School District v. Reeve

• Decision Date: 09 April 1892
• Citation: 19 S.W. 106,56 Ark. 68
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT v. REEVE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

19 S.W. 106

56 Ark. 68

SCHOOL DISTRICT v. REEVE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 9, 1892

APPEAL from Pulaski Circuit Court, ROBERT J. LEA, Judge.

D Reeve sued School District No. 7 of Pulaski county, before a justice of the peace, upon several school warrants. Judgment was for plaintiff, and an appeal was taken to the circuit court.

The warrants were similar to the following:

No. 10 $ 40.00.

DISTRICT SCHOOL FUND, DISTRICT NO. 7.

WAMPOO ARK., Sept. 22, 1888.

Treasurer of Pulaski County, Arkansas:

Pay to James J. Manuel, or order, the sum of Forty Dollars, for teaching in August and September, 1888, out of the general fund.

D. F ROSE, Secretary,

S. S. DESHA, President,

Directors.

It does not appear that the warrants were endorsed or assigned to plaintiff.

The cause was tried before the court sitting as a jury, upon the following agreed statement of facts:

"It is hereby agreed between plaintiff and defendant in this case that the warrants sued on herein were duly presented to the treasurer for payment, but that such presentation was not made within sixty days after the date of their issue. That this case be submitted to the court sitting as a jury for a trial thereof on the face of said warrants and this agreement of facts, this December 30, 1890."

Judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant has appealed.

Reversed and remanded.

Blackwood & Williams, for appellant.

1. The warrants were void, not having been presented to the county treasurer within sixty days after their issue. Mansf. Dig., secs. 6221, 6222, 6255, 6256.

2. But if valid under Acts 1885, p. 107, plaintiff's remedy was against the county treasurer. The directors had done all in their power and their whole duty. Mandamus against the treasurer was the remedy. 33 Ark. 81; 25 id. 263; 39 Cal. 270; 51 Mich. 184; Mansf. Dig. sec. 4569: 33 Ark. 451.

3. The warrants were payable to order, and the record shows no transfer nor assignment, or right in plaintiff to sue.

OPINION

HEMINGWAY, J.

The court's refusal to make three several declarations of law at the request of the defendant presents the different questions in this case. The declarations refused were as follows:

"1. That, said warrants not having been presented to the treasurer within sixty days from their issue, they are null and void, and judgment should be for defendant.

"2. That the directors, having issued the warrants, had complied with the full requirements of the law, and if the same are valid now or were at the time of the institution of this suit, the county treasurer should have paid them, and, not having done so, plaintiff should have pursued his appropriate remedy against the county treasurer to compel that officer to pay said warrants, and judgment in this action should be for defendants.

"3. That plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on said warrants in this action against the school district, and judgment should be for defendants."

1. In section 6255 of Mansfield's Digest was a provision, among others, that school warrants should be void unless presented for payment to the treasurer within sixty days; but this section was amended in 1885 by re-enacting its other provisions and omitting the one referred to. Acts 1885, p. 107. The manifest design of the amendment was to abrogate the rule avoiding warrants not thus presented, and we think the court properly refused to make the first declaration.

2. School districts are bodies corporate, and the statute provides that they may make contracts and sue and be sued. It imposes no restrictions upon their liability to be sued, and we conclude that it was intended that they, like other persons, might be sued whenever they made default in discharging their obligations. In other States it has been held that similar bodies were liable to suit upon similar warrants, at least after demand. Varner v. Nobleborough, 2 Greenl. 126; Tied. Com. Pap., sec. 140 & cases. If a different rule is maintained by any court, the fact has not been called to our attention. If the treasurer refuses to pay such warrants when he has in his hands money that ought to be paid on them, mandamus against him may be invoked, but that does not prove that the holder may not resort to other remedies. We have ruled that the statute of limitations ran against school warrants as well as county warrants. School District v. Cromer, 52 Ark. 454, 12 S.W. 878; Crudup v. Ramsey, 54 Ark. 168, 15 S.W. 458. As this statute operates only were there is a right to sue, it follows from the decisions that a suit may be maintained on unpaid school or county warrants. The fact that the suit imposes a burden of costs upon the school district and does not advance the collection of plaintiff's claim is an argument for the change of the statute; but as it plainly provides that school districts may contract and be sued upon their contracts, without restricting the liability to suit, relief against burdensome and fruitless suits must come from a change in the law. We are of opinion that the second declaration was not the law.

3. It is contended that the third declaration is proper for the reason that when a plaintiff, who is not the original payee sues to recover upon unendorsed paper payable to order, he can succeed only upon proof that he acquired it from the payee by a bona fide transfer and delivery. At the common law a recovery could be had only upon a legal title derived by endorsement; but a more liberal practice now prevails,...