Schoger v. State

• Decision Date: 01 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 35917.,35917.
• Citation: 226 P.3d 1269
• Parties: Shey Marie SCHOGER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

226 P.3d 1269

Shey Marie SCHOGER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 35917.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 2009 Term.

February 1, 2010.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, Boise, for appellant. Dennis Benjamin argued.

The Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

Shey Schoger appeals from the district court's denial of her ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. We affirm.

I.

In 2004, Shey Schoger was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine (400 grams or more). The State and Schoger reached a plea agreement wherein Schoger would plead guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine (200 grams or more), and the State would recommend the mandatory minimum fixed sentence of five years with an unspecified indeterminate term. At the plea hearing, Schoger told the court that she had 56 grams of methamphetamine on her person and that there was more than 200 grams in her house that she shared with her boyfriend. In response, the court asked her whether she had intended to exercise control over the drugs in the house, and she responded "no." Based on this denial, the court refused to accept either her guilty plea or an Alford plea. At the ensuing trial, Schoger was found guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine (400 grams or more) and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum fixed term of ten years and an indeterminate term of five years.

After Schoger lost an appeal in which she contended that her sentence was excessive, Schoger filed a petition for post-conviction relief in district court, alleging (1) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to explain the factual and legal basis necessary for her to plead guilty and (2) that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advance the claim that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting Schoger's Alford guilty plea. On the first claim, the district court held that while trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to advise Schoger of the elements of her offense, she was not prejudiced because she did not have a right to plead guilty to a crime that she denied committing. On the second claim, the district court held that appellate counsel was not ineffective because Schoger would not have prevailed even if the issue had been presented on direct appeal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Schoger's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of Schoger's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, holding that had Schoger properly understood the legal concept, she could have truthfully admitted to constructive possession of the methamphetamine. As a result, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. The State then requested, and we granted, review of all issues on appeal.

II.

This Court grants review of decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals in strictly limited circumstances. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b), the "[g]ranting [of] a petition for review from a final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons...." Idaho App. R. 118(b). While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when considering a case on review, it reviews the district court's decision directly. State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009).

A.

For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to survive summary dismissal, the petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 362, 367 (2008). To establish deficient assistance, the claimant has the burden of showing that her attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d at 367. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the claimant's counsel was competent and diligent. Id. More simply put, "the standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). Additionally, to establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d at 367.

1. Trial Counsel

Schoger argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to explain the factual and legal basis necessary for her guilty plea. At the plea hearing, the following exchange transpired:

BY THE COURT: So you can just tell me right now, did you know it was there or did you only possess 56 grams that you told me about at first?

A: Yes. Yes. It was in the house and—

Q: And you knew about it?

A: I didn't know, I didn't know that much, but I knew there was some in there.

Q: Did you have the intention to exercise control over it?

A: No.

The district court then explained its rationale for rejecting her guilty plea: "What she has just told me here is a defense, is a factual innocence assertion as to the charge.... She's told me that she did not commit the crime to which she would have pled under the information." From this, Schoger argues that had she properly understood the intricacies of constructive possession, she may have answered truthfully that she did intend to exercise control, and the court would have accepted her plea.

Both the district court and the Court of Appeals held that the failure to advise a defendant of the elements of her offense is an omission that constitutes deficient performance. However, the district court held that Schoger was not prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance because she did not have a right to plead guilty to a crime that she denied committing. The Court of Appeals reversed on this point, holding that "liberally construing the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Schoger, her statements are sufficient to raise an inference that she would have admitted to constructively possessing the methamphetamine in the residence had she adequately understood the legal concept." The court further held that "[h]ad counsel adequately advised Schoger of the legal principle of constructive possession, Schoger perhaps would have truthfully admitted being in constructive possession."

We affirm the district court's denial of Schoger's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Schoger argues that she may have truthfully admitted to being in constructive possession of the drugs had she understood the legal concept because the district court's question was directed only at her future intent to exercise control over the methamphetamine, and consequently, she may truthfully have admitted to constructively possessing the drugs by exercising control in the past.¹ Schoger argues that through this interpretation, she could have truthfully testified at an evidentiary hearing that she constructively possessed at least 200 grams. However, there is one major problem with Schoger's argument—Schoger cannot establish the requisite causation element of her claim. In other words, regardless of whether trial counsel's performance was deficient, Schoger cannot show that but for trial counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Even if trial counsel would have explained the minutiae of constructive possession, and even further assuming that the district court's question was subject to conflicting interpretations, it does not follow that Schoger would have answered the district court's question any differently. Trial counsel's explanation of the elements of constructive possession would not have changed Schoger's interpretation of the district court's inquiry.²

Related to this, Schoger's assignment of error does not arise from trial counsel's failure to explain the elements of constructive possession, but rather arises from an alleged misunderstanding by the court as to what Schoger was admitting. To illustrate, Schoger argues that her misunderstanding of the intricacies of constructive possession "combined with the Court's questions phrased in the future tense, led to a misunderstanding by the Court as to what Ms. Schoger was admitting." Thus, Schoger's assertion is, in effect, that the district court should not have rejected her guilty plea premised upon her denial of any future intent to exercise control over the methamphetamine. This assertion fails to establish a causal link between counsel's failure to explain the intricacies of constructive possession and the district court's rejection of her guilty plea.

To summarize, Schoger repeatedly argues that had she been properly instructed in the finer points of constructive possession, the court would have accepted her guilty plea. Completely missing in this analysis is the question of why that is the case—her argument lacks any explanation of cause and effect. Therefore, Schoger has not shown that but for trial counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Consequently, because Schoger has not met her burden of proving the causation element of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim, she cannot show that she was prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged deficient performance. For this reason, we affirm the district court's summary dismissal of Schoger's claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

2. Appellate C...