Schnitker v. Springfield Urban League, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4–15–0991.,4–15–0991.
• Citation: 2016 IL App (4th) 150991,67 N.E.3d 583
• Parties: Jamie SCHNITKER, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. SPRINGFIELD URBAN LEAGUE, INC., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2016 IL App (4th) 150991

67 N.E.3d 583

Jamie SCHNITKER, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.SPRINGFIELD URBAN LEAGUE, INC., Defendant–Appellant.

No. 4–15–0991.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 22, 2016.

Geri Lynn Arrindell, John L. Gilbert, and Timothy C. Sansone (argued), of Sandberg Phoenix & Von Gontard P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.

Colleen R. Lawless (argued), of Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In June 2015, plaintiff, Jamie Schnitker, filed a second amended complaint, alleging defendant, Springfield Urban League, Inc., failed to rehire her for a teaching position after illegally discriminating against her based on her race and religion in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) ( 775 ILCS 5/1–101 to 10–104 (West 2010)). The following month, plaintiff prevailed in a jury trial, where she was awarded $100,000 in damages.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by tendering three of plaintiff's proposed jury instructions related to the Act, asserting those instructions inaccurately stated the law. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Factual Overview

¶ 5 From September 1997 until May 2010, plaintiff was a teacher for defendant's Jacksonville Head Start facility. Plaintiff is Caucasian and of a non-Pentecostal religion. In March 2010, plaintiff's job performance was rated as above average, and she was recommended for rehire for the 2010 to 2011 school year. During this time, plaintiff observed her site supervisor, who was African–American and of the Pentecostal faith, slowly replacing vacant positions at the Jacksonville facility with new staff that were African–American and/or affiliated with the supervisor's Pentecostal church. By January 2010, approximately half of the Jacksonville employees were associated with the Pentecostal church. The site supervisor denied she had any authority to make hiring or termination decisions. Plaintiff and two of her Caucasian, non-Pentecostal coworkers complained of preferential treatment toward the new employees, which included those employees receiving extra time off, receiving permission to complete work for the church during school hours, and opportunities for summer employment.

¶ 6 Due to concerns over grant funding, in June 2010, all Head Start employees, including plaintiff, received termination letters. However, as of August 19, 2010, all but three employees at the Jacksonville facilities had received their return-to-work letters. Plaintiff and the two other Caucasian, non-Pentecostal employees were the only employees who had not received their return-to-work letters. Defendant asserted the delay in sending plaintiff and her two coworkers return-to-work letters was attributed to a pending internal audit of random workers throughout its numerous Head Start programs, including those three employees at the Jacksonville facility.

¶ 7 On August 23, 2010, despite not receiving a return-to-work letter, plaintiff reported for orientation but was told to leave because she was not on the list as a teacher. According to defendant, this led to plaintiff thereafter engaging in disrespectful behavior, such as cursing, throwing a telephone, and being disruptive to the point where she was escorted from one of the Head Start facilities. Prior to these occurrences, defendant claimed plaintiff was scheduled to be recalled as a teacher for the 2010 to 2011 school year once the audit had been completed. However, defendant cited plaintiff's behavior as its reason for not rehiring plaintiff. Plaintiff denied all misbehavior other than cursing in a facility parking lot when she was alone with a friend. A newly certified teacher, who was both African–American and Pentecostal, was hired as a full-time teacher.

¶ 8 B. Administrative Proceedings

¶ 9 Plaintiff sought review of defendant's decision not to hire her with the Department of Human Rights (Department) on the grounds that defendant had discriminated against her on the basis of her religion and race. In April 2011, the Department dismissed her claim due to lack of substantial evidence.

¶ 10 C. Trial Court Proceedings

¶ 11 1. Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 12 In October 2011, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, alleging defendant's decision not to rehire her was a pretext for racial discrimination (count I) and religious discrimination (count II) and, therefore, it violated the Act. Id. Plaintiff asserted other teachers who were non-Caucasian and Pentecostal, both those similarly situated and those of lesser experience and seniority, were rehired.

¶ 13 In November 2013, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination. The trial court denied the motion in February 2014, finding issues of material fact remained that precluded summary judgment. In June 2015, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint containing the same allegations of racial and religious discrimination.

¶ 14 2. Jury Instructions

¶ 15 Later that month, the parties filed their proposed jury instructions. Three of those instructions are at issue on this appeal.

¶ 16 a. Plaintiff's Instruction Nos. 15 and 16

¶ 17 Plaintiff's instruction Nos. 15 and 16 outline the elements of workplace discrimination based on race and religion. The instructions are nearly identical; the only difference is that plaintiff's instruction No. 15 included language regarding racial discrimination, whereas plaintiff's instruction No. 16 included language regarding religious discrimination. Due to the similarity of the instructions and the parties' arguments, we address these instructions together.

¶ 18 Plaintiff's instruction Nos. 15 and 16 were tendered as follows. The bracketed language highlights the differing language in plaintiff's instruction No. 16. The first portion of plaintiff's instruction Nos. 15 and 16 outlined plaintiff's theory that defendant's refusal to rehire her was based on pretext.

"In this case, Plaintiff claims that she was not rehired to her teaching position because of her race [religion]. Defendant denies this claim and asserts that it did not rehire Plaintiff due to her unprofessional conduct on or after August 23, 2010.

To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove five things by a preponderance of the evidence:

First, that Plaintiff is Caucasian [non-Pentecostal];

Second, that Plaintiff applied for and was qualified to be rehired to her teaching position;

Third, that Defendant did not rehire Plaintiff to her teaching position;

Fourth, that Defendant rehired similarly situated non-Caucasian [Pentecostal] teachers and other personnel who had less seniority and less education than Plaintiff[;]

Fifth, that Plaintiff sustained damages as a result of Defendant's decision not to rehire her[.]

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proven, then your verdict should be for Plaintiff. On the other hand, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Defendant."

Plaintiff cited this portion of the instruction as a modified version of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 250.02 (2006). Plaintiff later tendered the following additional language to plaintiff's instruction Nos. 15 and 16, which outlines her motivating-factor theory of liability:

"In the alternative, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her race [religion] was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision not to rehire her. A motivating factor is something that contributed to Defendant's decision.

If you find that Plaintiff has proven that her race [religion] contributed to Defendant's decision not to rehire her, you must then decide whether Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have rehired her even if Plaintiff was not Caucasian [was Pentecostal]. If so, you must enter a verdict for the Plaintiff but you may not award her damages."

¶ 19 This motivating-factor portion of plaintiff's instruction Nos. 15 and 16 cited 7th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 3.01 (2005 rev.). Defendant objected to the fourth element of the pretext portion—"that Defendant rehired similarly situated non-Caucasian [Pentecostal] teachers and other personnel who had less seniority and less education than Plaintiff"—as incorrectly omitting plaintiff's burden to prove causation. Further, defendant objected to the mixed-motive paragraphs as inaccurately stating the law. Accordingly, defendant tendered alternative instructions, defendant's instruction Nos. 11 and 12, which omitted the mixed-motive paragraphs and amended the fourth element of the pretext paragraphs to read: " that Defendant did not rehire Plaintiff because of her race [religion]." The trial court denied defendant's instruction Nos. 11 and 12 and ordered plaintiff's instruction Nos. 15 and 16 given over defendant's objections. Additionally, the jury instructions contained a scrivener's error the parties corrected after the trial court read the instructions to the jury. Because the scrivener's error does not impact our analysis of this case, we will not address it.

¶ 20 b. Plaintiff's Instruction No. 17

¶ 21 Plaintiff's instruction No. 17 read:

"You must decide whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race or religion. The fact that Defendant may have treated some Caucasians or non-Pentecostal employees favorably does not immunize it from liability in this case. In other words, you may find Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff even though Defendant did not discriminate against other Caucasian or non-Pentecostal employees."

This nonpattern instruction cited an unpublished federal district court case, Woods v. Von Maur, Inc., No. 09 C 7800, 2012 WL 2062400 (N.D.Ill. June 7, 2012). Defenda...