Ramsay v. Sarkas

• Citation: 295 A.2d 416,110 R.I. 590
• Decision Date: 12 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1605-M,1605-M
• Parties: Samuel H. RAMSAY, Jr., et al. v. Deeb G. SARKAS, Liquor Control Administrator, et al. P.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 416

295 A.2d 416

110 R.I. 590

Samuel H. RAMSAY, Jr., et al. v. Deeb G. SARKAS, Liquor Control Administrator, et al.

No. 1605-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 12, 1972.

Donald A. McDonald, City Sol., John L. Sousa and Joseph T. Little, Asst. City Sols., for petitioners.

Alexander G. Teitz, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for Liquor Control Administrator.

Thomas F. Farrelly, Providence, for East Providence Beverage Co.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for certiorari, seeking review of a decision of the Superior Court dismissing the petitioners' appeal from a ruling of the state liquor control administrator, hereinafter referred to as the state licensing authority. The petitioners, in their capacity as the Board of Licensing Commissioners of the City of East Providence, hereinafter referred to as the local licensing authority, sought review pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(a). The Superior Court held that the local licensing authority was without standing under said § 42-35-15(a) to challenge the specific decision of the state licensing authority. The trial justice dismissed the complaint and affirmed the decision of the state licensing authority, whereupon we ordered this writ of certiorari to issue, and in accordance with its mandate the pertinent records were duly certified to this court for our examination.

It appears from the record that the East Providence Beverage Co., hereinafter referred to as the applicant, is the holder of a Class A retail beverage license which permitted it to conduct its business in premises located at 328 Warren Avenue in the city of East Providence. The applicant had applied to the local licensing authority for permission to transfer its Class A retail beverage license to 191 Willett Avenue in that city, such application for permission to relocate its place of business being made pursuant to the provisions of § 3-5-19.

The local licensing authority, after hearing, denied the application to relocate the applicant's place of business, and on September 22, 1970, the applicant petitioned the state licensing authority for a review of that decision. On March 16, 1971, the decision of the local licensing authority was reversed by the state licensing authority and that authority, by order, directed the local licensing authority to issue a permit for the relocation of the premises used by the applicant in the conduct of his business in accordance with his application.

Thereafter, the local licensing authority, pursuant to § 42-35-15(a), proceeded to prosecute an appeal from the decision of the state licensing authority to the Superior Court. In the course of prosecuting this appeal, the parties submitted to the Superior Court an agreed statement of facts. At the conclusion of the agreed statement of facts, the parties stipulated that the hearing 'could be limited to the question' of whether the state licensing authority under the pertinent statutes had jurisdiction to review and reverse a decision of a local licensing authority with respect to a matter which involved permitting the holder of an existing license to relocate the premises within which he conducted that business to another part of the municipality involved. ¹

A decision on the question which the parties presented to the Superior Court on agreement would require a construction of the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the state licensing authority, namely, § 3-7-21, and the effect thereon of the statute giving to local licensing authorities power to permit the transfer of an existing license from one place to another within the town in which it was issued, to wit, § 3-5-19. The trial justice, however, after noting the contentions of the parties concerning the power of the state licensing authority to overrule a local authority on the relocation of existing licenses, acting sua sponte, went directly to what she considered the antecedent issue, that is, the question of the standing of the local licensing authority to prosecute an appeal under § 42-35-15(a).

The trial justice, relying on New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Fascio, 105 R.I. 711, 254 A.2d 758 (1969), noted that the exclusive method for obtaining a review by the Superior Court of agency decisions is by way of § 42-35-15(a) and that to have standing to initiate such an appeal, it must be established that the appellant is an 'aggrieved' person within the meaning of that section. She then went on, citing Fascio, to hold that where a statute requires aggrievement to provide standing for judicial review, this court has generally held that such aggrievement results when an order, decision, or decree adversely affects in a substantial manner some personal or property right of the party or imposes upon it some burden or obligation. This is, of course, the classic test for establishing aggrievement and has been recognized at least from Tillinghast v. Brown University, 24 R.I. 179, 52 A. 891 (1902), having been reaffirmed in Newport National Bank v. Providence Institution for Savings, 101 R.I. 614, 226 A.2d 137 (1967).

The trial justice then concluded that nothing in the record established that the decision of the state licensing authority adversely affected in any substantial manner some personal or property right of the local licensing authority or imposed any burden or obligation upon it. She further concluded that the local licensing authority was not aggrieved within the meaning of § 42-35-15(a) and dismissed the appeal. With this conclusion we agree.

Counsel for the local licensing authority has argued that the instant case should be treated as an exception to the requirement of aggrievement as a prerequisite to the prosecution of such an appeal. The substance of this argument is that where an administrative board seeks to appeal a decision of a state authority to the Superior Court and the issue raised concerns a public interest that extends beyond the interests of the immediate parties, the board in its capacity as a representative of the public should be given standing to prosecute the appeal.

This court has on occasion recognized the necessity for permitting an agency to prosecute an appeal to the Superior Court or a petition for writ of certiorari in order to protect or promote an interest in the outcome of the controversy shared by the public at large. In order to do this, we have on occasion conferred a sort of vicarious standing to prosecute appeals from the decisions of administrative agencies even though such agencies could not satisfy the test of aggrievement set out in Fascio. Board of Police Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 86 R.I. 172, 133 A.2d 737 (1957), and School Committee of Pawtucket v. State Board of Education, 103 R.I. 359, 237 A.2d 713 (1968), are typical of the cases in which we have so acted.

In our opinion, however, it would serve no useful purpose to extend this opinion by a discussion of when circumstances exist in which such action would be appropriate. In the Reynolds case, for example, such a public interest arose out of the fact that a reversal of the order appealed from would have increased the total number of establishments operating under liquor licenses in the city of Warwick. This, we felt, constituted a matter of substantial public interest, the impairment of which could seriously impede the local board's interests in limiting the number of such establishments.

We held in Reynolds that this court has '* * * allowed a local board to petition for certiorari to review a decision of the administrator where the board alleged in substance that he had exceeded his jurisdiction by unlawfully invading theirs. Romano v. Daneker, 78 R.I. 79, 79 A.2d 175; Board of License Comm'rs of Town of Portsmouth v. Daneker, 78 R.I. 101, 79 A.2d 614.' Board of Police Comm'rs v. Reynolds, supra, 86 R.I. at 177, 133 A.2d at 741.

However, in the instant case the interest is hardly one of the public. Rather, it is the private interest of the possessor of the license which is involved. Of course, a local licensing agency must always consider the public interest whenever it grants or refuses a license. However, we are constrained to conclude that no substantial public interest such as the jurisdictional question which arose in Reynolds exists here which would move us to confer standing upon the local licensing agency to prosecute this appeal.

In order to preclude further litigation of this matter, we think we should consider also the question whether the state licensing authority has, under the pertinent statutes, jurisdiction to review a decision of a local licensing authority involving an application for a relocation of a license within a municipality in which that license has already been issued. It is settled that it is within the inherent power of this court to set aside a judgment that is void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the court that entered it. Pollins v. McGovern, R.I., 291 A.2d 418 (1972); Lamarche v. Lamarche, 108 R.I. 213, 273 A.2d 860 (1971). It may well be argued that the order of the state licensing authority, in effect, is a judgment and that if it were issued without jurisdiction by a state licensing authority, it could be vacated by this court on that ground. In order to settle the matter, therefore, we will consider the question raised by the parties in the agreed statement of facts.

The appellate jurisdiction of the state licensing authority is conferred upon it in § 3-7-21. In that section there is an enumeration of three specific classes that have the right to appeal from a decision of a local licensing authority to the state licensing authority. These are, first, any petitioner applying for a license; second, any person authorized to protest against the granting of a license; and, third, the holder of any license whose license shall have been revoked or suspended by any local board or authority. What ...