Schrempf v. State

• Decision Date: 29 January 1985
• Citation: 486 N.Y.S.2d 1010,107 A.D.2d 1042
• Parties: Flora A. SCHREMPF, as Executrix under the Last Will and Testament of Albert R. Schrempf, Deceased, Respondent, v. The STATE of New York, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 1010

486 N.Y.S.2d 1010

107 A.D.2d 1042

Flora A. SCHREMPF, as Executrix under the Last Will and Testament of Albert R. Schrempf, Deceased, Respondent, v. The STATE of New York, Appellant.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

January 29, 1985

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. by Vernon Stuart, Albany, for appellant. Hoffmann, Hubert & Hoffmann by Wilfred Hoffmann, Syracuse, for respondent.

Judgment affirmed with costs. All concur, except BOOMER, J., who dissents and votes to reverse, in the following Memorandum:

Joseph Evans, an outpatient at Hutchings Psychiatric Center, a State institution, fatally stabbed Albert R. Schrempf and Schrempf's executor brought this wrongful death claim against the State. After a trial, the court found that the State was negligent in the care and treatment of Evans and that the State's negligence was the proximate cause of Schrempf's death. Evans had a long history of mental illness and violent behavior, which was detailed in his medical records at Hutchings Psychiatric Center. Shortly before the fatal stabbing, Evans was seen by a State psychiatrist, who became aware that Evans was not taking his medication. The court found that, in view of Evans' propensity for violence, the psychiatrist was negligent in failing to take some action to guard against the risk presented, such as administering a drug that would have long-term effects, encouraging Evans to voluntarily admit himself as an inpatient, or taking steps to have him involuntarily committed. I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the judgment in favor of claimant because I fail to see, in this case, any duty owing by the State to Schrempf. A person has a duty to act to protect another from the acts of a third person when he has either a special relationship to the other person or such a relationship to the third person (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 315). The State had no special relationship to Schrempf and although it had a relationship to Evans, it did not have a relationship sufficient to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect others. The liability of a mental institution for the actions of its inmates is predicated upon the control it possesses over them. Thus, a mental institution may be liable to persons harmed by inmates committed to its care because of its negligence in discharging the inmates (see Homere v. State of New York, 79 Misc.2d 972, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820, affd. 48 A.D.2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246) or in failing to guard against their escape (see Excelsior Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. State of New York, 296 N.Y. 40, 69 N.E.2d 553). It has no continuing duty to exercise a parental role over discharged inmates (see Cameron v. State of New York, 37 A.D.2d 46, 51, 322 N.Y.S.2d 562, affd 30 N.Y.2d 596, 331 N.Y.S.2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 118). An outpatient mental clinic, on the other hand, does not have any more control over its patients than a private...