School Committee of Town of Winslow v. Inhabitants of Town of Winslow

• Decision Date: 09 August 1979
• Citation: 404 A.2d 988
• Parties: SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF WINSLOW et al. v. INHABITANTS OF the TOWN OF WINSLOW et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 988

404 A.2d 988

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF WINSLOW et al. v. INHABITANTS OF the TOWN OF WINSLOW et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Aug. 9, 1979.

Drummond, Woodsum Plimpton & MacMahon by Hugh G. E. MacMahon (orally), Richard A. Carriuolo, Portland, for plaintiffs.

Sandy & Sandy by Robert E. Sandy, Jr. (orally), Waterville, for defendants.

Before POMEROY, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

Questions arising from the operation of public schools, the relationship between the superintending school committee and teachers and their respective rights and obligations, have long been a fruitful source of litigation. The first such litigation came to the Court and was decided in 1825. Searsmont v. Farwell, 3 Me. 450 (1825). A controversy involving the respective rights of the City Council of a City and its School Committee is not unprecedented. Lunn v. City of Auburn, 110 Me. 241, 85 A. 893 (1913).

However, the case now for decision is the first which has come before us since the adoption of the Municipal Home Rule Provision of our Constitution, (Constitution of Maine, Art. 8, Part 2, Section 1, added by amendment CXI, approved by voters at Special Election in November 1969). The matter now before us is actually three actions. ¹ All cases challenge the legality of the adoption by referendum on December 5, 1977 of proposed amendments to the Winslow Town Charter.

The referendum changed the term of office of Winslow School Committee Members from three years to two, and the system of election from an "at large basis" to a "district basis." Plaintiffs were granted summary judgment by the Superior Court, Kennebec County on all three actions on July 11, 1978, thereby nullifying the election result. A motion to alter and amend the judgment was denied. This appeal followed.

We deny the appeal.

In 1969 the legislature granted Winslow its Town Charter. (Private and Special Laws 1969 Ch. 7). The Charter replaced Winslow's town meeting form of government with a Council-Manager organization, and was approved by the voters of Winslow at their March 10, 1969 annual town meeting.

The Charter created a Town Council composed of seven members elected at large for three-year terms, the terms to be staggered. School administration was vested in a municipal department of education, to be controlled by a five-member school committee created by Charter Article 7. The Committee members were to be elected at large to staggered three-year terms.

In 1975, a referendum adopted a charter amendment changing the election of council members from an at-large basis to a district basis, creating seven single-member districts, and shortening council terms to two years. The amendment took effect beginning with the November, 1976 municipal election.

The procedures which concern us here began in August, 1977, when the Council by ordinance, adopted and proposed to the voters a series of charter amendments concerning both council and school committee elections. Included among the proposed amendments were changes to Charter Section 701, relating to the School Committee ² and to Charter Section 201, relating to the Town Council. ³ Another amendment, to add a new Section 905 to the Charter, was also proposed. ⁴ These proposed amendments, together with others not the subject of these cases, were submitted to the voters on December 5, 1977, and were approved.

This appeal focuses on Proposed Charter Amendments Nos. 1 and 4. In sum, Amendment No. 1 proposed the following charter revisions:

(1) Amend Section 701 so as to:

(a) reduce term of office for School Committee members from 3 to 2 years;

(b) provide for election of all five Committee seats by districts;

(c) provide for election of all five Committee seats in November 1978; ⁵

(d) provide for an initial term of office of one rather than 2 years for 2 of the Committee members to be elected in November 1978; ⁶

(e) eliminate a provision that upon adoption of the Charter (in 1969), the incumbent Committee members would retain office for their elected terms.

(2) Amend Section 201 so as to:

(a) change the manner of electing Town Council members from 7 seats by districts to 5 seats by district and 2 seats at large; and

(b) establish an initial term of one year for three of the seven councilors elected in the November 1978 election. ⁷

Moreover, voters were instructed on the official ballot to vote either "yes" or "no" to both Proposed Charter Amendment No. 1 and Proposed Charter Amendment No. 4. Proposed Amendment No. 4 offered the following revisions:

(1) Add a new Section 905 to the Charter, which would:

(a) establish 5 Town Council Districts;

(b) establish a Town Districting Commission, to propose a plan for redistricting the Council Districts;

(c) establish guidelines and procedures for the work of the Districting Commission and action by the Council in adopting the redistricting proposals; and

(d) establish guidelines and procedures in the event the Council failed to adopt the redistricting proposals prior to the November 1978 election.

Both proposed Amendments were adopted by the Winslow voters. ⁸

In its opinion of July 7, 1978, the Superior Court held:

That the amendments to Section 701 to the Charter . . . changing the term of office for school committee members from three (3) to two (2) years and terminating the terms of office of present school committee members as of December 31, 1978, violate the "Home Rule" Provisions, Article VIII, Part Second, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Maine, because: (a) they do not involve a matter local and municipal in character, and (b) they are prohibited by the provisions of the constitution and general law of the State of Maine relating to educational matters. ⁹

Appellee's presented three distinct arguments for setting aside the referendum, two of which were specifically cited in the Superior Court's opinion. The last reason was impliedly accepted by the grant of summary judgment. These are (1) the constitutional argument, asserting that the school committee term of office is an educational matter reserved to the State, and beyond the municipality's power to modify, pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment, Supra, to the Maine Constitution; (2) the statutory argument, asserting that 20 M.R.S.A. §§ 471-472 require a 3-year term for town school committees; and (3) the procedural argument, asserting that the combination of amendments to Charter Articles 2 and 7 in the same referendum question, and the instructions to vote identically on Amendments 1 and 4 amounted to an improper joinder of separate subjects in violation of 30 M.R.S.A. § 1914(1)(A).

Appellants contend that, contrary to the Superior Court's conclusion, the term of office of school committee members is a matter which is local and municipal in character, and thus within the prerogative of the Town to modify.

While there is ample authority for the proposition that education is a matter of State rather than local concern, they argue, the Court erred in concluding that the term of office of a Winslow School Committee member is a matter of "Education " for these purposes. They allege a distinction, said to have been previously recognized in other jurisdictions, between the State's "Educational policy " and the selection of a local body to administer that policy. Secondly, appellants alleged that 20 M.R.S.A. §§ 471-472, while facially applicable to Winslow as a "Town," does not apply, as Winslow's government is "Municipal," and no general law establishes the term of office for school committees in "Cities." Finally, they contend that the referendum questions were properly joined, setting forth a "Functionally dependent " proposal for a local election system for both Town Council and School Committee.

The preeminence of the State in educational matters, vis-a-vis local government is clear. One authority on the subject has expressed the general principle and its corollary implications in this manner:

The most universal element of conceptual design in the American school system is the maxim that education is a concern of all the people. As it is usually stated, education is a state function.

The conclusion from this is that education, even when delegated to municipal officers, is different from most of the functions of municipal officers in that any state-wide regulation takes precedence over local regulations even though the right to establish the local regulations may appear to arise from a municipal charter approved by the legislature or its agents or established by general home rule regulations in the constitution itself. In other words, general powers of the municipality, even though they may derive directly from the constitution, must bow to state regulation on the field of education, established by authority of the legislature. In such cases where the municipality acts as the local agent in charge of education, the municipality is at one and the same time a chartered corporation and an agency of the state.

H. Mort, The Law and Public Education 16-17 (1959).

This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed, in various contexts, the plenary authority of the Legislature in the control of the public school system of this state. A consistent line of authority developed over the past century ¹⁰ culminated in our decision two decades ago in Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959).

In Squires, we stated that "(t)He State controls the public schools," Supra at 155, 153 A.2d at 83, and that "State educational policy cannot and must not be interfered with by any subordinate governing body." Id. at 159, 153 A.2d at 85. The Legislature, we concluded, controlled "The educational System of the State In all its varied and intertwining aspects." Id. (emphasis added). Subsequent decisions have cast no doubt on the vitality of the principle's set forth in Squires. ¹¹

In its brief, however, appellants urge that we adopt a distinction,...