Schoolcraft's Adm'R v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 10 November 1891 |
| Citation | 92 Ky. 233 |
| Parties | Schoolcraft's Adm'r v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
James Schoolcraft, while at work for the Standard Oil Company upon a switch belonging to it, but which was connected with the appellee's road, was struck by a car which was suddenly put in motion by a car being backed by those in charge of it for the appellee from its road on to the switch, and so injured that he died in a short time. The petition avers that the injury was the result of willful neglect upon the part of those in charge of appellee's car. It also sets forth fully the manner of the injury.
Section 3, chapter 57 of the General Statutes gives a right of action to the widow, heirs or personal representative of the deceased, if the life be lost by the willful neglect of any person, company or corporation, their agents or servants and in such a case punitive damages may be recovered.
Section 1 of the same chapter provides: "If the life of any person not in the employment of a railroad company shall be lost in this Commonwealth, by reason of the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor or proprietors of any railroad, or by the unfitness or negligence or carelessness of their servants or agents, the personal representative of the person whose life is so lost may institute suit and recover damages in the same manner that the person himself might have done for any injury where death did not ensue."
Section 3, as construed by this court, only gives a right of action if the deceased leaves a widow or child. Because this was not averred a demurrer was presented to the petition, but overruled. The appellee then asked that the appellant be compelled to elect whether it would prosecute the action under the first or third section of the statute; and being required over its objection to do so, it elected to proceed under the first; and, thereupon, the appellee filed its answer. It, inter alia, sets up that the deceased left no widow or child; denies that his death resulted from neglect of any character upon its part, and avers that it was caused by his own negligence.
A demurrer to the first defense was overruled, notwithstanding the appellant had been compelled to, and had elected to proceed under section 1 of the statute. The appellant then filed its reply. A demurrer was presented to it, the grounds being first, that it did not deny the deceased left no widow or child; and second, that the action could not be maintained under section 1, because it violates both the State and United States Constitution. At this stage of the proceedings the case was transferred from the Court of Common Pleas to the Louisville Law and Equity Court, and the latter carried the demurrer to the reply back to the petition, and sustained it to it upon the ground that the first section of the statute is unconstitutional. The appellant failing to plead further the action was dismissed, and it has appealed.
It is urged first, that the action of the lower court must be sustained because the suit was in fact brought under the third section of the statute. The character of neglect alleged must determine whether a recovery is sought under the one; or the other section; that is, if the proceeding be under the third section, the neglect must be averred to have been willful, because it is the creature of the statute; but if under the first, then it is sufficient to aver the injury resulted from negligence, or to state facts showing it. (Givens v. Kentucky Cent. R. Co. 89 Ky., 231.)
Here, however, while willful neglect was averred, yet the circumstances of the injury were fully stated, showing negligence, if truly set out; and the appellee, by its own motion, compelled the appellant to elect to proceed under the first section of the statute. Moreover, the appellee in its answer denied that the injury resulted from neglect of any character upon its part, and pleaded the negligence of the deceased as the cause of it, which is not available in a case where death results from the willful neglect of the defendant. The issue was, therefore, fully made up as an action under the first section.
The fact that the court, after the election had been made, refused to strike out of the petition the averments relating to willful neglect can not cause the party to be regarded as prosecuting an action of a character different from that fixed by the election, and which could be maintained upon the petition, as it fully set forth the manner of the injury, and showed, according to the facts stated, that it was the result of negligence.
It is urged with great ingenuity and ability, however, that the first section of the statute is unconstitutional; that it is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State denying to "any person" within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; and that it also contravenes those provisions of our State Bill of Rights, which guarantee equal rights to all persons under the law, and the impartial administration of justice.
It is said that it makes two discriminations; first, that it authorizes an action against railroads alone, instead of against all persons; and second, that it gives a right of action as against a railroad to all persons, save those in its employ.
The appellee will not, however, be heard to complain upon the latter ground. It has no interest in that question. Indeed, the exception is for its benefit. (Cooley's Con. Lim., side page 163.)
It is well settled that a corporation is "a person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; that it is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and that no State can, to any extent, deny it. (Santa Clara County v. South. P. Railroad, 118 U. S., 396; Pembina Mining Company v Pennsylvania, 125 U. S., 181.) But this Constitutional provision does not affect the police power of the State, which is to be exercised for the protection and safety of its citizens. It was not the purpose of the Constitution to disarm the state of the power to guard the public safety. It is true also that corporations are embraced by the provisions of our State Bill of Rights, to which we have alluded. It will be noticed, however, that ...
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