Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 64023-8,64023-8
• Citation: 134 Wn.2d 468,951 P.2d 749
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Lori Lynne SCHOOLEY, Respondent, v. PINCH'S DELI MARKET, INC. a Washington corporation; "Doe Corporation", a Washington corporation d/b/a Pinch's Deli Market, Spanaway; James M. Boyd, Jr. and Jane Doe Boyd, husband and wife, d/b/a Pinch's Deli Market; and John Doe d/b/a Pinch's Deli Market, Petitioners.

Page 468

134 Wn.2d 468

951 P.2d 749

Lori Lynne SCHOOLEY, Respondent, v. PINCH'S DELI MARKET, INC. a Washington corporation; "Doe Corporation", a Washington corporation d/b/a Pinch's Deli Market, Spanaway; James M. Boyd, Jr. and Jane Doe Boyd husband and wife, d/b/a Pinch's Deli Market; and John Doe d/b/a Pinch's Deli Market, Petitioners.

No. 64023-8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Argued Nov. 29, 1996.

Decided Feb. 26, 1998.

Ronald Gardner, Lee, Smart, Cook, Martin & Patterson, David L. Martin, Seattle, for Petitioners

Briggs & Briggs, Shawn Briggs, Tacoma, Tom Chambers, Seattle, for Respondent.

Russell Love, Seattle, amicus curiae for Kenneth Gaston.

Bryan Harnetiaux, Gary Bloom, Debra Stephens, Spokane, amicus curiae on behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n MADSEN, Justice.

Pinch's Deli seeks review of a Court of Appeals' decision reinstating Lori Schooley's personal injury action after dismissal on summary judgment. At issue is whether Pinch's Deli can be liable for injuries suffered by Schooley as a result of the store's illegal sale of alcohol to another minor who in turn gave the alcohol to Schooley. We conclude it can and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 25, 1989, Russell Bowser invited five of his friends, all of whom were under 21, over for a party while his parents were out of town. Everyone at the party wanted beer so Bowser, then 19, Lori Schooley, then 18, and the others decided to pool their money and purchase beer. They drove to Pinch's Deli and Bowser and two others entered the store to buy beer. Schooley and the others remained in the car. Bowser purchased four cases of beer. He was not asked to produce identification when purchasing the beer.

After purchasing the beer, Bowser, Schooley, and the others returned to Bowser's house. Schooley drank two or three beers and then consumed an unknown quantity while playing a drinking game with the others. Later, Bowser and one of the other boys carried Schooley to the pool to throw her in. She asked them if she could strip down to her swimsuit, which she had on underneath her clothes, before they threw her in. The boys let her down and she took off her clothes. However, before they could throw her in she dove into the water. The pool was only two feet deep where Schooley dove and consequently she fractured her spinal cord and is now quadriplegic.

Schooley sued Pinch's Deli for damages for negligently selling alcohol to minors. The trial court granted Pinch's motion for summary judgment. In a published opinion,

Division Two of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded for trial. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., 80 Wash.App. 862, 912 P.2d 1044 (1996). Pinch's Deli filed a petition for review in this court and review was granted.

VENDOR LIABILITY FOR THE SALE OF ALCOHOL TO MINORS

After Congress repealed Prohibition in 1933, the Washington Legislature passed the Washington alcoholic beverage control (WABC) act, also known as the Washington State Liquor Law. RCW 66.04.010-.98.100. In part, this Act prohibits selling alcohol to any minor, or giving or otherwise supplying liquor to any minor. RCW 66.44.270, .320. The WABC Act defines a minor as anyone under the age of 21. RCW 66.44.270, .320. The Legislature explicitly provided for criminal sanctions for violations of the WABC Act. RCW 66.44.180.

Although the Legislature was silent on the issue of civil liability, this court has recognized that the criminal provisions of the WABC Act may create a minimum standard of conduct for a reasonable person. This court has recognized that RCW 66.44.320, which prohibits vendors from selling alcohol to minors, creates a standard of care that when breached can be considered by the trier of fact as evidence of negligence. Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash.2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987); see also Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash.2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983). ¹

The issue presented in this case is one of first impression in the State of Washington. To date, we have found that an injured intoxicated minor purchaser and third persons injured by the intoxicated minor purchaser both have a cause of action in negligence against the vendor who sold In order to prove actionable negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach thereof, a resulting injury, and proximate causation between the breach and the resulting injury. Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash.2d 226, 228, 677 P.2d 166 (1984). Proximate causation has two elements: cause in fact and legal causation. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 435, 671 P.2d 230 (1983); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239, 249, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).

                alcohol to the minor.  See Purchase, 108 Wash.2d at 228, 737 P.2d 661;  Young, 99 Wash.2d at 660, 663 P.2d 834.   In this case, however, a somewhat different scenario has occurred;  a third person minor who obtained alcohol from a minor purchaser was injured.  Thus, the issue here is whether a vendor who sells alcohol to a minor who subsequently furnishes the alcohol to another minor can be held liable for foreseeable alcohol related injuries arising from the initial sale of alcohol
                

Pinch's Deli makes two principal arguments regarding liability for Schooley's injuries. First, Petitioner argues it did not owe a duty of care to Schooley because she is not within the class of persons protected by the statute. Second, Petitioner argues that even if a duty of care was owed to Schooley, the sale of alcohol was not the legal cause of her injuries. Petitioner contends Schooley's injuries are too remote and that the legal consequences of the sale to the first minor should not extend to injuries resulting from subsequent transfers of the purchased alcohol.

DUTY OF CARE

We turn first to the contention that Schooley is not within the class of persons protected by the statute. In a negligence action the threshold question is whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the injured plaintiff. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash.2d 31, 36, 896 P.2d 1245 (1995). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law. Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 479, 824 P.2d 483 (1992). To determine whether a duty of care exists based upon a statutory violation this court has adopted the Restatement test, which, among We look to the language of the statute to ascertain whether the plaintiff is a member of the protected class. See Hansen, 118 Wash.2d at 481, 824 P.2d 483 (because Keith Hansen was a minor when he was furnished alcohol he was a part of the protected class of RCW 66.44.270, which prohibits any person from giving alcohol to a minor). When a duty is found to exist from the defendant to the plaintiff then concepts of foreseeability serve to define the scope of the duty owed. ³ Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash.2d 381, 395, 755 P.2d 759 (1988); Hansen, 118 Wash.2d at 484, 824 P.2d 483; Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479, 492, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989).

other things, requires that the injured person be within the class of persons the statute was enacted to protect. Hansen, 118 Wash.2d at 480, 824 P.2d 483; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965). ²

The WABC Act explicitly prohibits commercial vendors from "sell[ing] any intoxicating liquor to any minor." RCW 66.44.320; see also RCW 66.44.270(1) ("[i]t is unlawful for any person to sell ... liquor to any person under the age of twenty-one years ..."). Washington's policy prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors is firm and comprehensive. See, e.g., RCW 66.16.040 (illegal for state liquor stores to Petitioner argues that the statute protects only the immediate minor purchaser, and not other third person minors who may receive the liquor from the minor purchaser. While the legislation focuses primarily on the minor purchaser, the notion that the prohibition against selling liquor to minors imposes a duty toward persons other than the minor purchaser is not a new concept. In Purchase, we found that third persons injured by a minor purchaser have a cause of action against the liquor vendor stating the vendor's duty extends not only to the minor purchaser but "to members of the general public as well." Purchase, 108 Wash.2d at 228, 737 P.2d 661. To conclude that the commercial vendor's duty extends to third persons whom the minor purchaser injures but not minors with whom the alcohol was shared would be an arbitrary distinction not supported by the recognized purpose of the statute.

sell alcohol to minors); RCW 66.44.190 (liquor sales on the grounds of University of Washington are prohibited); RCW 66.44.310 (illegal to serve a minor or allow a minor to remain in any area classified by the Board as off-limits).

We have repeatedly emphasized that "persons under 21 years of age are neither physically nor mentally equipped to handle the consumption of intoxicating liquor." Young, 99 Wash.2d at 660, 663 P.2d 834; Kelly, 127 Wash.2d at 40, 896 P.2d 1245. The recognized purpose of legislation prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors is to protect minors' health and safety interests from their "own inability to drink responsibly" and to protect against the particular hazard of "alcohol in the hands of minors." Hansen, 118 Wash.2d at 481-82, 824 P.2d 483. Because minors who drink commonly do so with other minors, protecting all those injured as a result of the illegal sale of alcohol to minors is the best way to serve the purpose for which the legislation was created, to prevent minors from drinking. Thus, we find that Schooley is part of the protected class.

Petitioner next contends that, although underage, Schooley does not need the protection of the statute. Petitioner cites no authority for this proposition, arguing As we found, Schooley is within the protected class and foreseeability serves to define the scope of the duty owed. Id. at 483, 824 P.2d 483; see also Christen, 113 Wash.2d at 491, 780 P.2d 1307 (recognizing that the concept of...