Schneider v. State

Decision Date15 October 1973
Docket NumberNo. 48638,No. 1,48638,1
Citation130 Ga.App. 3,202 S.E.2d 238
PartiesAlfred T. SCHNEIDER v. The STATE
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Stanley P. Herndon, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Richard E. Hicks, Morris H. Rosenberg, Carter Goode, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

DEEN, Judge.

Where (1) the defendant in a criminal case contends that a confession sought to be introduced in evidence by the state was obtained as a result of coercion, and (2) the testimony on the point is in conflict, and (3) the judge leaves the question of voluntariness or coercion to the jury without making a preliminary finding that the confession was in fact voluntary, the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593. In such event, the case must be returned to the trial court, and the trial judge must hold a hearing to determine whether the confession was voluntary; in the absence of such hearing, or in the event the judge finds that the confession was coerced, the verdict will be set aside. See Hilliard v. State, 128 Ga.App. 157(8), 195 S.E.2d 772. That this was exactly the ruling in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, is shown by the dissent of Justice Black at page 409, 84 S.Ct. at page 1798, where he states: 'The Court, instead of reversing for an entire new trial, gives New York a reasonable time for a judge to hold a new hearing, including the taking of new testimony, to determine whether the confession was voluntary. . . . I . . . agree with my Brother Clark that what Jackson is entitled to is a complete new trial.'

2. It is to be observed that in both the Sims and Jackson cases there was some evidence which, at the time the confession was admitted in evidence, would have authorized the trial judge, had he exercised his discretion in that direction, to rule that the confession was coerced. In the present case, prior to the admission of the defendant's confession in evidence, a detective testified that the defendant had voluntarily given him a 'statement' which the defendant had himself written out on a typewriter available in the office. At this point the defendant's counsel indicated he had a motion, the judge sent the jury outside; counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground the defendant's Jackson v. Denno right had been violated, the judge stated that neither he nor the jury had been apprised of the contents of the 'statement' at this point and the defendant could proceed with a Jackson v. Denno hearing in the absence of the jury if he wished to; the defendant offered nothing, and the court then recalled the jury, allowed the confession to be admitted in evidence, and later instructed them that they were to determine whether it had been voluntarily made, and, if so, what weight to ascribe to it, but if not they were to reject it.

The defendant was convicted; a motion for new trial was presented one of the grounds of which was that the court had not made an initial independent determination of voluntariness prior to admitting the confession (in effect, that he had followed the old New York rule which the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in Jackson v. Denno rather than the Massachusetts rule which it indicated constituted a sufficient protection of these fair trial rights) and the court then called for a new hearing on the question. Again the...

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16 cases
  • Fain v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 25, 1983
    ...defendant Mary Fain must be granted a new trial. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98(4), 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981); Schneider v. State, 130 Ga.App. 3(1), 202 S.E.2d 238 (1973). We are unpersuaded by the state's additional argument that a voluntariness determination was not then, and is not now, requir......
  • Williamson v. State, 53637
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 3, 1977
    ...to strike an alleged confession was made with no contention that the statement was coerced or involuntary. Accord Schneider v. State, 130 Ga.App. 3, 202 S.E.2d 238. Accordingly, the case must be returned to the trial court, and the trial judge must hold a hearing to determine whether the co......
  • Peinado v. State, A96A2125
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 21, 1996
    ...statements or confessions that he has made. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Schneider v. State, 130 Ga.App. 2, 202 S.E.2d 238 (1973)." Pierce v. State, 238 Ga. 126(1), 128, 231 S.E.2d 744. The Supreme Court of the United States "has never ruled that all......
  • Porter v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 25, 1977
    ...statements or confessions that he has made. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Schneider v. State, 130 Ga.App. 3, 202 S.E.2d 238 (1973). At such a hearing, the state must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence (Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,......
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