School Dist. No. 9, Fremont County v. District Boundary Bd. In and For Fremont County

• Decision Date: 30 March 1960
• Docket Number: No. 25,No. 9,G,No. 2900,F,9,25,2900
• Citation: 351 P.2d 106
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 9, IN COUNTY OF FREMONT, and State of Wyoming, Barbara Myers, H. D. Culver and Virginia Shaw, the duly elected, qualified and acting Trustees of School Districtremont County, Wyoming, in such capacity and individually as patrons, electors and taxpayers of said School District, Western Nuclear Corporation, a corporation, a taxpayer of said School Districtrieve Land and Cattle Company, a corporation, a taxpayer of said School District, in County of Fremont, and State of Wyoming, all for themselves and for benefit of all other patrons, electors and taxpayers of said School District, in County of Fremont, and State of Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs-in-Error below), v. DISTRICT BOUNDARY BOARD IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY, Wyoming, and School District, in County of Fremont, and State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants-in-Error below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 106

351 P.2d 106

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 9, IN COUNTY OF FREMONT, and State of Wyoming, Barbara Myers, H. D. Culver and Virginia Shaw, the duly elected, qualified and acting Trustees of School District No. 9, Fremont County, Wyoming, in such capacity and individually as patrons, electors and taxpayers of said School District, Western Nuclear Corporation, a corporation, a taxpayer of said School District No. 9, Grieve Land and Cattle Company, a corporation, a taxpayer of said School District No. 9, in County of Fremont, and State of Wyoming, all for themselves and for benefit of all other patrons, electors and taxpayers of said School District No. 9, in County of Fremont, and State of Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs-in-Error below), v. DISTRICT BOUNDARY BOARD IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY, Wyoming, and School District No. 25, in County of Fremont, and State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants-in-Error below).

No. 2900.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 30, 1960.

W. A. Smith, & Nicholas, Lander, and Harold M. Johnson, Rawlins, for appellants.

G. L. Spence, Riverton, for Dist. Boundary Bd James L. Hettinger, Moran, Hettinger & Leedy, Riverton, for appellee School Dist. No. 25.

Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER and HARNSBERGER, JJ.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court.

This case relates to boundary changes of school districts in Fremont County, Wyoming, under § 21-211, W.S.1957. ¹ On May 22, 1957, the chairman of the board of trustees of School District 25, wrote to the board of county commissioners asking that a meeting of the district boundary board be called to consider the transferring of two or three southern tiers of townships from District 40 to District 25. The chairman of the board of county commissioners called a meeting of the boundary board to sit on June 5, 1957, at which time the commissioners and county treasurer were present, as were a number of interested citizens. The county superintendent was absent from the State during the month of June until about July 3; and Mattie Lee Brown, a receptionist in her office, attended the purported boundary board meeting and took minutes.

Another meeting substantially similar was held on June 18, and Mattie Lee Brown was appointed as deputy county superintendent by the chairman of the board of county commissioners, the other commissioners concurring.

On July 2 at a regular meeting of the county commissioners, whereat Mattie Lee Brown was present, matters relating to the change in boundaries were again discussed and provision made that on July 9 the boundary board would meet with taxpayers of School Districts 9 and 11 to discuss the matter of their becoming a part of the Fremont County Vocational High School District. A July 2 letter from School District 25 was presented to the commissioners, asking that the boundary board considered the addition of Townships 33 (the southern tier of townships of District 40) and 32 (the northern tier of townships of District 9) to School District 25. ² After some discussion, the meeting closed with the understanding that any decision regarding the addition of Townships 32 and 33 to District 25 would be postponed until a boundary board meeting on July 9.

On July 3 the county superintendent returned, and on July 9 a meeting of the boundary board was held with all members present and with a substantial number of citizens from each of School Districts 25, 40, and 9 being in attendance. The meeting convened about 10 a. m. and continued until noon, at which time it was recessed until 2 p. m. About 1:30 p. m. the boundary board, meeting in private session, voted on the measure and established new boundaries whereby Townships 32 and 33 were added to District 25. At about two o'clock the boundary board announced its decision to the assembled citizens.

On July 24 School District 9 and certain of its taxpayers filed a petition in district court against the board, alleging that it had held a purported meeting on July 9 behind closed doors and thereafter the chairman had announced to assembled interested persons that pursuant to majority vote Townships 32 in School District 9 had been annexed to School District 25; that the board's decision was unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive, amounting to a wanton disregard of the rights and interests of School District 9, its electors, partons, and taxpayers; that the decision was not based or founded upon a consideration of sbustantial facts, was arbitrary, capricious, irregularly taken, and was against the best interests of the public. Petitioners prayed that the decision of the board be set aside and the board enjoined from further proceedings in the matter. A 'transcript of the proceedings' (copies of various minutes and letters) of the board was attached to the petition as an exhibit. The boundary board entered an answer which was in effect a general denial, filed certain procedural motions, and when these were overruled by the court, moved for consolidation of the case (No. 9430) with District 40's appeal from the board's change in its boundaries (No. 9445). Appellants resisted the consolidation and also complained of the appearance of the county attorney in the cause, but neither the resistance nor complaint was favorably considered by the court, and the combined causes proceeded to hearing. The district court issued judgment for defendant boundary board in both cases, and District 9 has prosecuted this appeal. ³

Appellants insist that the court erred to their substantial prejudice in several procedural matters. They have failed to cite any authorities to substantiate their views, and we are always reluctant to consider claimed error unsupported by precedent or cogent argument, but we think that the problems raised are of sufficient public interest to merit discussion.

Appellants point out that although the court's order which permitted the intervention referred to a 'motion' of School District 25 asking permission therefor no such motion was ever filed and they insist further that the only pleading of District 25 was an unsigned answer filed some sixteen days after the trial was concluded. Neither of these contentions are controverted. It is therefore clear that District 25 Failed to comply with 24(c), W.R.C.P.:

'Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon all parties affected thereby. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.'

These requirements are for the purpose of informing the affected parties of applicant's claim and permitting a hearing thereon as a basis for the court's determination of the right to intervene. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 523, of Tulsa, Oklahoma v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 10 Cir., 123 F.2d 326. We think that District 25 having failed to comply with the rule did not become a party to the action; however, no prejudice is shown to have existed by reason of the purported intervention.

Appellants further contend that the court placed them at a disadvantage by setting the pretrial conference and the trial 'for the same time, forcing trial when the record was not complete and the issues were not fully made.' The record discloses that the pretrial order in this case was dated the same day as the trial ended and was not filed until thirty-nine days later. Such precipitant handling of the trial immediately following a pretrial conference although not contrary to the words of Rule 16, W.R.C.P., is, nevertheless, contrary to the basic reasons for the existence of the rule and to the best interests of procedural justice. The philosophy actuating adoption is well summarized in the committee report on pretrial clinic, 4 F.R.D. 35, 98, 99:

'(5) The Committee approves of the practice of the great majority of the judges using pre-trial procedure regularly in holding the pre-trial conference shortly before the time when the actual trial will be scheduled, the most preferable interval before trial being not less than one week or more than three weeks. In exceptional cases it may also be advantageous to call a pre-trial conference immediately after the joining of issue.

'(6) The Committee is impressed with the desirability of drawing up a pre-trial order while the parties are present, setting forth what has been agreement to or accomplished at the hearing.'

In Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., D.C.Or., 1 F.R.D. 571, 572, it was said that pretrial orders should be signed and filed 'a reasonable time before trial.' See also 'Pre-Trial Techniques Of Federal Judges,' 4 F.R.D. 183, 184, 185; and 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition, 1946, § 471 and § 473 at p. 963. Although the setting of the case on the heels of the pretrial procedure was improper, the appellants have failed to substantiate any claim of prejudice against them, and we therefore find no reversible error on the point.

It is insisted that the court erred in permitting the county attorney to act for the boundary board, but authorities to substantiate the contention are lacking. There is no statute requiring the county attorney to act for the board, but this fact alone does not indicate the impropriety of the representation, and appellants have shown no prejudice to them.

Counsel complain that the 'secret' meeting of the board demonstrates a fraudulent, wilful, wanton, and despotic attitude of the members. The only ground advanced as support of this view is the contention that under § 18-150, W.S.1957, the county commissioners should sit with open doors. Since the board of county commissioners and the district boundary board are not identical, it is doubtful that the mentioned statute is applicable. However, the very nature of the activities of quasi-judicial boards and agencies requires that their meetings be open to interested persons; and...