School Committee of City of Pawtucket v. State Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 105-M,105-M
• Citation: 103 R.I. 359,237 A.2d 713
• Parties: SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the CITY OF PAWTUCKET v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 713

237 A.2d 713

103 R.I. 359

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the CITY OF PAWTUCKET v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.

No. 105-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 1, 1968.

[103 R.I. 366] Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Joseph V. Cavanagh, Providence, for petitioner.

Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler & Biener, Providence, for respondents; Julius C. Michaelson, Richard A. Skolnik, Providence, of counsel.

OPINION

POWERS, Justice.

This is a petition for certiorari, brought on the authority of G.L.1956, § 42-35-16, as amended, to review certain questions of law which are alleged to have been decided erroneously by a superior court justice in rendering judgment on an appeal from a decision of the state board of education. The writ issued, and in compliance therewith the pertinent records were duly certified to this court.

It appears from such records that on October 5, 1964, through October 13, 1964, teachers who had contracted with the Pawtucket school committee, hereinafter referred to as petitioners, to teach in the public schools of that city, failed to report for duty. October 5, Monday, through October 9, Friday, were regularly scheduled school days, as was Tuesday, October 13. The intervening October 10 and 11 were Saturday and Sunday and the following day, October 12, was Columbus Day, a school holiday, by virtue of § 16-20-1.

It further appears that for some years it had been the custom in Pawtucket to pay teachers every two weeks for forty-two weeks on the basis of five days, Monday through Friday, for each week--or 210 days. For the two-week period October 5 through October 18 the teachers involved had a deduction in their salaries of 7/210ths. This represented a deduction for the six school days and for Columbus Day.

The absenting teachers, contending that Columbus Day should not have been included as a deductible day, appealed from petitioners' action to the state commissioner of education, as authorized by § 16-39-2. ¹

On consideration of the record before him, the commissioner reversed petitioners, ruling that while the deduction of 1/210th for each school day missed was a reasonable method of computing the absenting teachers' compensation for the two-week period in question, they could not be penalized 1/210th for not reporting for duty on a day which the legislature had expressly excluded as a school day. He ordered petitioners to restore the 1/210th representing Columbus Day.

From this decision, petitioners appealed to the state board of education pursuant to the provisions of § 16-39-3. ² After a hearing thereon the board sustained the commissioner and from this decision petitioners appealed to the superior court pursuant to the provisions of § 42-35-15(a), as amended. ³

We deem it advisable to note at this juncture that although not raised by the parties, this court recognizes that the status of the school committee as aggrieved persons within the meaning of § 42-35-15(a), as amended, is open to question. However, in view of the substantial public interest involved in the merits of the instant controversy we conclude that this question at large can best be left to a subsequent controversy in which it can be properly raised and argued.

Throughout the proceedings, beginning with the grievance lodged by the teachers with petitioners, and through the hearing conducted by the board of education, it was conceded that the contract between the parties had never been reduced to writing, nor was any evidence offered as to an oral contract, the terms of which would be controlling on the question in dispute. Taking note of this circumstance the trial justice rightfully concluded that petitioners' decision must be found to conform to contractual obligations which in turn should be determined from prevailing customs and procedures applicable to the unwritten contract. The petitioners urged as being persuasive of the correctness of their computation three examples of when an absent teacher would not be compensated for a school holiday. It would serve no useful purpose to spell them out here. Suffice it to say that in each such example the compensation of the absent teacher for the two-week pay period would be reduced by 1/210th for each paid day missed, among which would be included a holiday, if any. They further argued that by state regulation, 180 days of teaching are scheduled for the school year, and the 7/210ths deducted from the two-week period in question equalled 1/30th of the required 180 school days, or six days, which were in fact the number of school days that the teachers were absent.

Acknowledging that these contentions represented a reasonable basis for petitioners' decision to reduce the teachers' compensation by 7/210ths, the superior court justice nevertheless held that since the contract between the parties had not been spelled out, it was not unambiguous, and its terms therefore were questions of fact, citing Muirhead v. Fairlawn Enterprise, Inc., 72 R.I. 163, 48 A.2d 414, 49 A.2d 316 (1946), and Russolino v. A.F. Rotelli & Sons, Inc., 85 R.I. 160, 128 A.2d 337 (1957).

He then proceeded to point out that while the compensation deduction of 7/210ths was a term of the contract which petitioners might justifiably have found to be a fact, it was the prerogative of the commissioner to make the equally reasonable finding of fact that the teachers' contract precluded a deduction of 1/210th for absenting themselves on a day which the legislature had expressly designated as a school holiday.

In making this determination the superior court justice stated:

"The Court is bound to conclude therefore that there was here involved an issue of fact upon which the School Committee, the Commissioner of Education, and the Board of Education each could have found either way without being so contrary to the evidence as to warrant a court in saying that the finding could not stand. And if that were true as to those three finders of fact it must be doubly true in regard to the court under the Administrative Procedures Act under which it is expressly provided that 'the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact'. This, it must be noted, is a much stronger restrictive mandate upon the court than would be the case if this issue in an ordinary action of law went to a jury and the court was then faced with a motion for a new trial. In the latter case the court would be bound to review the evidence and determine whether in its view the verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence. Here however the Court can intervene only in case the finding is 'clearly erroneous' or 'arbitrar...