16, 1928.

(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

Error from City Court of Nashville; W. R. Smith, Judge.

Action by the Schneider Marble Company against P. T. Knight and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

C. A. Christian, of Tifton, and W. D. Buie, of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

R. F. Hendricks and Jeff S. Story, both of Nashville, and P. T. Knight, of Valdosta, for defendants in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

BELL, J. [1] 1. Where certain individuals, composing a committee to represent the general citizenry, whose names and identities were not disclosed, purchased a monument to be erected as a memorial to the soldiers from a given county who died in the World War, and the contract of purchase and sale was duly executed by the seller in terms of the agreement, the members of the committee may be held liable as individuals in a suit on account by the seller for the price of the monument. Civil Code 1910, §§ 3596, 3597; Lippincott & Co. v. Behre, 122 Ga. 543 (3), 50 S. E. 467; Willingham, Wright & Coving-ton v. Glover, 28 Ga. App. 394 (3), 111 S. E. 206; Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813 (1), 131 S. E. 527.

2. In such a case, where the order was signed by only one of the members of the committee, it would be permissible for the plaintiff to show by parol testimony that, with the knowledge of the plaintiff and of all persons concerned, this member, in signing the order, was acting for and by authority of the other members, as well as for himself, and thus that the others were bound, although the order purported on its face to have been executed by the signatory party upon his sole responsibility.

"Where a contract is signed by a person individually, parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that he was acting as agent for another." Fitzgerald Cotton Oil Co. v. Farmers' Supply Co., 3 Ga. App. 212(4), 59 S. E. 713; Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550(1), 134 S. E. 142; Harriman v. First Bryan Baptist Church, 63 Ga. 186, 36 Am. Rep. 117.

A different rule seems to prevail in the case of negotiable instruments or of contracts under seal. Burkhalter v. Perry, 127 Ga. 438, 56 S. E. 631, 119 Am. St. Rep. 343; Coaling Coal Co. v. Howard, 130 Ga. 807 (2), 61 S. E. 987, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1051.

3. Promissory notes are not payment until themselves paid, in the absence of agreement to the contrary. Civil Code 1910, § 4314. Whether the receipt of a promissory note amounts to a payment of the original debt depends upon the intention of the parties, and this intention may be proved by parol testimony, if the writing itself is silent or ambiguous on the question. Hall's Cotton Gin Co. v. Black, 71 Ga. 450 (2); Weaver v. Nixon, 69 Ga. 699 (2). The note in the present case, though bearing upon its face the memorandum, "Balance account for Berrien County Soldier Memorial, " was silent upon whether it was intended as payment, and the testimony offered by the plaintiffthat it had been given and accepted, not in settlement of the account, but merely as a matter of bookkeeping, and that such was the understanding of the parties, ought to have been...