School Bd. of City of Marshall v. State by Criminal Dist. Atty. ex rel. Warbritton
| Decision Date | 15 February 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. A-8050,A-8050 |
| Citation | 343 S.W.2d 247,162 Tex. 9 |
| Parties | SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF MARSHALL et al., Petitioners, v. STATE of Texas, by the CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY ex rel. Don WARBRITTON et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Gaines Baldwin, Smith & Hall, Marshall, Hart & Hart, Austin, for petitioners.
Jones, Brian & Jones, Marshall, for respondents.
This is a direct attack by quo warranto on an ordinance extending the corporate limits of the City of Marshall for school purposes only to embrace the territory of the Woodlawn Common School District No. 13. The ordinance is challenged on the ground that the petition requesting such extension was not signed by a majority of the resident qualified voters of the affected area as required by Article 2803, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stat. In response to the single special issue submitted, the jury found that the petition was signed by a majority of the voters residing in District 13, and judgment was entered on the verdict upholding the ordinance and decreeing that respondents take nothing. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained eight of respondents' nine points of error, including one asserting that the finding of the jury is contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence, and remanded the cause for a new trial. 337 S.W.2d 731.
Article 2803 authorizes a city to extend its school limits by ordinance on a petition signed by a majority of the voters residing in the area to be annexed and recommended by a majority vote of the board of school trustees of the city. When a petition is presented, someone must decide whether it is signed by the required number of voters. We think it is clear that the power to make that determination is conferred upon the governing body of the city by necessary implication, and respondents do not contend otherwise. No claim is made that the requested extension was not recommended by a majority of the board of school trustees, and the City Commission expressly found that the petition was signed by a majority of the resident qualified voters of District 13. The fundamental question presented by this appeal is the scope of judicial review of that finding.
It is settled that where the Legislature expressly or impliedly authorizes some officer or board to determine a question of fact prior to the ordering of an election for the creation of a political entity or for changing the boundaries of one already in existence without providing for a review of such preliminary finding, the administrative determination of that question is intended to be final. The finding when made is not subject to collateral attack and can be set aside in a direct proceeding only on the ground of fraud or bad faith. Scarborough v. Eubank, 93 Tex. 106, 53 S.W. 573; State v. Goodwin, 69 Tex. 55, 5 S.W. 678; State ex rel. Thompson v. Lester, Tex.Civ.App., 50 S.W.2d 386 (wr. ref.); Word v. Schow, Tex.Civ.App., 68 S.W. 192 (wr. ref.); Thompson v. State, 23 Tex.Civ.App. 370, 56 S.W. 603 (no writ); Driver v. Edwards, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 1109 (no writ); State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Self, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 756. See also Boynton v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W. 893 (wr. ref.); Wolf v. Young, Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W.2d 744 ().
Respondents argue that a different rule should be applied in this case, because here the ultimate issue is decided by the authority which makes the preliminary determination rather than by a vote of the people. In some of the cases cited above the courts have noted that the decisive factor in the proceeding then under consideration was the vote at the election and not the signatures on the petition, but the real basis of the holdings there made is that the exercise of governmental authority over the system established for the administration of public affairs throughout the State is a legislative matter. Subject to constitutional limitations, the determination of political questions such as the...
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