School District No. 9 of Apache County v. First National Bank of Holbrook, Civil 4330
Decision Date | 15 October 1941 |
Docket Number | Civil 4330 |
Citation | 118 P.2d 78,58 Ariz. 86 |
Parties | SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 9 OF APACHE COUNTY, and APACHE COUNTY, Appellants, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HOLBROOK, a Corporation, Appellee |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Navajo. Richard Lamson, Judge. Judgment reversed and case remanded with instructions.
Messrs Wilson, Compton & Wilson, for Appellants.
Mr. Guy Axline and Messrs. Armstrong, Kramer, Morrison & Roche, for Appellee.
The County of Apache and various school districts in said county as plaintiffs, filed some thirteen cases against First National Bank of Holbrook, called defendant, to recover moneys of the plaintiffs alleged to have been fraudulently and illegally paid to defendant on school warrants fraudulently, wrongfully and illegally issued. Each action contained a number of counts so that altogether some two hundred and seventy-eight warrants were involved therein. In each case defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a general and various special demurrers. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and overruled all of the special demurrers, but sustained the general one based on the ground that the complaints failed to state a cause of action, and judgment was rendered for defendant. Some time thereafter plaintiffs moved for an order vacating the judgment and granting leave to plaintiffs to amend their complaint, which motion was denied, and this appeal has been taken.
By leave of this court a consolidated abstract of record was filed in the thirteen cases and the briefs argued them as one. The first question for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the judgment and grant leave to plaintiffs to amend. Under section 21-448, Arizona Code 1939, a party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is filed otherwise only by leave of court or the consent of the adverse party. It was, therefore, within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court whether the suggested amendment should be allowed. Upon an examination of the amendment, we are of the opinion that it would not have materially affected the question of whether the complaints stated a cause of action. Such being the case, we think the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the judgment and permit an amendment to the pleadings. We, therefore, consider the issue on the merits which is whether the complaints stated causes of action against defendant.
The first count of the complaint in case No. 4330, after setting up the capacity of the various parties, proceeds as follows:
The remaining counts in No. 4330 and the counts in the other complaints followed the same general form except as to dates and details of the warrants involved and other allegations of facts which it is claimed make such warrants illegal. Some state that the warrants were drawn on unapportioned school funds; some that they were not endorsed by the payee; some that they bore forged endorsements; some that they were endorsed by only one of two or more payees; some that they were drawn for a purpose not authorized by law; and some that they were not duly endorsed by the person entitled to receive the same. They then continue with the allegation of a demand on defendant for repayment, and that the fraudulent and unlawful acts set forth in each of the complaints were not known to plaintiffs nor did they have reasonable knowledge thereof until March 1, 1935.
It will be seen that some of these allegations go to the original validity of the warrants and some to the method of their transfer to defendant. We consider first the objections to their validity. These objections are (a) no voucher signed by two of the trustees was issued to the county superintendent for the payment shown by the warrant; (b) the warrant was not drawn on funds already apportioned to the district; and (c) the warrant was drawn for a purpose not authorized by law.
The material parts of the law governing the issuance of school warrants, as it stood at the time of the ones involved herein, as contained in the 1928 code, read as follows:
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