School Dist. v. Howe

• Decision Date: 13 June 1896
• Citation: 37 S.W. 717
• Parties: SCHOOL DIST. OF FT. SMITH v. HOWE, County Clerk.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

37 S.W. 717

SCHOOL DIST. OF FT. SMITH v. HOWE, County Clerk.¹

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 13, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Sebastian county; Edgar E. Bryant, Judge.

Suit by the school district of Ft. Smith against Herndon Howe, county clerk. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Proceeding to enjoin the clerk of Sebastian county from extending taxes against certain lands owned by the school district of Ft. Smith. The facts are as follows: A portion of the military reservation at Ft. Smith was donated by act of congress to the city of Ft. Smith, to be held in trust for the use of the free public schools of said city. The act provided that within 10 years the lands should be laid off into lots, and the lots sold at public sale, and that the proceeds should be paid "to the treasurer of the school board of the single school district of Fort Smith to be used by said board in the erection of schoolhouses and for the pay of teachers and the maintenance of the free public schools in said district." 23 Stat. 20. Afterwards the general assembly of this state passed an act, the first section of which is as follows: "That the school board of the school district of Fort Smith shall and is hereby authorized and empowered and required, in behalf of and for the said school district to become a purchaser at any sale hereafter made by said city of any unsold lots or real estate donated or granted by the act of congress, approved May 13, 1884, to the said city for the use and benefit of the free public schools of the single school district of said city; and hereafter to own, lease, control or sell the same, and also to become a purchaser at any sale of any property situated in said school district, on which said school district may at the time of such purchase have any lien, or in which it may have any interest, whenever in the opinion of said school board it shall be deemed necessary in order to protect the interest of said school district." Acts 1891, p. 166. The property described in the complaint, and claimed to be exempt, was acquired by the school district of Ft. Smith through purchase by the board of directors of said district, under the authority of the act above quoted. Most of the property consists of vacant and unimproved city lots, but a portion of the lots have buildings upon them, and are rented.

Humphry & Warner, for appellant. Clendening, Mechem & Youmans, for appellee.

RIDDICK, J. (after stating the facts).

The lots claimed by appellant to be exempt from taxation belong to the school district of Ft. Smith, and the question before us is whether such land is exempt from taxation. The constitution of the state declares that laws exempting property from taxation, except as therein provided, shall be void. Const. art. 16, § 6; Railway Co. v. Worthen, 46 Ark. 312. It further provides that the following property shall be exempt from taxation: "Public property used exclusively for public purposes; churches used as such; cemeteries used exclusively as such; school buildings and apparatus; libraries and grounds used exclusively for school purposes; and buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for public charity." Const. 1874, art. 16, § 5. This provision defining what public property is exempt from taxation does not refer to property owned by the state, for the presumption is that the state does not intend to tax its own property, but it refers to property owned by the public corporations, or organizations of the state, such as counties, cities, towns, and school districts. It will be noticed that all public property is not exempt from taxation, but only that public property which is used exclusively for public purposes. It is conceded that this land is public property, but the question of its exemption from taxation is not determined alone by its character as public property, but also by the nature of its use. This land is not used for school grounds, nor is there any intention to erect upon it buildings of any kind for the use of schools; but it was purchased, and is now held, only for the purpose of sale or for rent. It was purchased by the board of directors of the school district of Ft. Smith as an investment and for profit, under the authority conferred by the act of April 1, 1891. The proceeds arising therefrom when sold or rented are to be used for the benefit of the public schools of said district; yet this does not justify us in holding that the land itself is now used exclusively for public purposes, within the meaning of our constitution. It is true that, in a certain sense, all land belonging to the public must be used for public purposes; for, whether it be held for sale or rent, or used as a park or pleasure ground, or in some other way not in contemplation of law, its control and use must be regulated by considerations of benefit to the public community to which it belongs. But it is obvious that this is not the sense in which the...