School District No. 22 of Poinsett County v. Castell

• Decision Date: 14 October 1912
• Citation: 150 S.W. 407,105 Ark. 106
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22 OF POINSETT COUNTY v. CASTELL
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

150 S.W. 407

105 Ark. 106

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22 OF POINSETT COUNTY v. CASTELL

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 14, 1912

Appeal from Poinsett Chancery Court; C. D. Frierson, Chancellor reversed.

Decree reversed, and cause remanded.

Going & Brinkerhoff, for appellant.

1. A contract entered into with two of three directors of a school district at a special meeting of which previous notice had not been given, and which meeting the third director did not attend, is invalid. 69 Ark. 159; 90 Ark. 335; 52 Ark. 511; 67 Ark. 236.

2. It can not be claimed that the third director ratified the contract in this case. The facts in School District No. 2 v. Goodwin, 81 Ark. 143, as so totally different from the facts here as to make that case inapplicable.

J. F Gautney and E. L. Westbrooke, for appellee.

If the contract as originally executed was invalid, the evidence shows that it was acquiesced in by the third director and thereby validated. 81 Ark. 143, 144, 145; 83 Ark. 491; 67 Ark. 236.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This is an action instituted by a school district through its directors seeking to enjoin appellee from using the public schoolhouse of the district and from teaching a school therein and also to cancel a contract made with him to teach said school, which it is alleged was invalid. It is alleged in the complaint that a contract had been entered into with appellee to teach the school, but only two of the school directors had joined in its execution, and for that reason it was invalid. It was also alleged that the appellee was incompetent and had failed to perform his duties as teacher and since the contract was made his license as a teacher had been revoked by the county superintendent of public schools. To this complaint appellee filed an answer in which he denied each of the above allegations and averred that he had been duly employed to teach the school for ten months and was faithfully carrying out said contract. Upon the filing of the complaint, a temporary restraining order was issued which was subsequently dissolved, and upon final hearing of the case the complaint was dismissed, and a judgment rendered in favor of appellee for damages for expenses incurred by him for paying railroad fare, hotel bills and other items in obtaining the dissolution of the temporary restraining order amounting to a total of $30.63. It appears from the testimony that on September 4, 1911, appellee entered into a written contract with two directors of the school district by the terms of which he agreed to teach the school for a period of ten months from that date. He at once began teaching the school and continued for three weeks, when complaints were made by patrons charging that he was incompetent and failing to discharge correctly his duties as such teacher. He was requested by the two directors to quit teaching the school, which he refused to do. Thereupon, at the suggestion of these two directors, the superintendent of public instruction of the county saw him and requested him to quit teaching the school, and on his failing to do so declared his license as a teacher revoked. This suit was then instituted, and the appellee did not teach the school thereafter. The appellee taught the school for three weeks, and we think there was testimony sufficient to warrant the finding of the chancellor that he was a competent teacher and performed his duties properly, and that the revocation of his license was made without notice or hearing, and therefore was unauthorized and invalid. The undisputed testimony, however, shows that the contract for teaching the school was entered into by only two of the directors of the district. The third director had no notice of, and was not present at, the meeting at which this contract was made, and did not know that the contract had been made. He did not know that appellee had been employed as such teacher, and there was no evidence adduced showing that he knew that appellee was teaching the school during said three weeks. It appears that the two directors who signed the contract lived in one end of the district and the third director lived at some distance at the other end; that there were two schools in the district; and that the directors had a general understanding or tacit agreement that...