Schoenfeld v. Buker

Citation262 Minn. 122,114 N.W.2d 560
Decision Date09 March 1962
Docket NumberNo. 38207,38207
PartiesEdwin SCHOENFELD, Appellant, v. Dorothy BUKER et al., Respondents.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Syllabus by the Court

1. The vacation of stipulations is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court and its action will not be reversed unless it can be shown that the court acted in such an arbitrary manner as to frustrate justice.

2. In determining whether to grant or deny an application for relief from a stipulation of dismissal based upon compromise and settlement the court must necessarily consider the equities of the parties.

3. A stipulation of dismissal is presumed to be valid and the refusal of the court below to set it aside will be reversed on appeal only for abuse of judicial discretion.

4. Although an alleged mistake need not be 'mutual' in the sense that both parties are under a similar delusion there must be concealment or at least knowledge on the part of one party that the other party is laboring under a mistake in order to set aside a release for unilateral mistake.

5. In order to justify rescinding a contract or release on the ground of mutual mistake, the mistake must be as to a past or present fact material to the contract.

6. The appellant's claim that the settlement was improvidently made must be determined not only by the seriousness of his injuries or by the extent of his damages but also by the probability of his recovery.

7. The dismissal with prejudice, arrived at in open court, became binding upon the parties and stands as a bar to the bringing of another action on the same cause, even though the formality of discharging the action may not have been entered of record.

Blethen, Ogle, Gage & Krause, Mankato, for appellant.

Carroll, Thorson, Anderson & Cronan, Minneapolis, for respondents.

NELSON, Justice.

This is an appeal by Edwin Schoenfeld from an order denying a motion to set aside a stipulation of dismissal, for leave to amend his complaint, and to have the cause reinstated on the trial calendar.

Following an automobile accident on October 29, 1955, suits were instituted against appellant as follows:

(a) Rachel Buker v. Edward Schoenfeld, Dorothy Buker, and Edwin Buker;

(b) Loren Buker v. Edwin Schoenfeld, Dorothy Buker, and Edwin Buker;

(c) Dorothy Buker and Gerald Buker v. Edwin Schoenfeld;

(d) Edwin Buker v. Edwin Schoenfeld.

This appeal, however, involves an action by Edwin Schoenfeld against Dorothy Buker and Edwin Buker arising out of the same automobile accident.

The trial of the actions brought by Rachel and Loren Buker was commenced in the District Court of Waseca County on October 18, 1956. Negotiations for settlement got under way during the course of the trial and as a result, on October 22, the five cases, including the one here on appeal, were settled and disposed of by stipulation of dismissal in the following form:

'It is hereby stipulated that the above entitled action, having been completely and fully compromised and settled, may be and hereby is dismissed on its merits with prejudice but without costs to either party; and the clerk of said court, upon the filing of this stipulation, is hereby authorized and directed to so dismiss said action of record.

'Dated at Waseca Minn, the 22nd day of October. 56.

'/s/ Edwin Schoenfeld

/s/ H. J. Tschohl

Attorney for Plaintiff

/s/ Harold J. Carroll

Attorney for Defendant'

The release, signed by appellant in the presence of attorneys for his insurance company as well as his personal counsel, H. J. Tschohl, reads as follows:

'For valuable considerations, including contributions on behalf of Dorothy Buker and Edwin Buker, in cases against me, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I do hereby release and forever discharge Dorothy Buker and Edwin Buker from all claims, demands and right of action whatsoever, which I ever had, which I now have or can have on account of injury or injuries both known and unknown to person, damage to property, loss of services and medical expense sustained by me, or which may hereafter arise, in consequence of an accident which occurred on or about the 29 day of October 1955 at or near Waseca, Minnesota

'It is agreed that the payment of the above sum is not to be construed as an admission by or on behalf of the above named party of any liability whatsoever on account of said accident, and the above sum is accepted in full satisfaction of all claims arising from the above mentioned accident.

'Executed at Waseca, Minnesota this 22 day of October 1956

'/s/ Edwin Schoenfeld

'In the presence of

/s/ W. W. Laidlaw

/s/ H. J. Tschohl

/s/ Edward J. Callahan, Jr.'

The compromise and settlement was forthwith approved by the trial court with all parties represented by their counsel.

The accident occurred at the intersection of St. Mary's Township Road and State Aid Road No. 9 about 3 miles from Waseca. Appellant was the driver of his automobile, and Dorothy Buker was the driver of the other automobile involved, which was owned by Edwin Buker. Rachel Buker, the wife of Loren Buker, was a passenger in the automobile driven by Dorothy Buker. Gerald Buker is the husband of Dorothy Buker. The intersection was uncontrolled, with the directional right-of-way in favor of defendant Dorothy Buker. The two automobiles collided at some point in the intersection resulting in injuries to both drivers and Rachel Buker.

Dr. S. T. Normann, a physician practicing in Waseca, was called and arrived shortly after the accident. He found that appellant was hanging out of the right front door of his car with his head and shoulders on the ground and his legs caught inside the car. He had received a head injury, was comatose, and responded only slightly to stimulation. Upon arrival at the hospital it was found he had, besides the head injury, a bruise of the right temple, a small laceration at the middle of the forehead, and a laceration of the right side of the lower lip. Both of his knees were bruised and he also had multiple body bruises. X-rays of the skull were taken and found to be negative. He remained in a state of coma for approximately one week and was discharged from the hospital November 17, 1955. It also appears that due to a concussion he suffered amnesia for a period of time after the accident. In his affidavit he states that he does not remember any events from the time of the accident until December 25, 1955.

The record indicates that on November 25, 1955, appellant was examined by Dr. Siegfried C. G. Oeljen of Waseca, an eye specialist. Dr. Oeljen had previously treated appellant following a gunshot wound causing injury to his right eye. Removal of that eye became necessary, but the record indicates that no involvement of the left eye took place at the time. The results of the examination by Dr. Oeljen on November 25 were negative except that there were a few vitreous floaters in the left eye. A refraction was done at the time. With glasses his vision was 20/20. Later, on March 19, 1957, Schoenfeld again consulted Dr. Oeljen and it was found that his vision had decreased to 20/60 and that the fundus of the eye now showed many vitreous floaters present. Treatment was prescribed but his condition did not respond after several weeks and Dr. Oeljen promptly sent him to the Mayo Clinic. The condition in his eye was diagnosed there as a perivasculitis with scar tissue manifestation in the retina. A small arc of retinal detachment was present. Treatment was continued over a period of several months, during which time his vision improved to 20/40. While driving his tractor on August 28, 1958, he received a sudden jar when the tractor hit a bump and he experienced a drop in his vision to a point where he was able only to count fingers at 3 feet. Dr. Oeljen stated that he believes that appellant received injuries in the accident of October 29, 1955, causing an inflammatory process to start which gradually led to more and more scar tissue formation within the eye and which has gradually caused a detachment of the retina with resulting blindness.

Appellant carried a policy of automobile insurance with the Minnesota Mutual Fire & Casualty Insurance Company which provided for a $20,000 limit of liability for each person and a $40,000 limit for each accident. Two letters sent to appellant by the attorney for his insurance company stated that it was the insurer's purpose to inform him of his rights under the policy so that he might, if he desired, retain independent counsel to protect himself from personal exposure above the policy limits. Insurance counsel in both letters stated that he would be willing to associate and cooperate with such counsel, but each letter contained the further statement that:

'If I have not heard from you or if the company has not heard from you we will then assume that you do not wish to be represented for the excess over the policy limits.'

The first letter informed him that the suits brought against him by Rachel Buker and Loren Buker were considered as one so that his limit of protection agaisnt them would be $20,000 although the aggregate amount demanded by the plaintiffs totalled $80,000. The other letter, written after Dorothy and Gerald Buker had instituted their action, pointed out that they also demanded damages in excess of $20,000, the limit of coverage for the claims asserted in that action.

Appellant was advised that under a compromise and settlement he would escape the danger of having a judgment entered against him in excess of his policy limits, and he knew that in consideration of such benefits he would have to release his claim for damages.

The record indicates that appellant was well aware of the fact that the Buker car had the directional right-of-way. A reading of the record leads to the conclusion that plaintiff's own insurance carrier and its attorney, as well as his own personal counsel, in their evaluation of the probable liability in view of the...

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