School Committee of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, Am. Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO)

• Decision Date: 11 May 1979
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Citation: 389 N.E.2d 970,378 Mass. 65
• Parties: , 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2303 SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. v. BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS ().
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 970

389 N.E.2d 970

378 Mass. 65, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2303

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. v. BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFL-CIO).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 5, 1979.

Decided May 11, 1979.

Alan J. McDonald, Boston (Gabriel O. Dumont, Jr., Boston, with him), for defendant.

Jay F. Jason, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston (Kevin F. Moloney, First Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, with him), for the School Committee of Boston.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN, WILKINS and ABRAMS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

In this case we again consider the legal barriers imposed on judicial enforcement of arbitral awards arising from public sector labor-management grievance proceedings. The Boston Teachers Union (union), defendant, appeals from an order by a judge of the Superior Court vacating an arbitrator's award which directed the plaintiff, the School Committee of Boston (committee), to comply with its contractual promise to consult the union prior to instituting a change in a manner which is a "proper subject" for collective bargaining.

Our review herein is confined to the following narrow question: whether the arbitrator's award substantially interferes with the school committee's ability to formulate and administer educational policy. Because there are subjects which no school committee is free to bargain away to a union or delegate to an arbitrator, arbitral awards concerning these issues are subject to judicial examination. If an award violates this principle, it should be vacated. This may be true even in a case, like the instant one, where the school committee concedes that the matter is arbitrable within the meaning of the contractual language. In the present case, however, we discern no matter of educational management imperiled by enforcement of the arbitrator's order. We therefore reverse the decision of the Superior Court and confirm the award of the arbitrator.

We summarize the facts as discussed in the arbitrator's decision. The union and the committee were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which, by its own terms, was effective for the period between September 1, 1976, and August 31, 1978. Article X of the agreement, captioned "Handling of New Issues," provided that "(w)ith respect to matters not covered by this Agreement which are proper subjects for collective bargaining the Committee agrees it will make no changes without prior consultation and negotiation with the Union." Prior to the 1976-1977 school year the committee had no policy to require elementary school final examinations. Indeed, no provision relating to this subject was included in the agreement; nor was such a policy ever discussed in the course of negotiations leading to the agreement. However, on or about May 23, 1977, the committee, through its representatives, announced and thereafter implemented a decision to hold elementary school final examinations on June 20-22, 1977, without prior consultation or negotiation with the union.

As a result of the committee's unilateral actions, the union, after the school year had ended, ¹ processed a grievance in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement ² and ultimately filed a demand for arbitration. ³ At the hearing before the arbitrator, union witnesses testified that the short notice of the examination requirement a week or ten days in some cases caused a significant increase in the amount of out-of-school work which teachers were required to perform. Twenty or more hours were spent by the typical teacher, after school hours and on weekends, reviewing course material covered for the year and preparing the examinations. No teacher was given time during the regular work day to prepare examinations, and no additional compensation was provided teachers for this extra work. ⁴ Based on these facts, the union contended that the decision to institute elementary school final examinations was a "proper subject of bargaining" which, under Article X, required consultation with the union before the committee was free to unilaterally act. The committee argued, in opposition, that, according to the final paragraph of the agreement and to State law, it had "complete authority over the policies and administration of the schools . . . ." ⁵ The power to establish a policy calling for the administration of final examinations to elementary school students, the committee claimed, was within that grant of authority, and, as such, negotiations on this question were removed from whatever bargaining obligations the committee otherwise held.

Determining that the new final examination was a proper subject for bargaining and therefore subject to advance consultation under Article X of the labor contract, the arbitrator found for the union and ordered the committee to bargain. But, pursuant to concurrently filed motions to vacate and to confirm the arbitral award, ⁶ a judge of the Superior Court deemed the arbitrator's award to be invalid as a matter of law, evidently in the belief that the award would unduly infringe on the exclusive prerogative of the committee to establish or change educational policy. We granted the union's application for direct appellate review.

We note at the outset that the issue before us is not whether the union grievance was arbitrable under the labor agreement. See School Comm. of Southbridge v. Brown, --- Mass. ---, --- ^A, 377 N.E.2d 935 (1978); School Comm. of Agawam v. Agawam Educ. Ass'n, 371 Mass. 845, 847, 359 N.E.2d 956 (1977); Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977); Acting Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 514, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 746 (1977). The school committee concedes that the matter was arbitrable within the meaning of the contractual language. Nor are we asked to decide whether the arbitrator erred in his interpretation of the relevant contractual provision. Both parties acknowledge that courts do not review the merits of an arbitrable matter. See School Comm. of Southbridge v. Brown, supra; School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 372 Mass. 106, 115, 360 N.E.2d 877 (1977); Greene v. Mari & Sons Flooring Co., 362 Mass. 560, 563, 289 N.E.2d 860 (1972). United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). By agreeing to arbitration, the parties commit such covered subjects to the final determination of the arbitrator. School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 685, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976).

The single issue presented in this case is whether there is a noncontractual legal barrier to the enforcement of the arbitrator's award directing the committee to consult the union prior to implementing elementary school final examinations, or, stated more specifically, whether the enforcement of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, as interpreted by the arbitrator, improperly intrudes into an area reserved for the judgment of the school committee regarding educational policy. ⁷

It is by now well recognized that the subjects of public sector collective bargaining are more restricted than those in private sector labor relations. See, Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector at 82-83 (A. Knapp. ed. 1977). "Public policy, whether derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional law, or in neither" may limit the ability of a public employer, such as a school committee, to bind itself to a given contractual provision or to delegate to an arbitrator the power to bind it. School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, supra, quoting from Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 616-617, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 339 N.E.2d 132 (1975). ⁸ While this principle may be raised in varied contexts in unfair labor practice proceedings before the Labor Relations Commission, ⁹ in actions to stay arbitration under G.L. c. 150C, § 2(B ), ¹⁰ or as here, in actions to vacate or confirm arbitral awards ¹¹ the analysis to be utilized is essentially the same in all instances: whether the ingredient of public policy in the issue subject to dispute is so comparatively heavy that collective bargaining, and even voluntary arbitration, on the subject is, as a matter of law, to be denied effect. School Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Local 66, 372 Mass. 605, 614, 363 N.E.2d 485 (1977). ¹² Underlying this development is the belief that, unless the bargaining relationship is carefully regulated, giving public employees the collective power to negotiate labor contracts poses the substantial danger of distorting the normal political process for controlling public policy. See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 Yale L.J. 1107 (1969). ¹³

In the public education setting, this court on several occasions has alluded to subjects which are beyond the scope of collective bargaining: specific appointment ¹⁴ and tenure ¹⁵ determinations, as well as school committee decisions to abolish positions ¹⁶ have been found to be within the zone of management prerogative over educational policy. See G.L. c. 71, §§ 37-38. Issues such as these are committed to the judgment of the school committee alone. See Boston Teachers Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 462, 350 N.E.2d 707 (1976). However, even where certain ultimate decisions may or have been deemed to be so laced with educational policy as to be beyond the reach of bargaining and arbitration, we have upheld arbitral awards which have merely involved questions of adherence by the school committee to Procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement for resolving such determinations. See School Comm. of W. Springfield v. Korbut, --- Mass. ---, --- ^B, 369...