School Com'rs of City of Charlotte v. Board of Aldermen of City of Charlotte
Decision Date | 28 February 1912 |
Citation | 73 S.E. 905,158 N.C. 191 |
Parties | SCHOOL COM'RS OF CITY OF CHARLOTTE v. BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Mecklenburg County; Lyon, Judge.
Mandamus by the School Commissioners of the City of Charlotte against the Board of Aldermen and Treasurer of the City of Charlotte to compel the turning over to the treasurer of the school board proceeds of the sale of school bonds. From a judgment awarding the writ, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Where a statute expresses a general intention and also a particular intention incompatible with it, the particular intention may be deemed an exception to the general one.
Civil action, instituted by the school commissioners of the city of Charlotte to compel the board of aldermen and treasurer of said city to turn over to treasurer of the school board the proceeds arising from the sale of certain schools bonds issued by the city of Charlotte, under and by virtue of chapter 317, Priv. Laws 1911, heard before his honor Judge C C. Lyon, at January term, 1912, superior court, Mecklenburg county. On the hearing, judgment was rendered in manner and form as follows: Defendants having duly excepted, appealed to Supreme Court.
Chase Brenizer, for appellants.
Burwell & Cansler and Tillett & Guthrie, for appellees.
Chapter 317, Private Laws 1911, conferred upon the board of aldermen of the city of Charlotte the power, on approval of the popular vote, to issue bonds for various purposes, not to exceed in the aggregate the sum of $1,065,000, and specified that a portion of these bonds, not to exceed in amount the sum of $100,000, should be known as "school bonds," and to be used for the purpose of purchasing lands for schools and of building schoolhouses for the graded schools of the city. The act also providing "that moneys arising from the sale of the bonds" should be used for no other purpose than that for which they were authorized to be issued. In taking the sense of the qualified voters, the different purposes were to be submitted as separate propositions, and the votes taken in five different ballot boxes, and, in reference to the effect of the election, the act in question further provides: "If a majority of such qualified voters shall vote 'issue' on any one or more of the five propositions submitted for issuing bonds for the purposes aforesaid, then it shall be deemed and held that the proposition receiving a majority of such votes is favored and approved by a majority of the qualified voters of the city of Charlotte, and the board of aldermen shall cause bonds to be prepared and issued for the purposes so approved of by a majority of qualified voters of the city, and levy a tax in accordance with the provisions of this act." The measure having been approved by the popular vote, the bonds in question were issued and sold, and the proceeds are now held by defendants, subject to the provisions of the law and the judgment of the court on the questions presented.
It further appears that the plaintiffs, the school board of the city of Charlotte, having made selection of certain sites for school purposes, have made demand on defendants that the fund in question be turned over to their treasurer, and defendant the board of aldermen, professing a willingness to turn over $80,000 of said fund, the amount apportioned for four of the school sites, has refused to turn over the remaining $20,000, the amount apportioned for the public school of North Charlotte, contending that the site selected for school purposes in that section of the city is not a suitable or proper one, and that, under the charter of the city of Charlotte and other acts relevant to the inquiry, and by reason of the powers conferred in said acts on the board of aldermen of the city, said body must of necessity have a discretionary supervision of these matters and the ultimate power of determining whether the moneys in question shall or shall not be expended in the purchase of the site selected. If defendants are correct in their position that they are possessed of discretionary power in the premises, the present action must fail; for it is familiar doctrine that mandamus does not lie to enforce the exercise of discretionary power in any given or specified way. Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners, 150 N.C. 116, 63 S.E. 724; Barnes v. Commissioners, 135 N.C. 27, 47 S.E. 737; Ewbanks v. Turner, 134 N.C. 77, 46 S.E. 508. Coming, then, to this, the principal question presented, the revised charter of the city of Charlotte, enacted by the General Assembly in 1907 (Priv. Laws 1907, c. 342), in reference to the public school system of the city and on matters more directly relevant to the inquiry, makes provision as follows:
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