Schoonover v. Schoonover, 3727.

Decision Date27 January 1949
Docket NumberNo. 3727.,3727.
Citation172 F.2d 526
PartiesSCHOONOVER v. SCHOONOVER.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Paul A. Speer, of Amarillo, Tex., and Lee Gill, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.

James S. Twyford, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (L. E. Tryon, of Guymon, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and BRATTON and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges.

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.

On October 26, 1943, M. M. Schoonover and Marie Louise Schoonover, husband and wife, executed a separation and property settlement agreement. The agreement recited their marital difficulties, listed the property acquired by their joint efforts during their marriage, estimated its net value at $70,000, and provided that the wife should receive as her share one-half of the value thereof amounting to $35,000, in settlement of her share of their jointly acquired property. The contract contained other provisions specifying the mode of payment and other matters of common concern and interest to the parties. The husband also agreed to pay for the education of their one child for a specified period of time. The contract also recited that the wife had received separate and independent legal advice in the making of the contract and that the husband had divulged all the property which he owned or which he and his wife jointly owned. On October 30, 1943, certain changes were made under a supplemental agreement, the provisions of which are not material here.

Contemporaneously with the execution of the contract the wife filed a petition for divorce against the husband in an Oklahoma State Court. The divorce petition referred to the property settlement contract of October 26, 1943, in the following terms:

"That the parties have accumulated, since their marriage, and by their joint efforts, considerable real estate and personal property of the approximate value of $90,000.00, and that there are debts of the parties in the proximate amount of $20,000.00, that the property of the parties is located and situated in Texas County, Oklahoma and in Roosevelt County, New Mexico, and said property is more particularly described in a certain Property Settlement entered into between the parties and hereinafter mentioned.

"That the plaintiff and defendant have entered into an Agreement which is a property settlement whereby the parties have settled their property rights and interests therein, a copy of said Agreement is hereto attached, marked Exhibit `A' and made a part hereof, and that the plaintiff desires that said property agreement and settlement be approved by the Court.

"Wherefore, plaintiff prays for a decree of divorce from the defendant, that the marriage relation existing between the parties be dissolved, that the property settlement entered into between plaintiff and defendant be approved and for such other relief as to the court may seem proper."

The divorce decree entered in the divorce action was in part as follows:

"The court further finds that the parties have heretofore entered into a separation agreement and property settlement contract, which said agreements were before the court and which the court finds are fair, just and equitable and were made and entered into by each of said parties upon competent and able advise and that the same should be approved.

"It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by the court that the marriage relationship heretofore existing between the said Marie Louise Schoonover and M. M. Schoonover, be, and the same is hereby dissolved and both parties are released from the same.

"It is further ordered that the care, custody and education of the child of the parties hereto, Charles Schoonover, be confided to the plaintiff exclusively.

"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the property settlement agreements entered into by and between the parties, making disposition of their property affairs be, and the same is hereby confirmed by the court."

On June 11, 1947, appellant, the ex-wife filed this action against her former husband in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The complaint charged M. M. Schoonover with fraud in the execution of the property settlement agreement. In brief, the complaint alleged that Schoonover had procured the execution of the contract on her part by fraud; that he had made fraudulent representations to her shortly prior to the execution thereof with respect to the property acquired by them during their marriage and with respect to the value thereof and misrepresented the amount of indebtedness owed by them, and fraudulently failed to list property jointly acquired by them.

In her first cause of action, she prayed for a reformation of the contract so as to speak the truth as to the fair cash market value of the property, the true indebtedness owing by them, and that the contract be reformed so as to award her one-half of the net value of the property so established. In a second cause of action, she prayed the court to award her one-half of the net earnings received by appellee from the earnings of their joint property; and in a third cause of action, she prayed that the court ascertain the amount due her under the contract as reformed and award her judgment therefor against Schoonover.

By answer, Schoonover pleaded that the property settlement agreement was merged in the decree of divorce and that such decree was res judicata of the three issues tendered by the complaint in this action. In a pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the petition, the contracts, exhibits and decree in the divorce action. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the judgment in the divorce action was res judicata of the questions sought to be presented in this action. The court sustained the motion and entered judgment against plaintiff and this appeal followed.

Appellee's position that the property settlement contract was merged in the judgment in the divorce action and was thereby extinguished cannot be sustained. The decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court are, without exception, to the contrary.1

In these cases the Supreme Court distinguishes between those agreements which are in the nature of stipulations entered into between parties for the purpose of dispensing with the necessity of proof to enable the court to enter its judgment adjudicating the property rights of the parties and those agreements in which the parties expressly agree as to a division of their property rights and in which they intend that their rights shall thereafter be as set out in the contract "whether submitted to the court or not." Allen v. Allen, 196 Okl. 36, 162 P.2d 193, 194. Without exception, the Oklahoma court has held that contracts of the former class become merged in and are extinguished by the decree, and that thereafter any rights or cause of action must be based on the judgment. As to the latter class of agreements, the court has likewise, without exception, held that such contracts survive and that the contract is not merged in the decree even though the contract was submitted to the court for its approval and was approved by the court. It thus seems well settled by the Oklahoma decisions that where married couples enter into a property settlement contract which fully and completely adjusts their rights in their common property, and thereafter one files an action for divorce in which the contract is submitted to the court for its approval and is approved by the court, the contract is not merged in the decree and the rights of the parties thereafter are controlled by the contract and any action to enforce such rights must be based upon the contract and not upon the decree of the court.

Such being the case, it is difficult to see why such a contract would be any different than a property settlement contract between two partners, and why the parties in an action thereon could not assert the same rights or the same defenses against each other that partners could in disputes arising out of a partnership property settlement contract.

While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not specifically held that a property settlement contract which has been approved by the court in a divorce proceeding may be attacked in an independent action on the ground of fraud, we think that was the effect of the court's decision in Herd v. Bilby, 199 Okl. 437, 186 P.2d 833, 834. In the Herd case, as here, a property settlement contract was confirmed by the decree but was not incorporated therein. Thereafter in a quiet title action against her, the wife asserted rights in certain real estate greater than those conferred by the contract. These claims seem to have been based, in part at least, on a claim of fraud practiced upon her in procuring her execution of the contract. Apparently this defense was entertained by the court and was resolved against her. In laying down the general principles of law, the court said: "* * * we hold that the contract of settlement in the divorce case between W. T. Meadors and defendant was not merged into nor extinguished by the decree of divorce rendered in that action, and that in the absence of fraud or collusion it was valid and binding upon the parties."

In disposing of the wife's claim that fraud had been practiced upon her, the court said: "The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, and her conduct after her remarriage, justify the conclusion that defendant understood that her rights in the property and her right to alimony payments terminated upon her remarriage; that she was not mislead in executing the contract, and that no fraud was practiced upon her in connection therewith. We have carefully examined the entire record, as well as the cases relied upon by defendant to sustain her contention, such as McRoberts v. McRoberts, 177 Okl. 156, 57 P.2d 1175, and Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okl. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, and are impelled to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Spindel v. Spindel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • April 11, 1968
    ...decree); Block v. Block, 196 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1952) (fraud in property settlement portions of divorce decree); Schoonover v. Schoonover, 172 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1949) (same); Hastings v. Douglass, 249 F. 378 (N.D.W.Va. 1918) (suit by heirs to annul deceased's marriage). Thus, in Sharon v.......
  • Cassidy v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Texas, Civ.A. No. 94-B-1480.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • April 2, 1998
    ...only to such relief as the pleadings support. Daniels v. Thomas, 225 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir.1955); accord Schoonover v. Schoonover, 172 F.2d 526, 530 (10th Cir. 1949). While a plaintiff is charged with a duty of giving a short and plain statement of the asserted claims and a demand for jud......
  • Kruse v. Repp
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • March 20, 2020
    ..., 305 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) ; Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc. , 897 F.2d 826, 841–42 (5th Cir. 1990) ; Schoonover v. Schoonover , 172 F.2d 526, 530 (10th Cir. 1949). In other words, the pleading of a claim entitling a plaintiff to relief under Rule 8(a)(2) is distinct from a request ......
  • Reininger v. Oklahoma
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
    • November 9, 2017
    ...the selection of an improper remedy in the ... demand for relief will not be fatal to a party's pleading...."); Schoonover v. Schoonover , 172 F.2d 526, 530 (10th Cir. 1949) (Because "the prayer forms no part of the cause of action, ... a pleader will be entitled to the relief made out by t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT