School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, in Campbell County v. Cook

• Decision Date: 08 March 1967
• Docket Number: Nos. 3549,3550,s. 3549
• Citation: 424 P.2d 751
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT NOS. 2, 3, 6, 9, AND 10, IN the COUNTY OF CAMPBELL and State of Wyoming, and Robert Sorenson, Lloyd Halladay, Lawrence Gilbertz, Mrs. R. E. Isenberger, and Ted Cosner, qualified electors of Campbell County, Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. Nelle E. COOK, Superintendent of Schools of Campbell County, Wyoming, and County of Campbell, State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants below). SCHOOL DISTRICTS NOS. 2, 3, 6, 9, AND 10, IN the COUNTY OF CAMPBELL and State of Wyoming, and Robert Sorenson, Lloyd Halladay, Lawrence Gilbertz, Mrs. R. E. Isenberger, and Ted Cosner, qualified electors of Campbell County, Wyoming, Appellants(Plaintiffs below), v. Nelle E. COOK, Superintendent of Schools of Campbell County, Wyoming, Appellee(Defendant below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 751

424 P.2d 751

SCHOOL DISTRICT NOS. 2, 3, 6, 9, AND 10, IN the COUNTY OF CAMPBELL and State of Wyoming, and Robert Sorenson, Lloyd Halladay, Lawrence Gilbertz, Mrs. R. E. Isenberger, and Ted Cosner, qualified electors of Campbell County, Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. Nelle E. COOK, Superintendent of Schools of Campbell County, Wyoming, and County of Campbell, State of Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants below).

SCHOOL DISTRICTS NOS. 2, 3, 6, 9, AND 10, IN the COUNTY OF CAMPBELL and State of Wyoming, and Robert Sorenson, Lloyd Halladay, Lawrence Gilbertz, Mrs. R. E. Isenberger, and Ted Cosner, qualified electors of Campbell County, Wyoming, Appellants(Plaintiffs below), v. Nelle E. COOK, Superintendent of Schools of Campbell County, Wyoming, Appellee(Defendant below).

Nos. 3549, 3550.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 8, 1967.

Robert R. Rose, Jr., Casper, for appellants.

Wade Brorby, County Atty., Thomas Morgan, Gillette, for appellees.

Before PARKER, C. J., and HARNSBERGER, GRAY, and McINTYRE, JJ.

Mr. Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

Pursuant to the provisions of § 21-233, W.S.1957, the defendant, Nelle E. Cook, County Superintendant of Schools for Campbell County, Wyoming, published notice that a special election would be held on March 15, 1966, for the purpose of affording the qualified electors of said county an opportunity to adopt or reject a duly approved plan for the formation of a new countywide school district. The proposal affected twelve organized school districts in the county and each district was designated as a separate polling place for the election. In the canvass of the votes the districts were separately tabulated. The principal dispute here centers around the outcome of that election. Bearing upon this question is the provision of the foregoing section which reads:

'* * * The formation of the new district shall have been approved if one of the following alternative requirements shall have been met.

'(a) A majority of the votes of the total area involved, disregarding all district boundaries, shall constitute approval if no district within said area has a majority of the total number of electors of the area.

'(b) If one component district within the area has a majority of the total number of electors of the proposed reorganized district, and a majority of the votes cast at the special election within the most populous district shall have been in favor of the proposed reorganized district, approval shall be indicated by this favorable majority in this most populous district and, in addition, by a favorable majority of the total area outside of this most populous district and considered separate from it by otherwise disregarding all existing district boundaries.'

In this connection the notice of the county superintendent advised that under the law of Wyoming the proposal would be deemed rejected unless approved by a majority vote in District One-which includes the Town of Gillette and which the parties stipulated contained 'more persons entitled to vote' than 'all the rest of Campbell County'-and a majority of the votes cast in the total area of the county outside of District One. The total vote cast at the election was 898. Of these, 495 voted to adopt the plan and 403 voted to reject it. On the other hand, the tabulated vote for the two areas reflected a vote in District One of 359 for adoption and 71 opposed, and a vote in the outside area of 136 for adoption and 332 opposed. As can be seen, the proposition carried by a majority of the votes cast in the county as a whole but failed to obtain a majority of the votes cast in each of the two areas. Apparently there was doubt as to the outcome of the election and the chairman of the state committee for the reorganization of school districts requested guidance from the attorney general. Under date of March 31, 1966, the attorney general, among other things, gave it as his opinion that the word 'electors' as used in the statute meant those 'voting' at the election without regard to areas and as a consequence the reorganization plan had been approved. Opinion 13, Attorney General Opinions, Wyoming, 1966. Shortly thereafter the county superintendent, pursuant to § 21-235, W.S.1957, entered an order reciting in substance that as a result of the adoption of the plan by the election all of the existing school districts in the county were abolished and a new district was formed to be known as 'Campbell County Unified School District'; that the boundaries of the new district were coterminous with the boundary lines of the county; and that a meeting would be held on April 26, 1966, for the election of trustees of the newly formed district and for organization of the board of trustees.

Thereupon the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the District Court of Campbell County, generally alleging the facts to be as related above and further alleging that the county superintendent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law in entering the said order for the reason that the proposed reorganization plan failed to receive the vote necessary for its adoption or in the alternative that the election be declared void for the reason that the statute in question was contrary to specified provisions of the constitution in that it was vague and ambiguous and failed to contain adequate standards for the conduct of said election. The relief sought was a declaratory judgment sustaining either of their respective claims and for supplemental relief by way of a temporary restraining order and injunction. For our purposes we need not generally concern ourselves with matters relating to the requested supplemental relief, and we come directly to the action taken by the trial court on the motion of the county superintendent to dismiss the complaint for the reason that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion was not supported by affidavits or otherwise and it does not indicate the grounds upon which the county superintendent relied. Nevertheless, from the manner in which the case was presented, it appears that it was predicated upon the same grounds advanced in resistance to the motion for a temporary injunction to the effect that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal from the order as provided in § 21-238, W.S.1957, or by an action in quo warranto; that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to injunctive relief; that § 21-233(b), upon which plaintiff relies, is unconstitutional; and that the plan was adopted at the election by a 'majority of the voters' which was all that was required under the provisions of § 21-233(a).

In the order and judgment entered by the trial court granting the motion to dismiss it is recited that the court, in addition to the pleadings, considered the record made, which included a transcript of the testimony and proceedings had upon the hearing for a preliminary injunction and also the stipulation of the parties mentioned above concerning the persons entitled to vote. Consequently, in keepting with Rule 12(b), W.R.C.P., we treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Although counsel for the plaintiffs, in oral argument, complained that the procedure followed by the trial court deprived the plaintiffs of their day in court in that they were afforded no opportunity to present evidence in support of their claim for declaratory relief, we question that such contention is actually sustained by the record. Furthermore, we think the dispositive question in this case is whether or not the trial court reached the proper legal conclusion on the outcome of the election and we are inclined to agree with the view apparently taken by the trial court that on this issue there was no dispute as to the facts already established by the record; that further inquiry into the facts would be unrewarding; and all that remained to be done was to draw the legal conclusion. Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 81, 97 A.L.R.2d 243; Forbes Company v. MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56, 57.

The trial court in disposing of the motion has not aided us in delineating the grounds upon which its action was taken (see Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, Wyo., 397 P.2d 800, 801), but from the record we gather it was taken primarily on the basis that there was another adequate remedy at law in that an appeal might have been taken under § 21-238, W.S.1957. While we are inclined to agree that plaintiffs, as matters turned out, might have been well advised to have pursued the statutory remedy of appeal in the first instance-which they later did in Case No. 3550 to no avail-we are not persuaded that by the action for declaratory judgment they were foreclosed from obtaining any relief to which they might have been entitled under the provisions of § 21-233(a) and (b).

We have said several times that the courts are always open to correct arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent action taken by an administrative official or board, Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Wilson, Wyo., 400 P.2d 144, 145, rehearing denied 401 P.2d 960, and we indicated in Forest Oil Corporation v. Davis, Wyo., 396 F.2d 832, 835, that these matters might be inquired into by a direct action even though there was a statutory method of appeal. We also direct attention to the provision in Rule 57, W.R.C.P., stating that 'The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.' There remains, of course, a wide discretion in the trial court in disposing of such an action but 'This discretion is not an arbitrary one, but one which should be based upon sound legal principle.' Wyoming Humane Society v. Port, Wyo., 404 P.2d 834, 835. Incidentally, we might say that there this court upheld the denial of relief but the circumstances present in that case and in the instant case are quite distinguishable....