Ade v. Batten
| Decision Date | 08 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 20609,No. 1,1,20609 |
| Citation | 878 P.2d 813,126 Idaho 114 |
| Parties | Gary W. ADE and Lucinda B. Ade, husband and wife, Andrew B. Broaddus and Stephanie J. Broaddus, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Raymond M. BATTEN, Jr., and his heirs, successors or assigns claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in or to the real property described as: A portion of Rutter's Tract "E" situated in the Southeast 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 6, Township 48 North, Range 3 East, B.M., Shoshone County, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows: Beginning at cornerof said Rutter's Tract "E"; thence South 52 Degrees 30.5' West, 107.49 feet to a point; thence North 57 degrees 28.5' West, 112.73 feet to a point, said point being the real point of beginning; thence North 57 degrees 28.5' West, 105 feet; thence North 44 degrees 47' East, 52.49 feet; thence South 57 degrees 24.5' East, 94 feet more or less to a point that bears North 32 degrees 31.5' East of the point of beginning; thence South 32 degrees 31.5' West, 51 feet more or less to the point of beginning, Defendant-Appellant. and Gordon C. Batelaan and Sue E. Batelaan, husband and wife, Carol P. Batten, husband and wife, Rose B. Rogers, a single woman, and their heirs, successors, or assigns, and any and all persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest in or to the real property described as: (See title above for description), Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Edward J. Anson, argued.
This appeal is taken from the district court's denial of relief on two post-judgment motions filed by Raymond Batten, Jr. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
On December 17, 1992, the district court heard a motion for summary judgment filed by Gary and Lucinda Ade in their quiet title action against Batten. Although he had been notified of the hearing pursuant to his pro se appearance, Batten was not present. On January 26, 1993, the district court issued its Batten filed a "motion for new trial" on February 12, 1993, requesting that the district court set aside the order granting summary judgment. Batten asserted in his accompanying affidavit that through mistake, he had appeared for the summary judgment hearing at the wrong courthouse in Coeur d'Alene. He advised that he had contacted the clerk's office by phone to advise the court that he would be late, but that the hearing had already taken place when he arrived. Reminding the district court that he was appearing pro se, Batten also claimed mistake in failing to timely serve his affidavits opposing summary judgment, which were filed with the district court on the date of the hearing. Following the district court's order and supplemental judgment dated February 22, 1993, Batten also filed a motion to disallow costs awarded to the Ades. The district court then conducted a hearing on Batten's "motion for new trial" and the motion to disallow costs. The district court denied the post-judgment motions, and Batten appeals.
[126 Idaho 116] memorandum opinion granting summary judgment to the Ades and entered judgment, quieting title in them. The district court also awarded costs and fees to the Ades.
We initially note that Batten did not timely appeal from the judgment in favor of the Ades. Batten's "motion for new trial," which was inaccurately named because no trial had taken place, nevertheless sought to amend the judgment and alleged grounds similar to those spelled out in I.R.C.P. 59. However, a motion under Rule 59 is required to be served not later than fourteen days after the entry of the judgment. Batten's motion, which was filed seventeen days post-judgment, was not timely.
Although the motion could also be construed as a request for reconsideration, which is governed by I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), such a motion must likewise be made not later than fourteen days after the entry of the final judgment. Therefore, the motion was not timely filed as a motion for reconsideration.
A Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment or a Rule 11(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration, if timely made, would toll the time to file a notice of appeal. Under the circumstances, however, the filing of Batten's motion did not enlarge the period of time for the direct appeal from the order on summary judgment. I.A.R. 14(a).
The district court has considerable discretion whether to reconsider its order under the grounds specified in Rule 60(b). Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 650, 827 P.2d 656, 663 (1992), citing Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 599 P.2d 985 (1979). Accordingly, the district court held that Batten's motion was timely under I.R.C.P. 60(b) and treated the motion as one for relief from a final judgment or order. 1 It is the denial of this motion from which Batten appeals, although he asserts therein that the summary judgment was improperly decided because he was denied the opportunity to present argument or submit his opposing affidavits for consideration.
It has been held that a Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for a timely appeal. Dustin v. Beckstrand, 103 Idaho 780, 654 P.2d 368 (1982); In re Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct.App.1990). Addressing the scope of review on appeal from the denial of a motion filed pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b), the court in Kagan v. Caterpillar As the court explained in Pryor v. United States Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.1985):
[126 Idaho 117] Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601 (7th Cir.1986) stated:
The dismissal itself is not here appealed, however, as we have indicated. Rather, this appeal is taken from the district court's denial of relief under the 'motion to reinstate,' which we here treat as if it had been a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal. 'However persuasive the plaintiffs' assertions of legal error might have been on a direct appeal, timely taken, our review of the plaintiffs' appeal in its present procedural posture is strictly limited to determining whether the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion constituted an abuse of discretion.' Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir.1983) (citations omitted).
Similarly, this court has stated with respect to our review of a district court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion, "we can only consider whether the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion; we cannot reach the merits of the underlying judgment." Marane, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 755 F.2d 106, 112 (7th Cir.1985). Thus, "our review of denial of Rule 60(b) relief [is] meaningfully narrower than would [be] our review on direct appeal of the underlying order from which relief was sought by the Rule 60(b) motion." Pryor, 769 F.2d at 286.
Kagan at 607. See also Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1960); Del Carmen v. Emerson Electric Co., 908 F.2d 158 (7th Cir.1990); Tunca v. Lutheran General Hospital, 844 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1988); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.1971), cert. denied sub nom. Herriman v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 405 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 957, 30 L.Ed.2d 792 (1972). Because Idaho's Rule 60(b) is essentially the same as Federal Rule 60(b), we find it appropriate to apply the reasoning from the federal cases in this instance. Therefore, we conclude that any issues arising out of the district court's order granting summary judgment are beyond the scope of our review in this appeal.
A Rule 60(b) motion permits a district court to grant relief from a judgment based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, or void or satisfied judgments if filed within six months. First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Parker Bros., Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 32, 730 P.2d 950, 952 (1986). The decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion is within the discretion of the trial court. Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 36, 592 P.2d 849, 851 (1979), citing 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 60.19. See also Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 P.2d 66 (1979) (). An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's discretionary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Northwest Roofers & Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. Bullis, 114 Idaho 56, 753 P.2d 267 (Ct.App.1988). If the trial court makes findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, applies the proper criteria under Rule 60(b) to those facts, and reaches a decision that follows logically from application of such criteria to the facts found, then the trial court will be deemed to have acted within its sound discretion. Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 754, 747 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct.App.1987), citing Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 658 P.2d 992 (Ct.App.1983) ().
The party moving to set aside a default judgment must not only meet the requirements of Rule 60(b), but must also plead facts which, if established, would constitute a defense to the action. Hearst Corp., supra; Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38, 720 P.2d 217, 221 (Ct.App.1986). See also Schraufnagel, supra, (motion to set aside order on summary judgment required a sufficient showing of grounds under Rule 60(b) and a showing of a meritorious defense). Upon the failure in the first instance to satisfy Rule 60(b)(1), we do not reach the further question
[126 Idaho 118] of whether a defense was adequately pled. See Avondale on Hayden, Inc., supra, 104 Idaho at 325, n. 4, 658 P.2d at 996, n. 4.
Batten's motion was couched in the language of Rule 60(b)(1). His only...
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