Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 61697,61697
• Citation: 432 So.2d 567
• Parties: James L. SCHREINER, Petitioner, v. McKENZIE TANK LINES, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 567

432 So.2d 567

James L. SCHREINER, Petitioner, v. McKENZIE TANK LINES, INC., et al., Respondents.

No. 61697.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 31, 1983.

Rehearing Denied June 29, 1983.

Robert A. Emmanuel and William D. Marsh of Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola, for petitioner.

W. Guy McKenzie, Jr. of McKenzie & Panebianco, Tallahassee, for McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc.; and L. Kathleen Horton of Clark, Partington, Hart, Hart & Johnson, Pensacola, for Risk Management Services, Inc., respondents.

Parker D. Thomson, Sanford L. Bohrer and Richard J. Ovelmen of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for The Governor's Commission on Advocacy For Persons With Developmental Disabilities, amicus curiae.

Dana Baird, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for Florida Commission on Human Relations, amicus curiae.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported as Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 408 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). This case requires a construction of the basic rights provision, article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution. The critical issue is whether the deprivation clause portion of article I, section 2, applies only to protect individuals from government action, or whether the deprivation clause was also intended to protect against private party conduct where no government action is involved. The district court held that article I, section 2, should not apply to private action and should receive no broader construction than that given the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court then certified the following question to be one of great public importance:

Is there a requirement of state action, similar to that of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that must be found to exist prior to invoking one's right to seek relief under the Florida Constitution of 1968, article I, section 2?

408 So.2d at 721. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In summary, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court. We agree that state action must be present for relief to be granted under article I, section 2, because we find that the framers of this constitutional provision did not intend that article I, section 2, have a broader application than the related provision of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

The uncontroverted facts reflect the following. Petitioner, James Schreiner, was employed as a repairman by the respondent McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc. During the course of his employment, Schreiner operated motor vehicles on the highway. While working, Schreiner suffered epileptic seizures on three different occasions. After the first seizure, his driver's license was revoked by the State of Florida. Following the second seizure, Schreiner's doctor told him that he would have to limit his work to activities which did not require him to be off the surface of the ground. Then, when Schreiner suffered a third seizure while working, his employment was terminated. He initiated this action, which was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the only issue considered by the district court was whether Schreiner was unconstitutionally deprived of his employment due to a physical handicap in violation of article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution, which reads as follows:

Basic rights.--All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap.

In its thorough opinion, the district court addressed three issues. First, the district court considered whether the deprivation clause portion of article I, section 2, is self-executing and found that it is. Second, the district court considered whether this provision of the Florida Constitution, like the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, requires state action and found that it does. Third, the district court, based on its finding that state action is required, considered whether state action was present in this case and found it was not. We agree with the district court's answers as set out in its opinion and find that it is only necessary for us to discuss the state action requirement of article I, section 2.

At the outset, two points must be noted. First, the United States Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protects against discrimination by "states," and "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (footnote omitted). "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 3 S.Ct. 18, 21, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). The critical question is whether article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution was drafted and adopted with the intent to broaden the application of the deprivation clause to protect against the "individual invasion of individual rights" as well as to protect against state action.

Second, following the termination of Schreiner's employment by respondent, the legislature enacted section 23.161-167, Florida Statutes (1977). These provisions make it unlawful for private persons employing fifteen or more employees to discharge an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.

The basic rights provision of article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution, has three parts. The first is the equal protection clause, which provides that, "[a]ll natural persons are equal before the law ...." Petitioner concedes that the Florida equal protection clause protects only against improper state action, and does not apply to purely private action. The second part identifies the inalienable rights of Florida's citizens, "which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property ...." This inalienable rights clause does contain the exception "that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law." The third part of article I, section 2, is the deprivation clause, which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of any...