Schneider v. Yakima County
| Decision Date | 10 December 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 36913,36913 |
| Citation | 65 Wn.2d 352,397 P.2d 411 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Ferdinand C. SCHNEIDER, Richard T. McVey, by Bernard O. McVey, his Guardian ad Litem, John Rodney Hoffman, by John Randolph Hoffman, his Guardian ad Litem, Wayne Anthony Manuel, by Rudolph A. Manuel, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondents, v. YAKIMA COUNTY, a municipal corporation, Appellant. |
Lincoln E. Shropshire, Pros. Atty., Fred L. Stewart, Deputy Pros. Atty., Yakima, for appellant.
Tonkoff, Holst & Hanson, William B. Holst, Nashem & Prediletto, George H. Mullins, Yakima, for respondents.
An automobile, leaving a county road on a curve at the top of a steep declivity, went out into space and hurtled downward 83 feet to its first landing, and then continued downward to an ultimate landing 120 feet below the road. One occupant of the car was killed, and others were seriously injured.
The occupants were five boys, 16 or 17 years of age. The father of the boy who was killed brought a wrongful death action. Individual actions on behalf of each of three other boys, who were injured, were brought by their respective fathers as their guardians ad litem. 1 The defendant in each action was Yakima County (hereinafter called the County).
The actions were consolidated for trial, and the jury brought in a verdict for each plaintiff. From the judgments entered on these verdicts, the County appeals.
Thomas Cantwell, who did all the driving, borrowed his brother's new 1959 Pontiac Catalina automobile (referred to by Wayne Manuel as a 'hot rod') to take the other four boys for a ride. With him in the front seat were Wayne Manuel and Richard McVey; in the back seat were Ferdinand Schneider, Jr., and John Hoffman. They proceeded west on Summitview Avenue to Mize Road, thence south on Mize Road to Tieton Drive, thence west on Tieton Drive to the place of the accident. Along the way, they decided to test the car's speed and it reached 105 miles per hour.
A drawing, showing the curve on which the accident occurred, follows and will serve to make clear the situation as one proceeds west on Tieton Drive approaching that curve.
The road, as it curves sharply to the north, dips somewhat steeply (a 7.9 per cent grade) and then curves again to the southwest, climbing more gradually until it is again an east-west straight-away and, seemingly, in line with Tieton Drive east of the curve. The testimony is that a driver, traveling west, receives the impression that he is approaching a dip in Tieton Drive, rather than a curve, and that he sees Tieton Drive some distance ahead of him as though on the other side of the dip. This testimony is confirmed by the pictures in evidence.
Approaching from the east, the first sign of significance in this case was an intersection sign (see A). It was 444 feet east of the curve and 354 feet east of Mahre Road and was intended to direct attention to the intersection with Mahre Road, which comes in from the right.
Next is a reverse curve sign (see B), 310 feet east of the curve and 220 feet east of Mahre Road, intended to direct attention to the curve with which we are concerned.
There were no advisory speed signs and no 'slow' signs or other warnings that speed should be reduced for the curve. The legal speed limit on Tieton Drive was 60 miles per hour. There is evidence that any speed in excess of 35 miles an hour was dangerous for westbound traffic on this curve.
The testimony as to the speed at which Cantwell was driving, when he entered this curve, varied from 55 to 70 miles an hour--based on in-court and out-of-court statements made by the occupants of the car. An engineer computed, from the physical facts, that the car's speed when it left the road was 48.78 miles per hour.
Other facts and other testimony will be referred to as we consider the specific assignments of error.
The County urges that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the County was negligent, as a matter of law, in failing to perform its duty
'* * * to erect and maintain warning and other signs as to color, design, erection and location in accordance with the uniform standards adopted by the State Highway Commission. * * *' (Instruction No. 10) Instruction No. 19 told the jury that the County had the duty to exercise reasonable care to see that its roads and highways were maintained in a safe condition for ordinary travel, and that included the duty to give adequate warning of dangerous conditions in the highway. No error was assigned to this instruction.
The jury could conclude that there existed a dangerous condition and that reasonable care required an adequate warning. That the County had reached that conclusion is indicated by its placement of the two warning signs to which we have referred.
In considering this assignment of error, we are not concerned with any statutory duty of the County to place warning signs in the first instance, but with its duty (it having determined that markings are necessary) to conform with the
'* * * uniform state standard of color, design, erection and location adopted and designed by the Washington state highway commission. * * *' RCW 36.86.040 2
The necessity for a requirement of uniformity in color, design, manner of erection and location in a state having 39 counties seems obvious.
It was admitted by the county engineer that the signs placed by the County did not conform to certain standards adopted by the state highway commission, I.e., that the curve was on a radius that required a reverse turn sign (see C on page 412) rather than a reverse curve sign, and the minimum distance for such a turn sign is 350 feet from the beginning of the turn; and the sign which was erected was only 310 feet from the beginning of the turn.
This warranted the instruction that the County was negligent, as a matter of law, for its failure to conform to the uniform state standards.
The County's principal contention is that its failure to conform to state standards, and its other negligence if any, was not a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.
If the curve could not be taken safely at a speed in excess of 35 miles an hour (the legal limit being 60 miles an hour), the jury could conclude that the County was responsible for a lethal trap in not placing signs indicating a safe speed, or in cautioning drivers to drastically reduce speed, as well as for the failure to conform to the state's standards to which we have just referred. The jury could also have concluded that constructing the road with inadequate superelevation on the curve was negligence, or that the signs as placed, with the Mahre Road intersection so close to the curve, deceived and misled the traveling public.
Was any such negligence of the County a proximate cause of the accident? We could concede that it could not be conclusively determined that every negligent act or omission for which the County was responsible was a proximate cause of the car leaving the highway. If, for instance, the driver of the car had driven this route before and was familiar with the conditions and was just showing off his brother's hotrod, all the signs conceivable and wherever placed would not have influenced the result one iota. The driver of the car was in the courtroom during the trial, and his familiarity with the road, or lack of it, could have been ascertained; but for reasons best known to the trial tacticians he was not called as a witness 3 by any of the plaintiffs, or by the County.
The only testimony from which we can draw any inferences relating to proximate...
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