School Dist. for City of Holland, Ottawa and Allegan Counties v. Holland Ed. Ass'n, 17

• Decision Date: 01 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 17,17
• Citation: 157 N.W.2d 206,380 Mich. 314
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR the CITY OF HOLLAND, OTTAWA AND ALLEGAN COUNTIES, Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOLLAND EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Winona Penna, Ted Boeve, Margaret Depree, Dorothy Bradish, Barbara Lampen, Della Bowman, John Doe and Mary Roe, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 206

157 N.W.2d 206

380 Mich. 314

SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR the CITY OF HOLLAND, OTTAWA AND ALLEGAN COUNTIES, Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOLLAND EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Winona Penna, Ted Boeve Margaret Depree, Dorothy Bradish, Barbara Lampen Della Bowman, John Doe and Mary Roe Defendants-Appellants.

No. 17.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 1, 1968.

(Appeal from the Court of Appeals, Division 3, Before Fitzgerald, P.J., Burns and Holbrook, JJ.)

Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, Grand Rapids, by Norman E. Jabin, Philip F. Wood, Grand Rapids, Ten Cate, Townsend & Cunningham, Holland by James E. Townsend, Holland, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Donald H. Wollett, Peter M. Fishbein, Allen Kezsbom, New York City, for The National Education Assn.

Ellmann & Ellmann, Detroit, for Crestwood Education Assn., Amicus Curiae.

Foster Campbell, Lindemer & McGurrin, Lansing, by Theodore W. Swift, David C. Coey, Lansing, Edmund E. Shepherd, J. Michael Warren, Lansing, of counsel, for defendants-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Stewart H. Freeman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Amicus Curiae.

Keller, Thoma, McManus & Keller, Detroit, by Leonard A. Keller, Charles E. Keller, Detroit, for Michigan Assn. of School Boards, Amicus Curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

O'HARA, Justice.

Leave to appeal was granted in this case to review an order of the Court of Appeals. ¹ The order denied a stay of proceedings previously granted and denied the prayer of the appellants to dissolve a temporary injunction. The order remanded the cause to the circuit court for hearing on the merits.

This is a chancery case. The constitutional provision (Const.1963, art. 6, § 5) abolishes the distinctions between law and equity Proceedings. It did not abolish the historic difference between law and equity. We note this because it is as a Court of Equity we sit in the case at bar. In this, as in all other cases clearly in equity, we hear appeals De novo. The reason for this restatement of principle will appear decisionally later in our opinion.

In 1947, the legislature enacted what is generally referred to as the Hutchinson Act. C.L.1948, § 423.201 et seq., as amended by P.A.1965, No. 379 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. and Stat.Ann.1968 Cum.Supp. § 17.455(1) et seq.).

We herewith set forth the title to the act as amended by P.A.1965, No. 379:

'An act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide review from disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances and the holding of elections; to declare and protect the rights and privileges of public employees; and to prescribe means of enforcement and penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act.'

Its first section, as amended by P.A.1965, No. 379, defines a strike:

'As used in this act the word 'strike' shall mean the concerted failure to report for duty, the wilful absence from one's position, the stoppage of work, or the abstinence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges, or obligations of employment.'

The second section specifies the employees affected:

'No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the government of the state of Michigan, or in the government of any 1 or more of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the public school service, or in any public or special district, or in the service of any authority, commission, or board, or in any other branch of the public service, hereinafter called a 'public employee,' shall strike.'

In the late summer of 1967 the teachers in the School District for the City of Holland, Ottawa and Allegan Counties, acting through their duly certified collective bargaining agency, did not resume their teaching duties on the day set by the board of education. If they were employees within the meaning of the statute they were on strike as that term is defined in the statute.

The school district sought an injunction restraining the teachers from withholding their services. A hearing was held and the trial chancellor issued a temporary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied continuation of a stay order previously granted and the prayer to dissolve the injunction. We likewise denied a stay order and declined to dissolve the injunction but granted leave to appeal. The case is before us in that posture. Regrettably, we have a meager record, the pleadings, transcribed colloquies between court and counsel, and oral argument. To the extent possible, in order that our decision be precedentially meaningful, we will discuss those basic issues which relate to the legal concepts which we consider must govern, and will not limit ourselves to the narrow question of the propriety of the issuance of the temporary injunction.

We acknowledge the very thorough and helpful briefs of the parties and those filed Amicus curiae.

The first argument to which we must address ourselves is the challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Appellants contend it violates guarantees in both our Federal and the State constitutions. The constitutional rights claimed to be violated are those guaranteeing freedom of speech, assembly, freedom from involuntary servitude, and denial of equal protection of law. Appellants concede that the act has once been judicially declared free from constitutional infirmity. This Court so held in City of Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America (1952), 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228. Appellants argue, however, that in the intervening years Federal Supreme Court decisions, notably Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562, decided in 1967, have eroded the basis of this Court's decision in the Detroit public employees case.

We cannot agree. We are indeed mindful of the argument so vigorously advanced that public employees generally, and particularly teachers, are denied rights enjoyed by those in private employment to their prejudice. The wisdom and philosophy of the act in question is not ours to question. We do not hold here that limitations upon the right to strike by public employees could not be exercised by a legislature in an unconstitutional manner. We are concerned with our act and it alone. We do not read Garrity, supra, either directly or by implication to have overruled Detroit v. Association of Employees hereinbefore cited. Garrity concerned itself with the privilege against self-incrimination as against job forfeiture, a principle not involved herein. To hold our act flatly unconstitutional we would have to disregard our own precedent and the overwhelming weight of nationwide authority. We reaffirm the principle that within limitations not here relevant the sovereignty may deny to its employees the right to strike.

Next, it is argued that if the act be constitutional, as we have here held, it is inapplicable to appellants for 2 reasons; first, because appellants are not 'employees' within the meaning of the act, and second, that as to teachers, injunctive relief may not be granted because an alternative exclusive remedy is to be found in the act.

We consider the first. The principal thrust of this argument is that, because no contracts of employment were in force between appellants and appellee school district at the time the injunction issued, the involved teachers cannot be employees as a matter of law. It is contended that the school code, specifically C.L.S.1961, § 340.569, as amended by P.A.1965, No. 14 (Stat.Ann.1968 Rev. § 15.3569), mandates such conclusion. Appellants refer to this argument as the 'keystone issue.' This position is supported by the Attorney General, a party hereto by our invitation. The issue divided us in disposing of the question of the dissolution of the temporary injunction and the continuance of a previously granted stay order thereof. It has been the subject of the most extensive briefing of any issue in the case, and was the focal point of appellants' forceful presentation on oral argument. We note all of the foregoing in order that the parties may be fully aware that we have given to it the fullest and most careful consideration. In finality, we have come to the conclusion that Garden City School District v. Labor Mediation Board, 358 Mich. 258, 99 N.W.2d 485, of necessity must control. In that case the positions of the parties herein were reversed. In Garden City, the school board sought injunctive restraint against the State labor mediation board in its attempted mediation between teachers and the board. The school board challenged that jurisdiction, in part, on the ground that the school code required written contracts, and that the mediation board had no jurisdiction over the terms thereof. This Court said (pp. 262, 263, 99 N.W.2d p. 487):

'Public school teachers are certainly persons 'holding a position by appointment or employment * * * in the public school service.'

'Appellant school board contends, however, that the provisions of the school code of 1955 (C.L.S.1956, § 340.569 (Stat.Ann.1959 Rev. § 15.3659)), by providing that teachers shall be hired by written contract, denies jurisdiction to the labor mediation board for mediation as to any terms which might be included in such contracts.

'The written contract provision was first adopted in 1927, and the legislature was certainly familiar with its requirements when it adopted P.A.1947, No. 336, which we have quoted. We read these 2 acts together as allowing mediation of salary disputes In advance of the determination of the salary provisions of individual teacher contracts.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Since this Court concluded that there is jurisdiction to mediate grievances 'in advance of the determination of salary...