Schraufnagel v. Quinowski

• Decision Date: 14 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 16693,16693
• Citation: 747 P.2d 775,113 Idaho 753
• Parties: Dale T. SCHRAUFNAGEL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles D. QUINOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 775

747 P.2d 775

113 Idaho 753

Dale T. SCHRAUFNAGEL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles D. QUINOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16693.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 14, 1987.

Allen H. Browning, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

John T. Schroeder, Boise, and Gary K. Kiyuna, (argued), Nyssa, Or., for plaintiff-respondent.

BURNETT, Judge.

We are asked to decide whether, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, a pro se litigant's misunderstanding of court procedure constituted excusable neglect under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). The district court said no. We reverse.

Dale Schraufnagel sued Charles Quinowski for money allegedly due on a promissory note. Rather than seek the advice of legal counsel, Quinowski opted to represent himself. He appeared and filed an answer generally denying the allegations in the complaint. Plaintiff Schraufnagel then moved for summary judgment and served a notice of hearing on Quinowski. The notice contained an averment by plaintiff's counsel that judgment would be taken if Quinowski failed to appear. However, before the hearing date, Quinowski received another notice. This one came from the court. It stated that "the case is hereby set for a Court trial" on a specified date. It further recited that "a Pretrial/Settlement Conference will be held in the Judge's Chambers" on another specified date. Both dates were later than the date mentioned in the notice of hearing on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court's notice also set forth detailed instructions concerning discovery, identification of witnesses, marking of exhibits and other pretrial matters. It directed all pretrial motions to be heard, and all discovery completed, twenty-eight days before the pretrial conference.

Quinowski contends, and it appears to be undisputed, that he gave literal effect to the court's act of fixing trial and pretrial conference dates. He erroneously interpreted this act as signifying that the case would go to a pretrial conference and to trial despite the notice he had received from plaintiff's counsel regarding the motion for summary judgment. Consequently, he did not appear at the hearing on the motion. Neither did he supplement the record at that time by filing an affidavit or a more detailed answer containing specific defenses and denials to the allegations in the complaint. When the plaintiff's motion came on for hearing, the judge did not endeavor to determine why Quinowski was not present. Rather, he entered a judgment resembling a default judgment, stating that Quinowski had been duly served and had failed to appear. The instrument lacked any recital under the summary judgment rule, I.R.C.P. 56, that there were no genuine issues of material fact or that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Promptly upon learning that a judgment had been entered against him, Quinowski moved for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), claiming excusable neglect. He hired counsel to prepare and present the motion. His counsel also tendered an amended answer stating specific defenses. The motion for relief was denied. This appeal followed.

Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief for "mistake, inadvertence ... or excusable neglect." Although Quinowski characterized his failure to appear at the summary judgment hearing as excusable neglect, based upon his interpretation of seemingly conflicting notices, the district judge evaluated the case from the standpoint of "mistake." In his order denying the motion for relief, he stated that Quinowski's incorrect interpretation was a mistake of law, not of fact. He further noted that a mistake of law is not an appropriate ground for relief. This general proposition is supported by previous decisions of our Supreme Court. See, e.g., Reeves v. Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 629 P.2d 667 (1981); Thomas v. Stevens, 78 Idaho 266, 300 P.2d 811 (1956). The judge then added that even if Quinowski's conduct were treated as "neglect," it was not "excusable" because "by failing to seek legal counsel when he was served with papers he did not act as a reasonably prudent person."

Our standard of review is well established. The decision whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Such decisions will not be disturbed on appeal unless discretion is abused. Clark v. Atwood, 112 Idaho 115, 730 P.2d 1035 (Ct.App.1986). If the trial judge makes findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, applies the proper criteria under Rule 60(b)(1) to those facts, and reaches a decision that follows logically from application of such criteria to the facts found, then the judge will be deemed to have acted within his sound discretion. See Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 658 P.2d 992 (Ct.App.1983) (applying Rule 60(b) to default judgment case). Here, we find no fault with the trial judge's factual determinations. However, we believe he applied improper criteria to those facts.

The judge essentially held that a pro se litigant's neglect is not excusable if it could have been avoided by hiring an attorney. However, that is not the proper legal test. The test is whether the litigant engaged in conduct which, although constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing under the circumstances. See Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 712 P.2d 721 (Ct.App.1985) (applying reasonably prudent person standard in default judgment case). We decline to hold that it is imprudent per se to represent oneself in court. We do not recommend self-representation. It may produce unintended results and it often increases the burdens of the judicial system. But it is a right valued by many Idahoans. That right would be impermissibly abridged by precluding a distinct class of litigants--those representing themselves--from obtaining relief for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).

We turn to the judge's other ground for refusing relief--the characterization of Quinowski's conduct as a mistake of law. This Court has previously noted that there appears to be no satisfactory conceptual basis to distinguish entirely a mistake of law from excusable neglect. Stirm v. Puckett, 107 Idaho 1046, 695 P.2d 431 (Ct.App.1985). Indeed, where relief for a mistake has been denied because a mistake was one of law rather than fact, our Supreme Court has taken care to point out that the circumstances did not also show excusable neglect. McKee Bros., Ltd. v. Mesa Equipment, Inc., 102 Idaho 202, 628 P.2d 1036 (1981) (failure to amend answer without demonstrating excusable neglect justified trial court in entering summary judgment for plaintiff); Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P.2d 1053 (1939). In line with this reasoning, we have held that in an appropriate situation a mistake of law might also be treated as excusable neglect.

This overlap between mistake and excusable neglect necessarily implies the existence of cases where an act or omission might be treated as a mistake of law but also could be treated as excusable neglect. In the federal courts, for example, a default judgment has been set aside where a defendant failed to answer upon the erroneous assumption...