Schofield v. Hatfield
| Citation | 103 S.E. 732,25 Ga.App. 513 |
| Decision Date | 19 July 1920 |
| Docket Number | 10716. |
| Parties | SCHOFIELD v. HATFIELD. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court.
When two persons are engaged in the violation of the same criminal statute in the same manner and at the same time, but the act of each is separate and distinct from the act of the other and one of them is injured as a proximate result of such criminal act on the part of the other, he may nevertheless recover therefor, if his own criminal conduct has not proximately contributed to his injury.
Under the evidence in this case, whether or not the injured party was injured as a proximate result of his own negligence, or solely as a proximate result of the negligence of the other were questions of fact for the jury. The verdict which was found for the defendant not being demanded as a matter of law under the evidence, the first grant of a new trial to the plaintiff will not be disturbed.
Error from City Court of Macon; Du Pont Guerry, Judge.
Action by Mrs. I. I. Hatfield against J. S. Schofield. Verdict for defendant, a new trial was granted, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Mrs. I I. Hatfield brought suit against J. S. Schofield to recover for the homicide of her son. She alleged that the homicide was caused by the automobile of the defendant negligently colliding with an automobile which her son was driving along a public highway. Among various grounds of negligence as the cause of the injury, she alleged the negligence of the defendant in running his automobile along a public highway at a dangerous and unlawful rate of speed in excess of 60 miles per hour, in violation of a penal statute of the state regulating the speed of automobiles along public highways. There was evidence in support of these various allegations of negligence. It particularly appeared that both automobiles were traveling in the same direction along the highway, at a rate of speed in excess of 60 miles per hour, that the automobile in which the plaintiff's son was driving was overtaken by the defendant's automobile, and, while both were turning a curve in the road, the defendant's automobile ran into the automobile driven by the son and wrecked it, thereby causing his death. The jury found a verdict for the defendant. Upon motion of the plaintiff the verdict was set aside, and a new trial granted. To this grant of a new trial the defendant excepts, contending that the verdict, under the undisputed evidence, was demanded as a matter of law.
P. F Brock and Miller & Jones, all of Macon, for plaintiff in error.
Jordan & Moore and R. L. Berner, all of Macon, for defendant in error.
STEPHENS J. (after stating the facts as above).
The plaintiff's right to recover must necessarily depend upon the defendant's negligence as the proximate cause of the injury. She, of course, cannot recover upon her own negligence or that of the person injured. Any negligent act of the defendant in which the person injured participates and which is the joint act of both parties must necessarily be the negligence of the person injured as well as the defendant, and, if the proximate cause of the injury, would necessarily bar a recovery. If, however, the negligence of the parties...
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