Schoolfield v. Collins

• Decision Date: 16 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 80,80
• Citation: 281 N.C. 604,189 S.E.2d 208
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Sylvia Anne Collins SCHOOLFIELD, and husband, James Norman Schoolfield, Petitioners, v. Wanda Louise COLLINS (single), et al., Respondents.

Page 208

189 S.E.2d 208

281 N.C. 604

Sylvia Anne Collins SCHOOLFIELD, and husband, James Norman Schoolfield, Petitioners, v. Wanda Louise COLLINS (single), et al., Respondents.

No. 80.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 16, 1972.

Turner, Rollins & Rollins, by Elizabeth O. Rollins, Greensboro, for petitioner appellees.

Smith & Patterson, by Henry N. Patterson, Jr., Greensboro, for respondent appellant.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

Rule 56, G.S. § 1A--1, which became effective on January 1, 1970, has been considered in Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971); Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. North Carolina State Ports Authority, 280 N.C. 251, 185 S.E.2d 793 (1972); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972); Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972); Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972). The general rules applicable to summary judgment under Rule 56 as laid down in Kessing are approved and applied in the later cases. In each of these cases, summary judgment was held to be proper under the circumstances of the particular case.

The Court of Appeals held that respondent's answers to the interrogatories failed 'to disclose competent evidence of facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial'; that the 'answers to the interrogatories reveal that no genuine issue as to a material fact exists'; and that 'upon the facts established petitioner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' The opinion does not set forth what facts the court considered established or the reasons for its conclusion that petitioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

As noted in our preliminary statement, respondent made a part of her answer a copy of the purchase contract of May 26, 1958, in which Cone Mills Corporation was designated as 'Seller' and 'Alma C. Collins (Widow) and son, Robert W. Collins,' were designated 'Purchaser.' She alleged that Robert W. Collins died on December 21, 1962. She admitted that Cone Mills Corporation had executed the deed dated January 14, 1963, which, in terms, conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the subject property to Alma C. Collins (widow) and an undivided one-half interest to Louise G. Collins, Wanda Louise Collins and Sylvia Anne Collins. She also admitted that Louise G. Collins had executed a quitclaim deed dated January 14, 1963, which, in terms, conveyed her entire interest in the subject property to Wanda Louise Collins and Sylvia Anne Collins. (Note: Respondent's petition for Certiorari, which is verified by respondent, asserts (1) that 'the mortgage life insurance on the life of Robert Collins paid the balance due on the land contract' and (2) that Louise G. Collins was the estranged wife of Robert W. Collins.)

Upon the admitted facts stated in the preceding paragraph, Nothing else appearing, feme petitioner and respondent Wanda Louise Collins, as heirs of Robert W. Collins, would own an undivided one-half interest in the subject property and summary judgment in their favor would be correct. Any genuine issue as to a material fact must relate to facts alleged as the basis for respondent's asserted further answers and defenses.

Under Rule 56(c) the absence or presence of a genuine factual issue may be shown by 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, If any.' (Our italics.) While the object of the last two sentences of Rule 56(e) is to pierce General allegations in the non-movant's pleadings, Rule 56(e) does not deny that a properly verified pleading which meets all the requirements for affidavits may effectively 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'

In her pleading, respondent alleged specific facts within her Personal knowledge. Her pleading was verified in the manner prescribed by Rule 11(b), sworn to and subscribed before a notary public. An affidavit is '(a) written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer having authority to administer such oath.' Black's Law Dictionary, 80 (Rev.4th ed. 1968); Ogburn v. Sterchi Brothers Stores, Inc., 218 N.C. 507, 11 S.E.2d 460 (1940). Respondent's pleading meets all of these requirements; and, in respect of the specific facts stated therein, is an affidavit. '(T)here is nothing in the rules which precludes the judge from considering a verified answer as an affidavit in the cause.' Fletcher v. Norfolk Newspapers, Inc., 239 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1956). 'To the extent that a verified pleading meets (the requirements of Rule 56(e)) then it may properly be considered as equivalent to a supporting or opposing affidavit, as the case may be.' 6 Moore's Federal Practice, par. 56.11(3), at 2176 (2d ed. 1965).

We consider first respondent's allegation that '(i)t was initially and always the agreement among respondent Dora Lucille Collins and Alma C. Collins and Robert W. Collins, that the interest of Robert W. Collins in said property was that only of a trustee for Alma C. Collins and the respondent Dora Lucille Collins.' As to whether this allegation, if supported by competent evidence, would defeat petitioners' claim, see Bryant v. Kelly, 279 N.C. 123, 181 S.E.2d 438 (1971). In her answer, respondent asserted she had knowledge of the alleged agreement. In her answers to interrogatories, she asserted that three named persons had knowledge of statements made to them by Alma C. Collins which tended to support respondent's said general allegation. Testimony as to statements made by Alma would be incompetent as hearsay and G.S. § 8--51 would preclude respondent from testifying to such personal transaction with Robert. In short, respondent's answers to the interrogatories fail to show the existence of competent evidence to support her general allegations in reference to the alleged parol trust.

Independently of the alleged parol trust agreement, respondent alleges that she and Alma together 'furnished all of the consideration for the down payment and for all of the monthly payments, including mortgage insurance premiums, until the property was paid for in full.' Answering interrogatories pertinent to this allegation, respondent asserted that she personally 'provided approximately one hundred dollars toward the down payment' for the subject property. She asserted that she observed Alma take funds which she (Alma) had received from the Social Security Administration and funds which were given her by respondent 'when she went to the Cone Mills office to make the down payment' on the subject property. Respondent's contribution of Approximately $100.00 toward the down payment, with no obligation to make further payments of any kind, is insufficient to establish in favor of respondent any ascertainable trust interest in the subject property based on Pro tanto payment of the purchase price. Rhodes v. Raxter, 242 N.C. 206, 208, 87 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1955).

Alternatively, respondent asserts ownership of the subject property as beneficiary under Alma's will. This contention presupposes that Alma became sole owner because of contributions she made toward the purchase thereof.

With reference to payments subsequent to the down payment, respondent asserted that she 'observed Alma Collins each month take funds derived from her social security check to make the monthly payments on the land contract and send this money by different individuals to the Cone Mills Plant'. Although she asserted that 'receipts for the monthly payments state that they were received of Alma Collins,' no receipts were produced and identified. Garland C. Mays was identified as a person to whom 'Alma Collins on a number of occasions gave money . . . to take to the Cone Mills Proximity Plant to make the monthly payments on the land contract.' No affidavit of Garland Mays was presented. Respondent did not identify any other individual to whom Alma gave money to be taken to Cone Mills Corporation to make the monthly payments on the purchase contract.

Cone Mills Corporation acknowledged receipt of the down payment of $310.00 from the 'Purchaser.' Alma and Robert became equally obligated for the payment of the balance of $5,890.00 plus interest, taxes and insurance premiums. Respondent's assertions, although competent, were insufficient to show what amounts, if any, were paid to Cone Mills Corporation by Alma. When Robert died, the unpaid balance was paid from the insurance on his life.

Absent affidavits disclosing competent evidence of the existence of the express parol trust Alleged by respondent, respondent's assertions are not sufficient to establish that Robert held the legal title to an undivided one-half interest in the subject property as trustee for Alma. With reference to resulting trusts, see Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 97 S.E.2d 222 (1957), and cases cited; also, Bryant v. Kelly, supra.

Even so, for the reasons stated below, the court erred in granting petitioners' motion for summary judgment. The facts asserted by respondent in her verified pleading and in her answers to interrogatories which, for present purposes, must be accepted as true, include those narrated below.

On April 4, 1959, Robert, Alma and respondent executed the contract quoted in full in our preliminary statement. This contract provides for the disposition of the subject property upon the death of the three persons having an interest therein. One provision states: 'I(n) case of death of Lucille Dora Collins before the death of Alma C. Collins Her interest in the above mentioned property shall go to Robert W. Collins.' (Our italics.) Robert W. Collins died December 21, 1962. The contract further provides: 'In case of death of Robert W. Collins before the death of Lucille Dora Collins His interest in the above mentioned property shall go to Lucille Dora Collins.' (Our italics...