Schneidler v. Feeder's Grain & Supply Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 February 2000 |
| Citation | 24 S.W.3d 739 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. E.D. 2000) . Darryl Kenneth Schneidler, Respondent, v. Feeder's Grain and Supply, Inc., and Miller's Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois, Appellants. Case Number: ED75167 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Pike County, Hon. Fred Rush
Counsel for Appellant: Mark R. Bates
Counsel for Respondent: James D. Beck
Opinion Summary: Employer and insurer appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of employee. The trial court entered the judgment requiring employer and insurer to pay employee for the cost of a new prosthesis pursuant to the terms of a workers' compensation settlement, which provided employer to pay all future medical expenses of employee related to the injury.
AFFIRMED.
Northern Division Holds: (1) The trial court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment in accordance with the workers' compensation settlement agreement. (2) The judgment was enforceable through a garnishment proceeding. (3) The trial court did not err in granting employee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Opinion modified by Court's own motion on February 29, 2000. This substitution does not constitute a new opinion.
Feeder's Grain & Supply, Inc. ("employer") and Miller's Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois ("insurer") appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Darryl Schneidler ("employee"). The judgment ordered employer and insurer to pay employee $30,852.00 for the cost of a new prosthesis pursuant to the terms of a workers' compensation settlement, which provided employer to pay all future medical expenses of employee related to the injury. On appeal, employer and insurer challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court in enforcing a judgment from a settlement in the Division of Workers' Compensation ("division"). They also argue summary judgment was improper because material facts were in dispute. We affirm.
Employee was injured while working for employer on September 16, 1993. The damage from the accident caused his right arm to be amputated below the elbow. Employee filed a claim with the division against employer and insurer.
During the pendancy of the claim, employee received a prosthesis that was paid for by employer and insurer. Eleven months later, employee visited NovaCare to have a prosthetic evaluation, where it was determined that a new prosthesis would enhance the ability of his limb over his current prosthesis. Employee had selected NovaCare without the approval of employer or insurer. NovaCare sent a letter to employer and insurer detailing future plans for a new prosthesis and attempting to gain authorization for its payment. Employee never received an approval or denial from employer or insurer in response to NovaCare's letter.
The parties thereafter entered into a Stipulation For Compromise Settlement ("agreement"), approved by an administrative law judge. The agreement included a hand-written statement: "Employer & insurer shall pay for and reimburse claimant for all future medical expenses, prosthetic expenses & prosthetic care incurred by claimant which arises out of 9-16-93 injury." The agreement did not contain language requiring employer and insurer to approve any physicians, prosthetic specialist, or future treatment prior to reimbursing employee.
Employee received his new prosthesis approximately four days after the agreement was final. NovaCare sent a second letter to employer and insurer, who continued to fail to pay for or reimburse employee for the new prosthesis. Employee filed a motion to enforce the agreement in the circuit court. The trial court entered a judgment incorporating all of the terms of the agreement. Thereafter, employee filed a Request for Garnishment to collect $30,832.00 for the cost of the new prosthesis pursuant to the judgment. Employer and insurer filed a Motion to Quash Garnishment, which was denied after a hearing. A second Request for Garnishment was filed and discovery was conducted. Employee then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted employee's motion, and this appeal followed.
In their first point, employer and insurer argue the trial court lacked jurisdiction because this issue lies exclusively within the Workers' Compensation Division.
Jurisdiction concerns the right, power and authority of a court to act. Heinle v. K & R Express Systems, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Mo. App. 1996). Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court by their actions or agreements, where such jurisdiction does not otherwise exist. Id. The only power the court has when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is to dismiss the action; any other actions or proceedings of the court are null and void. Id. The court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the proceedings. Id.
Section 287.500 RSMo 19941 provides in pertinent part:
Any party in interest may file in the circuit court of the county in which the accident occurred, a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement approved by the division or by the commission . . . whereupon said court shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though said judgment were a final judgment which had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court.
Under the plain meaning of the statute, the trial court is authorized to enter a judgment on an approved workers' compensation settlement as if it was an original judgment of the court. Therefore, the trial court herein possessed the authority to enter a judgment in accordance with the agreement.
Our analysis, however, does not conclude here. We must decide whether the judgment entered by the trial court was enforceable through a garnishment proceeding.
To be enforceable by execution, a money judgment must specify with certainty the amount for which it is rendered, or if the amount is not stated, it must be ascertainable from the record. Javier v. Javier, 955 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Mo. App. 1...
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